Economic Restructuring and Emerging Patterns of Industrial Relations by Sleigh, Stephen R.
Upjohn Press Upjohn Research home page 
1-1-1993 
Economic Restructuring and Emerging Patterns of Industrial 
Relations 
Stephen R. Sleigh 
City University of New York 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Labor Economics Commons, and the Labor 
Relations Commons 
Citation 
Sleigh, Stephen R., ed. 1993. Economic Restructuring and Emerging Patterns of Industrial Relations. 
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/
9780880995566 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License. 














Stephen R. Sleigh 
Editor
1993
W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE for Employment Research 
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Economic restructuring and emerging patterns of industrial relations / 
Stephen R. Sleigh, editor, 
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references. 
ISBN 0-88099-131-3 (pbk.) — ISBN 0-88099-132-1 (cloth) 
1. Industrial relations—United States—Case studies. 




Copyright © 1993 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue 
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007
THE INSTITUTE, a nonprofit research organization, was established on July 1, 1945. 
It is an activity of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was 
formed in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn for the pur 
pose of carrying on "research into the causes and effects of unemployment and mea 
sures for the alleviation of unemployment."
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are the 
sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of the 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by J.R. Underbill. 
Index prepared by Shirley Kessel. 
Printed in the United States of America.
PREFACE
The Center for Labor-Management Policy Studies at the City Uni 
versity of New York hosted a year-long series of seminars during the 
academic year 1989-90 that brought together academics, union leaders, 
government officials, business executives, and graduate fellows at the 
Center to discuss and analyze the relationship between economic 
restructuring and industrial relations. In the fall of 1990 the Center 
hosted a conference at Princeton University, which included all of the 
seminar participants and an array of scholars and practitioners who 
have worked on understanding and shaping the highly competitive 
economic environment in which most organizations find themselves. 
Complete lists of seminar presenters and conference participants are 
included in Appendix I and Appendix II, respectively. This volume 
grew out of the seminars and conference sponsored by the Center.
Bruce Herman and I, both graduate fellows at the Center during this 
period, organized the seminar series and conference under the guid 
ance of Professor Seamus O'Cleireacain, then Assistant Director of the 
Center now at the Ford Foundation. We received financial, intellectual, 
and editing assistance from Susan Houseman, Allan Hunt, and Judy 
Gentry of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. We 
were also supported in our efforts by the Centers director, Victor Got- 
baum, and deputy director, Richard Styskal. Richard died tragically in 
the summer of 1990. All of us at the Center miss Richard's guidance 
and good humor.
In early 1991 Bruce Herman became President of the Garment 
Industry Development Corporation (GIDC) of New York, where he has 
put into practice many of the ideas that he writes about in the chapter 
on the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy. I assumed Richard Styskal's 
position as deputy director of the Center.
In any edited collection of works there inevitably are differences in 
writing styles and practice. To the greatest extent possible, we have 
sought to smooth them out so that the reader can extract the greatest 
amount of information from each of the cases. In the introduction I 
have briefly summarized the case studies and analyses, and have pro 
vided an executive summary of the key conclusions that follow from 
the papers. A bibliography is provided for readers interested in follow 
ing up on the many subjects that are raised in this collection.
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Stephen R. Sleigh 
City University of New York
Over the last 20 years, global competition, product obsolescence, 
and excess capacity in traditional industries have brought about pro 
nounced changes in the structure of the world economy. In response to 
these changes, unions, corporations, and governments have struggled 
to develop economic policies that will ensure adequate returns on 
investment, create or save jobs, and anchor industries within national 
borders. The purpose of this book is to review innovative responses to 
economic restructuring that have involved the joint efforts of unions, 
corporations, and government.
The record of these initiatives forms a mosaic of varied responses 
and results. Through a year-long series of seminars conducted by the 
Center for Labor Management Policy Studies of the City University of 
New York, culminating in a conference in the fall of 1990, analyses of 
efforts were presented where workers and their unions, businesses and 
government at the local, regional, or state level, have worked together 
to develop economic restructuring processes. These efforts include 
case studies from Western Europe, as well as detailed examination of 
U.S. examples, particularly state-level efforts from Michigan, Massa 
chusetts, and Pennsylvania. The analyses emphasize the role of indus 
trial relations in these processes. Detailing the seminars and the 
conference, this book serves as a resource for unions, businesses, and 
government on current economic restructuring activities and as a sur 
vey of current thinking about the process of economic restructuring, 
particularly the often neglected role workers and their unions play in 
this process. 1
The wide-ranging economic shocks of technological change and 
global competition have produced fundamental changes in the past two 
decades. In the steel industry alone, 460,000 American jobs were lost 
during the 1980s, cutting the membership of the United Steel workers
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of America in half. In the automobile industry, General Motors, Ford, 
and Chrysler all experienced reductions in the workforce and market 
share throughout the 1980s, and judging by recent announcements by 
GM that another 74,000 jobs will be cut over the next three years, the 
trend will continue. These changes have altered the respective roles of 
workers and their unions, management, and government in economic 
development. As the response time to these continuing changes short 
ens, considerable experimentation is underway in Western Europe and 
the United States to find the proper mix of employee involvement in 
managerial decisionmaking and government support for restructuring 
efforts. No clear paradigm has yet emerged that would replace the tra 
ditional adversarial relationships between labor, management, and 
government which in many respects have been institutionalized.2
In the United States, the importance of developing a coherent 
national economic restructuring strategy is becoming increasingly 
clear. President Bush's trip to Japan in January 1992 with a cadre of 
influential American CEOs highlighted the lack of a national strategy 
beyond the need to open up Asian markets to American products. The 
cases in this book point to a general direction for plotting a policy that 
is responsive to the highly competitive global economy in which enter 
prises large and small now operate. 3
The 1989-90 seminar series brought together practitioners to report 
on and critically assess the reciprocal relationships among technologi 
cal change, economic restructuring, and industrial relations. During the 
course of the project, three main issues were examined: the extent to 
which work organization and market share or competitive position are 
influenced by technical innovation; how these changes are conditioned 
by government policies; and the role collective bargaining relation 
ships between unions and companies play in the economic restructur 
ing process. The answers provided in these case studies are essentially 
qualitative judgments for which the analysis of cross-national experi 
ences is of considerable value. The comparative perspective allows one 
to identify those patterns that are specific to particular conditions 
within and between nations and regions, and those that form a more 
universal set of relationships. The case studies from Western Europe 
and the United States provide a context for two "thought" pieces, one 
by Wolfgang Streeck and one by Charles Sabel, on the implications 
these efforts have for industrial relations.
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While the exact mix of the respective roles of labor, management, 
and government varied in the cases examined, the project concentrated 
on efforts in which these three sectors are working cooperatively to 
address economic restructuring. More specifically, the project focused 
on collaborative efforts to expand and deepen market share through 
more diversified, higher value-added and customized products, and the 
reorganization strategies initiated to achieve these goals. The seminars 
primarily, though not exclusively, dealt with unionized workforces in 
manufacturing industries.
In both pieces by Charles Sabel and by Wolfgang Streeck the 
emphasis is on the importance of taking into account an institutional 
perspective of the labor market. The social dimension of economic 
restructuring is in part based upon the collection of institutional com 
petencies that make, in specific conditions, positive contributions to 
competitive market performance. The case studies, which are briefly 
described below, sought to identify what specific conditions and insti 
tutional mechanisms facilitated successful economic restructuring.
Case Studies of Economic 
Restructuring—European Experience
The first three case studies are from Western Europe. They were 
selected for their diversity of experience and for their emphasis on dif 
ferent aspects of the economic restructuring process. The three cases, 
from the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy, from Andalusia, Spain, and 
of the Auroux laws in France, are similar to the United States in that in 
each case unions at the national level are relatively weak.
Making transnational comparisons is always a difficult task, but we 
believe that the cases selected have important lessons for American 
policymakers because the problems faced in each case were roughly 
comparable. During the course of the seminar series we also hosted 
sessions on German codetermination and Swedish social democracy. 
We elected to include the less well-known examples from Italy, Spain, 
and France even though many people, particularly those in the labor 
movement, aspire to the high level of coordination that has prevailed 
between business, labor, and government in Germany and Sweden. It
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bears noting, however, that the paper by Wolfgang Streeck on training 
as a strategic variable in economic restructuring borrows heavily from 
his experience and understanding of the German system.
The first case study, by Bruce Herman, analyzes the successful eco 
nomic development of Emilia-Romagna, Italy. As explained by Her 
man, Emilia-Romagna has undergone a dramatic transformation in the 
past 50 years, moving from fascist domination and civil war to a situa 
tion of broad economic well-being and 40 years of government by the 
Italian left in the region.
In the 1950s, the Emilian economy was based primarily on agricul 
tural production. What manufacturing did exist was concentrated in a 
small number of very large, vertically integrated firms. As manufactur 
ing grew, there was a decline in large firms and a proliferation of small 
firms. Initially, the small firms of Emilia-Romagna served large enter 
prises as dependent subcontractors. To overcome the negative conse 
quences of this situation, small shops learned to diversify their client 
base through horizontal linkages to other firms. Stronger commercial 
linkages reinforced the tendency of industry sectors to cluster, further 
stimulating the consolidation of industrial districts comprised of firms 
involved in different stages of production.
Supporting industrial restructuring in Emilia-Romagna is a system 
of business services rooted in public/private cooperation. At first, 
industry experts were provided by trade associations to take advantage 
of appropriate economies of scale and cut overhead costs for member 
firms. Following the lead of the trade associations, regional and local 
governments became actively involved in economic restructuring, as 
has the trade union movement in Emilia-Romagna.
Local unions, particularly the FIOM (the metalworkers union), have 
concentrated on using the collective bargaining process to broaden par 
ticipation and gain more autonomy within the process of production. 
Beginning in 1987 the FIOM began to sign a series of agreements 
aimed at establishing more participatory cooperation through group- 
oriented work organization. Still in its initial stages, the FIOM is mak 
ing sure that the shop floor is not overlooked. The Emilian case shows 
the importance of strategic alliances between firms and the role that 
government and organized labor can play in fostering these connec 
tions.
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The second European case, by Michael Barzelay, is from Andalusia, 
Spain. The focus of this paper is entirely different from any of the oth 
ers in this collection in that the role workers or their unions play is tan 
gential to the economic restructuring process. What Barzelay does 
develop is a detailed rendering of the difficulties one public sector 
manager encounters as he tries to bring about a shift in the organization 
of an entire industry in his region. The role of a dedicated public 
administrator is clearly critical to success in this case, and a component 
that is often overlooked when policymakers think up economic devel 
opment strategy.
The case of Andalusia's attempts to revitalize the declining marble 
industry in this poor southeastern state in Spain starts with the end of 
the Franco era in the mid-1970s and the dawning of democracy in 
Spain. As a result of the reconfiguration of political boundaries after 
Franco, a series of autonomous states was created. Without a history of 
local self-government, the patterns of government assistance and regu 
lation remained to be defined in Andalusia. The principal activities 
Barzelay recorded from 1983 to 1988 were those of the director of the 
Institute of Industrial Promotion of Andalusia (IPIA), which was 
charged with instigating planning efforts, identifying the activities and 
tasks that must be carried out for planning to be productive, inducing 
participants to understand the competitive environment, insisting that 
joint actions which create common competitive advantages be con 
ceived and undertaken, and mobilizing resources for these individual 
and joint actions that fit the mutually agreed upon plan. The industry 
most in need of IPIA's assistance was the centuries old marble quarry 
ing in Andalusia.
In 1983 nearly 70 percent of the marble extracted from the indus 
try's quarries was sold in unfinished or semifinished form to manufac 
turers in other regions. The marble industry was characterized at that 
time by small, family-owned quarries that typically employed only a 
handful of workers, and those often only on a seasonal basis. Lacking 
modern technology and equipment, miners relied on the same tech 
niques of extraction that had been used for generations, and local fabri 
cators produced only artisanal goods.
The marble industry of the communities of Macael County, which 
employed 7,000, was in need of strategic realignment: jobs were being 
lost to more sophisticated operations; existing jobs were unsteady and,
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for the most part, poorly paid After initiating an action plan in 1985 
with the support of the mine owners and workers, the industry began to 
turn around. By 1987, only 30 percent of the marble extracted was sold 
in unfinished form, while the remainder was processed locally into 
higher value-added finished products.
Barzelay's case shows how social change and strategic planning, 
instigated and coordinated by a regional governmental institution, can 
dramatically improve the performance and competitive capacities of a 
traditional industry, even in one of Europe's most underdeveloped 
regions. While the case does not focus on industrial relations as such, it 
does offer a richly detailed analysis of the kinds of problems that a 
public administrator can expect to face when taking on the process of 
economic restructuring.
The third European case is also distinctive. In this piece Bernard 
Brown looks at the Auroux laws in France. Working from a new-found 
position of strength after the election of Mitterrand, the French labor 
movement worked closely with Socialist Minister of Labor, Jean Aur 
oux, to develop "new rights for workers." These efforts culminated in a 
series of four laws enacted in 1982 that were intended to give workers 
a direct say in the decisionmaking process of all enterprises employing 
more than 200 people. The intentions of the Socialist government and 
French labor movement, to create a new form of labor-management 
relations system through public action, were not realized, according to 
Brown. The most fundamental change seems to have occurred within 
management, described by Brown as a "cultural revolution that has 
taken place within the enterprise" in support of participatory programs.
Brown's brief analysis of the Auroux laws points to an ongoing 
debate among scholars of industrial relations in the United States as to 
the benefit of employee participation schemes. As one part of competi 
tiveness strategy, employee participation in decisionmaking has gained 
widespread support in both unionized and nonunion organizations in 
the United States. In 1978, the United States went so far as to adopt the 
Labor-Management Cooperation Act, whose main goal is "to improve 
communication between representatives of labor and management." 
Other steps along the same lines have included the creation of the 
Bureau of Labor Management Relations and Cooperative Programs 
within the Department of Labor and various efforts at improving qual 
ity service through cooperation in federal programs such as at the Fed-
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eral Aviation Administration. Brown's analysis of the French 
experience casts doubt on the way in which the participatory process 
was conceived and operationalized in France, a country with a rela 
tively weak labor movement. The implications for unions in the United 
States are sobering and are reflected in the lack of a participation pol 
icy at the AFL-CIO.
Case Studies of Economic 
Restructuring—U.S. Experience
The first case study from the United States, by Peter Lazes, 
describes the collaborative efforts of New York State and Cornell Uni 
versity's Program for Employment and Workplace Systems (PEWS) to 
keep a Buffalo windshield wiper blade company operating. Lazes 
worked closely with the company, Trico Products, and the union, 
United Automobile Workers, from 1985 to 1987 in trying to find inno 
vative solutions to the competitive challenge posed by the option to 
produce Trico's main product in Mexico at a fraction of the labor cost 
in the Buffalo plant.
The odds were long that the difference between costs in the Mexican 
plant—a "maquiladora," or assembly plant, on the U.S.-Mexico border 
and the Buffalo plant could be significantly reduced: the prevailing 
wage in Mexico was $1.20 an hour versus $12.50 in Trico's Buffalo 
plant An independent analysis by a well-known management consult 
ing firm showed that labor costs in Buffalo would have to be cut 30 
percent in order to remain competitive with the cost of producing in 
Mexico. In early 1985 the state's Urban Development Corporation 
agreed with Trico's management that the advantages of producing in 
Mexico were too great to overcome. But Lazes and the UAW regional 
director persuaded the skeptics to give PEWS and the workers in the 
plant some time to do their own analysis of possible cost savings from 
restructuring the work process.
Working together with Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and PEWS, 
union members and production management came up with a plan that 
exceeded the cost savings projected for the Mexican plant. The in-plant 
cost study teams, according to Lazes, created a new sense of together-
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ness among workers and between labor and management. While Tri- 
co's original projections were to close the Buffalo production 
facility—and in the process eliminate between 1,400 and 2,000 well- 
paid union jobs—the in-plant teams projected that half of the work 
force could be saved. In what Lazes described as a bittersweet out 
come, despite the concerted efforts to keep all production based in 
Buffalo, Trico's management still moved some production to Mexico. 
The Trico case presented by Lazes shows both what is possible through 
joint labor, business, and state efforts, and the limitations of these 
efforts. The inability of the state or the union to persuade Trico to 
approve their proposed improvements was an agonizing difficulty that 
could not be overcome.
Robert Coy, director of the Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation 
for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, along with Saul Rubenstein 
and Mike Shay, present the second U.S. case study by describing the 
state's Manufacturing Innovation Network Initiatives (MAIN) projects 
in the Lehigh Valley. At present the MAIN projects involve four differ 
ent industries: the plastics industry in northwestern Pennsylvania; the 
metalworking and machine tool industries in the southwestern part of 
the state; and the apparel industry in the Lehigh Valley. The basic 
approach of the MAIN projects is to work with clusters or groups of 
firms rather than trying to provide assistance in a piecemeal one-on- 
one fashion.
In order to develop the appropriate response, all MAIN projects 
begin with a strategic audit of the industry, which is used to gather 
information and to begin to define a constituency of firms. In turn, 
steering committees are established to organize the projects, while the 
specific industry needs identified are used to form working groups 
charged with coordinating and developing programs to address restruc 
turing problems. Within the Lehigh Valley there are over 200 apparel 
firms with over 15,000 employees. Pursuing a participatory restructur 
ing approach, which included representatives from business, labor, and 
government, the Lehigh Valley Project Steering Committee identified 
issues ranging from labor force problems, training, management sys 
tems and technology, industrial structure and linkages, and marketing 
and sourcing concerns. While these initiatives have not reached the 
implementation stage, this case stresses that the MAIN projects bode 
well for continued cooperative efforts.
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In the third case study from the United States, Mike Schippani gives 
an inside account of the Michigan Modernization Project, which was 
created by Governor Blanchard in 1984 to bring together labor, busi 
ness, and the state in reversing the declining competitiveness of Michi 
gan's industrial base. The state's plan, writes Schippani, was threefold.
The first part of Michigan's modernization strategy was a vision of 
Michigan as an international center for the development of manufac 
turing technology. The goal was to build institutions that would be in 
the business of developing and applying technology to the manufactur 
ing base of Michigan. Two institutions were created to achieve this 
goal: the Industrial Technology Institute and the Michigan Moderniza 
tion Service—a sort of industrial extension program.
The second part of the strategy was the creation of innovation capi 
tal to fill the gaps in financing available to newer firms or nontradi- 
tional projects. To accomplish this goal the state created the Michigan 
Strategic Fund.
The third part of the strategy centered around workforce learning 
and workplace relations. The keys to this aspect of the strategy, Schip 
pani argues, were the education and training of the workforce and 
innovations in labor-management relations. Bringing together 
resources from the state's Department of Education and Department of 
Labor, the Michigan Modernization Plan was able to provide technical 
services to hundreds of firms.
While evidence on the program's effectiveness is still under evalua 
tion, Schippani notes the importance of involving business, organized 
labor, and the government in joint collaborative efforts. As the three- 
part Michigan strategy grew and matured, it became clearer that early, 
proactive union involvement was critical to the success of maintaining 
industrial competitiveness. The elections in the fall of 1990, which dis 
placed Governor Blanchard, occasioned a fundamental shift in direc 
tion in economic development strategy in Michigan described by 
Schippani.
The final case study from the United States, presented by Frank 
Emspak, then director of the Massachusetts Center for Applied Tech 
nology, further emphasizes the need for inclusive, participatory 
restructuring. Emspak writes that the Center for Applied Technology 
concentrates on skills-based automation (user-driven design) as a key 
component of shop-floor reorganization. Utilizing the skills-based
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approach, the Center for Applied Technology has sought to involve 
blue-collar workers in technology development and deployment strate 
gies. To date the Center's efforts have been modest, impacting only a 
handful of firms. Nonetheless, Emspak stresses that worker-inclusive 
needs assessment creates a situation whereby the analysis of the prob 
lem helps build consensus for possible solutions. As in Michigan, the 
defeat of a liberal Democratic governor in the 1990 elections brought 
about significant changes in policy direction away from collaborative 
efforts involving business, unions, and government as equal partners to 
the traditional model of direct aid on an ad hoc basis from government 
to industry.
Economic Restructuring 
and Industrial Relations: Two Views
The two papers that conclude the volume provide provocative anal 
yses of economic restructuring and the emerging patterns of industrial 
relations. The two authors have written extensively on these and 
related topics during the 1980s and open up the debate on future eco 
nomic restructuring policy.
Charles Sabel writes of the relationship between international com 
petition, the organization of production, and labor-management rela 
tions. Pointing out that changing interfirm relationships are driving an 
ongoing industrial restructuring, Sabel examines how the reorganiza 
tion of production challenges the labor movement by creating new 
demands on behalf of both management and the rank-and-file.
Sabel links the development of unstable market conditions, and the 
subsequent need to respond through more flexible production, with the 
difficulties national unions are having in maintaining cohesion and 
membership. He argues that economic restructuring is creating a new 
set of production relations as the demise of stable mass markets under 
mines industrial organization based on the mass production of stan 
dardized commodities. The mass production regime, predicated on 
mass consumer markets, dedicated machinery, and semiskilled work 
ers and dependent on captive subsuppliers, is being superseded by a
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more fluid, increasingly differentiated, system of production, accord 
ing to Sabel.
In this economic environment, firms are forced to establish more 
interdependent relationships with subsuppliers and seek cooperative 
joint ventures with other firms to keep pace with changes in key tech 
nologies. This type of industrial configuration requires considerable 
workforce reskilling as rigid, long-run, standard product technologies 
are replaced by more flexible, short-run, computer-enhanced equip 
ment. Also present is the potential for a more decentralized system of 
control, within the chain of production, between the various units con 
tributing to the final product, and in labor-management relations.
In terms of labor-management relations, the demands for increased 
flexibility have led to a situation where local agreements are circum 
venting national contracts. Across Europe and the United States Sabel 
notes the emergence of local-level agreements, which he characterizes 
as the establishment of "jointness" rather than cooperation. That is, the 
responsibilities of labor and management became more intertwined, 
blurring the distinction between roles that requires joint action. More 
over, there is evidence of a shift toward decentralized bargaining, even 
where it is not officially sanctioned by national unions. As the cases 
show, these developments are rooted in the changing system of produc 
tion.
Wolfgang Streeck's paper concludes the book by specifying an insti 
tutional mechanism of the sort that Sabel is describing in a more gen 
eral fashion. Streeck focuses primarily on the value of union 
involvement in vocational training. In his view, skill formation is the 
key to enhancing productivity, and unions are well positioned to pro 
vide common linkage across firms to promote high standards of train 
ing. Streeck is clearly influenced by the successful German model of 
apprenticeship training, but he makes the case that the same logic that 
has brought business, labor, and government together in Germany may 
apply to other industrial countries as well. Supported by public policies 
that help reduce the incentive for employers to look for a free ride from 
someone else's training, unions may develop an active commitment to 
enforce high standards of training stringently, in the interest of high 
wages, secure employment, and a non-Taylorist organization of work.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
"If we don't develop a national program in the next five years, it's 
going to be impossible for us to be serious industrial contenders by the 
year 2000. I'm advocating for us collectively—government and indus 
try—to accept that there is a problem and that we have to come up with 
responsible solutions." So said Andrew Grove, president and chief 
executive officer of silicone chip manufacturer Intel Corporation in 
1990.4 We concur with this sentiment The cases presented show, in 
varied ways, how the third social partner—workers and their unions— 
can contribute to the economic restructuring process.
In the absence of a national industrial policy in the United States, 
state governments have taken the initiative by setting the agenda, pro 
viding funding, and establishing technical support programs for coop 
erative restructuring efforts. Throughout the 1980s, individual states 
started a wide variety of programs that responded to declining eco 
nomic competitiveness—particularly in the industrialized states of the 
Northeast and Midwest. These efforts were not strictly partisan, as evi 
denced by the innovative programs developed by Republican Gover 
nors Thornburgh of Pennsylvania, Kean of New Jersey, and Orr of 
Indiana. These Republican governors had no problem with seeking out 
governmental responses to declining competitiveness in the 1980s, 
often with the assistance of organized labor. The states examined in 
this book, along with the cases from Western Europe, point towards a 
common direction supporting an economic restructuring process that 
integrates social goal-setting while retaining the efficiency of market 
competition.
State efforts were developed out of pragmatic assessments of the 
need to remain competitive, not out of ideological commitment. What 
the cases show is that the ability of governments to positively influence 
economic development is limited when they go it alone. The question 
these states faced was not which industries are worth saving (the sun 
rise versus sunset debate that characterized the discussion of industrial 
policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s), but rather how can govern 
ment bring resources to promote joint efforts between businesses, 
workers, and unions who are trying to adapt to a profoundly changed 
operating environment.
Introduction 13
Still, the failure of "industrial policy" as a political idea in the 
United States, and the apparent success of various models of market 
economies the world over, would seem to indicate that rethinking the 
role of collaborative efforts between business, labor, and government 
is unnecessary. Transnational alliances, and direct foreign investment, 
blur the national identity of corporate identities, making life more diffi 
cult for interventionist policymakers not convinced of the benefits of 
trade liberalization. Policymakers long accustomed to a world in which 
they could identify and support "national champions," increasingly 
find that national champions have foreign alliances. The growth and 
diversity of these strategic alliances complicates the established rela 
tionships between policymakers and national champions. In some 
instances, the contributions of national champions to national employ 
ment, Gross National Product, and tax revenue may be little different 
from those of competitors who have opened production facilities in the 
national champion's home market.
Indeed, recent efforts emanating from Washington at coordinating 
business and governmental activities in economic development have 
been, by and large, spectacular flops. The much-publicized U.S. Mem 
ories project, a ground-breaking attempt by American computer com 
panies to cooperate in producing memory chips with federal 
government backing, was officially declared dead in early 1990. Simi 
larly, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's attempts to 
fund basic research and development of commercial technology for 
high-definition television, a project that enjoyed almost universal sup 
port on Capitol Hill in the spring of 1989, was effectively ended in the 
spring of 1990.
Given these failures, why is the idea of joint business, labor, and 
governmental coordination in economic restructuring being promoted 
in this book? The answer, as it emerges in the case studies in this vol 
ume, is that joint efforts work when the right conditions and well 
thought out policies prevail. This is not an ideological or moral argu 
ment—it is a pragmatic assessment that follows from and supports 
basic values of democratic participation. The lessons of how best to 
pursue economic restructuring are being learned piece by piece, and 
place by place. The importance of this volume is that it takes a step 
toward synthesizing these lessons into a coherent policy that is of use 
to workers and their unions, business, and government.
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A number of common themes which emerged from the case studies 
are useful for policymakers from business, labor, or government trying 
to fashion a coherent response to economic restructuring. We identified 
three.
1. Intrafirm organization, or workplace organization. As the 
case studies from Michigan, Massachusetts, and Italy clearly show, 
shop-floor organization and reorganization involve questions of 
employee participation in areas traditionally reserved for managerial 
decisionmaking and control over the decisionmaking process. Shorten 
ing product life cycles, doing away with rigid distinctions between 
jobs and departments in order to speed new product development, and 
just-in-time sourcing demand higher levels of coordination and coop 
eration within firms. Many of the firms discussed in the case studies 
have moved toward group, or team-based, work organization in an 
attempt to manage the growing complexity of production. The French 
example, however, serves as a cautionary note that the benefits of par 
ticipation may work against a weakened labor movement.
2. Interfirm linkages. The cases of Michigan, Pennsylvania, Italy, 
and Spain show that the improved competitive position of an individ 
ual firm, or semiautonomous unit of a larger corporation, is often the 
result of the quality of interfirm relations. The example of the increased 
interdependence of suppliers and original equipment manufacturers in 
the auto industry, whether in the United States, Germany, or Japan, is a 
case in point. The importance of interfirm relations is in turn com 
pounded by the need for access to technical specialization which is 
often prohibitively expensive to maintain, or by market uncertainty, 
both of which demand more flexible production. Increasingly, as these 
cases show, the competitive position of any individual firm is rooted in 
a web of forward and backward linkages with other suppliers and cli 
ent firms.
3. Industry policy. Distinct from the focus of debates about indus 
trial policy in the past, these cases suggest that when discussing the 
competitive situation of an industry sector, a subnational or regional 
focus tends to be the proper reference point. While the U.S. case stud 
ies showed that lack of a coherent federal policy was often the driving 
force behind the development of a state-level economic restructuring 
strategy, a more regional approach often made more sense for the states 
anyway. The competitive position of an industry sector, our cases indi-
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cated, is increasingly determined by the health of mutually reinforcing 
networks within regions.5
In conclusion, the essays in this book demonstrate the challenges 
and opportunities that exist for forging alliances between business, 
organized labor, and government that can create economic value. The 
diversity of cases also indicates that developing a coherent and effec 
tive federal-level industrial policy is problematic. Perhaps the best role 
the federal government can play in the United States is to help coordi 
nate and facilitate the activities undertaken at the local, regional, or 
state level. Providing a clearinghouse of information on such activities 
would perform a valuable service for local government officials, busi 
ness executives, and labor leaders. More comprehensive data on the 
effectiveness of differing approaches to economic restructuring would 
also assist researchers in assessing these new models.
Four observations follow from Sabel's essay and the case studies 
that involved the active participation of unions. Unions can influence 
restructuring, either positively through active participation in the pro 
cess or negatively by clinging to outdated work rules or practices, but 
union participation is neither necessary nor sufficient to insure a bene 
ficial outcome for labor. Weak unions in Japan, for example, seem 
quite compatible with international competitiveness, while strong 
unions and a management sheltered from market competition in the 
United States has in some instances led to mutual stagnation. Second, 
strong unions may well be undermined by successful corporate restruc 
turing. Skilled workers, for example, may lose their position as skills 
get transferred to automated processes or professional employees.
An additional point raised by Sabel, and evidenced in the case stud 
ies of Italy and Michigan, is that labor organizations need substantial 
internal reforms in order to face the challenges of economic restructur 
ing. Because of the rapid integration of firms with their suppliers, the 
unit of organization of the union can no longer be the firm or corpora 
tion, but must be regional or national. The whipsawing of plants 
against one another within General Motors, pitting UAW members in 
New York against UAW members in Michigan, is an example of this 
problem. Finally, the point was made that even in Europe, where 
unions are generally stronger and more politically influential than in 
the United States, workers and their unions often get hurt by restructur 
ing. While firms require more commitment from workers in high
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value-added operations, they often provide less job security. Moreover, 
the pressures for continuous learning in these firms has the effect of 
empowering workers but also of separating workers who have skills 
from those who do not. The subsequent stress and insecurity of work 
ers are areas that unions are only beginning to address.
Perhaps the most important lesson of all, however, is made clear in 
Wolfgang Streeck's concluding essay. Without an institutional base for 
supporting economic restructuring, the short-term pressures on politi 
cians will overwhelm the longer-term needs of economics. The cases 
of Michigan and Massachusetts provide ample testimony to this— 
without a strong institutional base, the changing of political parties 
governing the state led to significant retrenchment of economic 
restructuring programs. By institutionalizing the processes or policies 
described in the case studies, an economic restructuring process that 
pays attention to the emerging patterns of industrial relations can help 
address the difficulties of adapting to a highly competitive global mar 
ketplace. Putting the pieces together is a critical challenge for policy- 
makers in business, labor, and government throughout the industrial 
democracies in the 1990s.
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in a Small-Firm Economy
The Experience of Metalworkers 
in Emilia-Romagna, Italy
Bruce Herman 
Garment Industry Development Corporation
One example often referred to in discussions of successful eco 
nomic restructuring is the "Third Italy," particularly the Emilia- 
Romagna region of north-central Italy. And yet in the growing litera 
ture on Emilia-Romagna there is often little mention of the role of 
industrial relations in this predominantly small-firm economy. This 
chapter seeks to explain the history and results of a proactive collective 
bargaining strategy developed by the Federazione Impiegati Operai 
Metallurgici (FIOM), the metal-mechanical union affiliated with the 
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), in the context of 
the successful industrial restructuring of the Emilian economy.
The FIOM, with almost 70,000 members in the region (Catholic and 
Republican affiliates have 16,000 members), in an industry sector with 
a 55 percent unionization rate, has used its strength to pursue a proac 
tive collective bargaining strategy designed to increase worker partici 
pation and control. 1 Leveraging needed organizational change within 
the firm to gain greater autonomy and an expanded role in the restruc 
turing process, the FIOM is trying to "regain" control of work layout 
and job design. The goal of the FIOM approach is to establish an ongo 
ing, autonomous union role in what are often referred to as areas of 
management prerogative (such as work layout and staffing) inside indi 
vidual firms (intrafirm). Yet, given the complex web of relations 
between firms (interfirm) in Emilia-Romagna, the FIOM strategy is
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also clearly intended to promote an active union role in defining inter- 
firm relations as well.
The initial objective of the HOM strategy is to expand the scope of 
collective bargaining to establish interdisciplinary (cutting horizontally 
across existing vertical hierarchies), autonomous work groups, thereby 
bilaterally determining job design and layout Once established, these 
work groups will pursue productivity improvements and be rewarded 
based upon the results achieved. However, because of the autonomy of 
the work groups, management does not automatically gain access to 
the methods whereby the productivity improvements were achieved. 
Therefore, by attempting to establish ongoing autonomy and control 
over production decisions, the FIOM of Emilia-Romagna is redefining 
the boundaries of collective bargaining and industrial relations.
Background
Industrial relations have been in a state of flux for the past few 
decades, with the Italian situation exhibiting considerable volatility.2 
Twenty-five years ago the Italian labor movement found itself with for 
mal recognition guaranteed by the Italian constitution, but with very 
little real power and almost no presence inside the factory. 3 The union 
federations—Communist/Socialist (CGIL), Catholic (CISL), Republi 
can (UIL)—were numerically significant, yet they lacked effective 
power both on the shop floor and at the national policymaking level. 
This situation of formal recognition but de facto exclusion was swept 
away by the social unrest of the late 1960s and the "Italian Hot 
Autumn" of 1969. Throughout this phase of rapid ascendancy on the 
part of labor and the working class, the union movement played a var 
ied role, from that of catalyst to reactive captive, attempting to "ride 
the tiger."4 Nonetheless, despite a somewhat contradictory approach, 
by the mid-1970s the Italian labor movement was considerably 
strengthened and therefore had much to lose in the subsequent period 
of resurgent capital.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Italian labor movement 
succeeded in establishing, or co-opting, factory-based workers coun 
cils (consigli di fabbrica) while simultaneously achieving a national
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role in setting macroeconomic policy. Utilizing a process of political 
exchange, the Italian union federations were able to insert themselves 
into a tripartite, neo-corporatist bargaining process involving govern 
ment and industry. 5 Once having gained a seat at the national policy- 
making table, the union federations used their ability to control the 
political activities of their members (e.g., strikes, job actions, and 
broader demonstrations) in exchange for favored macroeconomic and 
social policy. The passage of the Italian Labor Bill of Rights (Statute di 
Lavoro) in 1970, the legislative response to the unrest of 1968-69, 
proved to be the most enduring result of this period of tripartite bar 
gaining.
Relations between the three national trade union federations— 
CGIL, CISL, and UIL—also improved dramatically during the 1970s. 
Increased cooperation among them led to the adoption in February 
1978 of a common platform, the EUR Accord, and it appeared as 
though a new era of industrial relations was beginning.6 The post-EUR 
optimism proved to be short-lived.
Union solidarity ruptured when CISL, UIL, and part of the CGIL 
supported the Craxi government plan to limit the wage indexing sys 
tem (seala mobile) in 1984. The metalworkers union, the Federazione 
Lavoratori Metalmeccanici (FLM), officially broke apart in February 
1984, although the crisis had been in the making since 1979-80. In par 
ticular, the failed 35-day strike at HAT in 1980 was emblematic, mark 
ing a significant shift in power away from unions and toward 
management initiative.7 After the 35-day strike, FIAT management 
moved quickly to reassert complete control over the organization of 
the factory by using technology to unilaterally restructure the firm. 8
Throughout Italy firms followed FIATs lead as industry restruc 
tured to the detriment of organized labor. Management began to out- 
source components, followed by whole subassemblies, in order to 
circumvent large unionized firms.9 Growing decentralization, fueled by 
outsourcing, contributed substantially to the proliferation of small 
firms; and as some of these firms increased their sophistication and 
capacity to meet market demand, local industrial agglomerations began 
to coalesce. 10 The development of a broad range of business services, 
including market, financial, and production assistance, by trade associ 
ations and some local governments assisted small firms in achieving 
certain "external" economies of scale. Shaped by the decentralization
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process and the subsequent interventions on behalf of trade associa 
tions and government, Emilia-Romagna evolved into one of the most 
advanced examples of a small-firm economy. Today, while some large, 
vertically integrated firms continue to operate in the region (FIATs 
tractor factory in Modena is one example), the Emilian reality is pre 
dominantly one of small and medium-sized firms.
Located in the heart of what has come to be known as the Third Italy 
(an area stretching from the Veneto to Tuscany), the Emilia-Romagna 
region of north-central Italy provides a useful example of dynamic 
economic development." This region has undergone a dramatic trans 
formation in the past 50 years, moving from fascist domination and 
civil war to a situation of broad economic well-being and political 
domination by the Italian Communist Party (PCI). 12 The present, 
unquestionably fluid situation in which the PCI is attempting to 
"refound" itself does not negate over 40 years of the PCI's rule.
The PCI's historic Bologna Congress of March 1990 confirmed the 
initiative to reconstitute the party, and at the Rimini Congress in early 
1991, the PCI officially became the Partite Democratic© della Sinistra 
(Democratic Party of the Left—PdS). Different interpretations of the 
new course remain and the divisions could well be destabilizing for the 
PdS. PdS Secretary, Achille Ochetto, the architect of the transforma 
tion, was himself rebuffed at the Rimini Congress by not being 
reelected Secretary on the first ballot, although he was reelected on the 
second ballot. Still, Ochetto, his cadre of quarantenne (40-year-olds, a 
reference to youth and an acknowledgment that the post-World War II 
generation has taken the lead within the party apparatus), and the nor 
mally allied reformist "miglioristi" wing of the party appear to have 
mustered a somewhat unstable majority.
Long-term PCI control over local governments has made Emilia- 
Romagna a center of activity for both the miglioristi and the postwar 
militants. Often in conflict in the past, many members of these two 
groups found themselves united in the "si" (promajoritarian/Ochetto 
platform) coalition during the heated internal debate that led to the 
demise of the PCI and the simultaneous birth of the PdS. 13 Perhaps 
more important, the transformation of the PCI into the PdS is, accord 
ing to the majoritarian position, an attempt to broaden the party to 
include other progressive forces. In this respect, Emilia-Romagna has
Economic Development and Industrial Relations in a Small-Firm Economy 23
been a leading example of inclusive politics based on the dominant 
electoral position of the PCI.
Coalition politics and government are familiar situations in Emilia- 
Romagna where the PCI has usually preferred to govern with the Ital 
ian Socialist Party (PSI). Recent, exclusively PCI, "monocolore" gov 
ernments appeared to challenge the norm of coalition, but the 
municipal elections of May 1990, in which the PCI continued to lose 
votes, led to a return of coalition government.
Since July 1990, Bologna (the capital of Emilia-Romagna) has been 
governed by a PCI, PSI and Psdi (Italian Social-Democratic Party) 
coalition headed by Renato Imbeni of the PdS, member of the Euro 
pean Parliament and mayor since 1983. At the regional level, the 
numerical impossibility of a local equivalent to the ruling national coa 
lition (the pentapartito or five-party coalition comprised of the Chris 
tian Democrats, PSI, Psdi, Republicans and Liberals) led to a regional 
agreement between the PCI, PSI, Psdi and the Republican Party. These 
recent political changes have resulted in the election of Socialist 
Enrico Boselli as President of the region. 14
In terms of industrial policy, the Regional Ministry of Industry, tra 
ditionally the domain of the PCI, is now in the hands of the Republican 
Party. The Republican Party is not a formal member of the governing 
coalition, but the Republicans agreed to support the new government 
and were given the Regional Ministry of Industry as part of that agree 
ment. Whether or not these political changes will lead to any signifi 
cant shifts in industrial policy remains to be seen.
The Emilian Economy
At the end of World War II, the local economy of Emilia-Romagna 
was primarily agricultural, with the manufacturing that did exist being 
concentrated in a small number of large, vertically integrated firms. 15 
This situation changed drastically during the 1950s and 1960s as agri 
culture was replaced by manufacturing as the dominant economic 
activity in the region.
It was also during the immediate post-World War II period that an 
active cooperative sector began to reassert itself. 16 Originally, the co-op
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movement was based in the agricultural sector, but it quickly spread to 
construction, food processing and distribution, light manufacturing, 
and transportation. Today, many Emilian co-ops have become large 
enterprises, dominating some industry sectors (construction, food pro 
cessing and distribution) and active in all economic areas. 17
As industry grew, there was a concomitant deterioration of the dom 
inance of a few sizable manufacturing firms and a proliferation of flex 
ible, specialized small firms. Today, Emilia-Romagna, with a 
population of almost 4 million, has over 325,000 individual firms. 
More than 90 percent employ fewer than 50 people, and almost 40 per 
cent of the workforce is engaged in manufacturing. The results of this 
decentralized, yet integrated, system of firms are striking.
•Wage rates are almost double the Italian average.
•Productivity is among Europe's highest
•Exports are increasing (7.9 percent of Italian exports originated in 
Emilia-Romagna in 1973; 10.2 percent in 1986).
•Per capita income grew faster than the Italian average between 
1970 and 1979; by 1979 per capita income in the region was 127 
percent of the national average. During the same 1970-79 period, 
the provinces of Modena and Reggio moved from seventeenth and 
twelfth in national income rankings to second and fourth, respec 
tively (Brusco 1982).
•From 1971 to the present, Gross Regional Product has increased 
over 50 percent. 18
Overall, the economy of Emilia-Romagna has proved to be both 
resilient, specializing in high value-added products, and adaptable, 
adjusting quickly to market fluctuations. A system of auxiliary industry 
services that operate through pooled resources, accessible programs, 
and accountable member organizations has directly contributed to the 
high level of technical expertise attained by individual firms.
Economic Development and Industrial Relations in a Small-Firm Economy 25
Decentralized Production and Flexible Manufacturing
Initially, the small firms of Emilia-Romagna served large enterprises 
as dependent subcontractors, and some of those relationships continue 
today. For example, many of the Modena artisans continue to supply 
components, or specialized manufacturing services such as grinding 
and heat treating, to FIAT's tractor factory, one of the remaining large, 
vertically integrated firms in Emilia-Romagna. Still, to overcome the 
negative consequences of being dependent subcontractors, many small 
shops learned to diversify their client base through horizontal linkages 
to other small firms. This process was accelerated as small firms 
decided to pursue discrete specializations in order to differentiate their 
activities and expertise from that of other small firms.
Relationships of trust grew as firms subcontracted among them 
selves rather than refusing to take on contracts too large for the indi 
vidual shop. Informal networks developed, especially in the tightly 
knit industrial districts in and around Bologna, Modena, and north 
along the via Emilia (Carpi, Reggio-Emilia, Piacenza) to Milan. 19
Commercial linkages were also encouraged by the diversification, 
fragmentation, and customization of market demand, which led firms 
to adapt flexible production techniques, both internally and externally, 
through outsourcing. Specialization strengthened commercial linkages, 
and as the small firms became increasingly independent of large enter 
prises, they began to coordinate their respective expertise, thereby 
developing value-adding partnerships. 20
Cooperation between firms made it feasible to bid on larger, more 
valuable contracts, and this in turn stimulated the growth of value-add 
ing chains which could be coordinated to create complete products. 
Stronger commercial relationships reinforced the tendency of industry 
sectors to cluster, further stimulating the consolidation of industrial 
districts comprised of firms involved in different stages of produc 
tion.21 These developments were facilitated by the growth of industry 
services which helped overcome the traditional limits of small busi 
ness.
Informal relations between firms have become.more structured as 
some medium-sized local firms have begun to acquire outright, or take 
a minority equity position in smaller, generally more specialized satel-
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lite firms. For example, Corazza, a medium-sized company producing 
food packaging equipment located outside Bologna, recently bought 
one of its more sophisticated subcontractors and acquired equity posi 
tions in other small suppliers. Similar relations are being established 
throughout the Emilian economy.
Many of the larger co-ops have grown by merging with other co 
ops.22 Recent studies have also identified significant merger and acqui 
sition activity as many of the Emilian firms are increasingly integrated 
into the global economy through large multinational corporations.23
Industry Services
In Emilia-Romagna, industry services are used not only to support 
individual firms, but to stimulate shared solutions to what appear at 
first to be individual problems.24 At the outset, industry services were 
provided by trade associations to take advantage of appropriate econo 
mies of scale and cut overhead costs for member firms. Because 
resources could be pooled by trade associations, shared accounting, 
payroll, and business planning services were available for reduced user 
fees. Easy access to these services (available to nonmember firms as 
well, though at a higher price) allows firms to cut costs while concen 
trating on producing high quality products.
The National Confederation of Artisans (CNA) is the most notable 
example of a small-firm trade association aggressively involved in pro 
viding an array of business services.25 Formed in the immediate post- 
World War II period, the CNA has grown to include 340,000 member 
firms (80,000 in Emilia-Romagna). Nationally, the organization has 
2,300 offices and 7,000 employees and is financed through annual 
membership dues of $100, plus 1 percent of payroll. As with most Ital 
ian trade associations, the CNA is organized both geographically and 
by industry sector. Local CNA chapters are organized at the provincial 
level and governed by an elected board of directors who must them 
selves be artisans. Sector-specific trade federations are organized 
nationally in 27 categories (i.e., metalworking, woodworking, cloth 
ing). Thus, artisan firms normally belong to a sector-specific trade fed 
eration within provincial chapters of the CNA.
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The sector-specific focus allows the CNA and its federations to 
develop considerable expertise and sophisticated, tailored business ser 
vices. Sector-specific expertise, channeled into geographically proxi 
mal clusters of related firms, allows the CNA staff to maximize its 
outreach for minimal cost. The democratic and participatory nature of 
the CNA also facilitates an ongoing process of interaction and 
exchange of information among member firms. As the CNA began to 
develop more sophisticated types of business services, member firms 
grew to expect and therefore demand increased levels of service.
Following the lead of trade associations, the regional and local gov 
ernments became actively involved in enterprise creation and develop 
ment. Promoting a system of industry services that facilitates economic 
development, public planners opted for an "incubator without walls" 
strategy. Economic development activities focused on:
•assistance in business expansion and new enterprise creation by 
developing targeted industrial parks for small firms and supporting 
trade associations and cooperatives to foster new enterprises;
•sectoral technology transfer programs and research services to aid 
innovation;
•market information, export assistance and support for trade fairs;
•upgrading the entire vocational and technical training system;
•financial assistance for an array of needs including training, group 
procurement, and purchasing new equipment.
To implement this strategy, a public-private partnership, ERVET, 
was created by the regional government with the support of local banks 
and trade associations in 1974. ERVET's industrial policy is geared 
towards sectors rather than individual firms and designed to provide 
both vertical (sector-specific) and horizontal (across industries) assis 
tance through technology transfer and marketing service centers 
located in their respective industrial districts. Established centers 
include:
Vertical (sector-specific) CITER (1980) for knitwear and fashion
CESMA (1983) for agricultural 
machinery 
CERCAL (1983) for shoe firms
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QUASCO (1985) for the construction 
industry
Horizontal (cutting across sector) CERMET (1985) for the metal
mechanical and related industries 
ASTER (1985) technology transfer and 
R&D center
RESFOR (1986) promotes 
subcontracting arrangements among 
firms located in the region 
SVEX (1989) export assistance for small 
firms
Labor's Role
The success of the broad, highly articulated economic development 
infrastructure of Emilia-Romagna is generally acknowledged. Less 
discussed is the role of industrial relations and organized labor in the 
Emilian economy.26 To date, trade unions play no direct role in the 
established service centers, and unlike local banks, trade associations 
and educational institutions, labor unions do not sit on the advisory 
boards of ERVET or the established centers.
The fact that organized labor plays little direct role in the service 
centers is criticized by the unions, although the criticism is somewhat 
muted given the leading role of the PCI-PdS and its historic alliance 
with the trade union movement (especially the CGIL). Still, organized 
labor's demand to be part of the governing board for a long-anticipated 
regional research complex, Polo Tecnologica, was the principal imped 
iment that delayed the start of the project for almost three years. 
Recently, the controversy was settled in labor's favor and the unions 
will be represented on the governing board of Polo Tecnologica. 27 This 
in itself is an interesting prospect, since few unions share a similar role 
in the world's increasingly numerous science parks.
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FIOM's Strategy
While the FIOM supports efforts to gain access to the region's eco 
nomic development apparatus, it has concentrated on using the collec 
tive bargaining process to broaden participation and gain more 
autonomy on the shop floor and increased control over the process of 
production. As explained by the FIOM's Regional General Secretary, 
Francesco Garibaldo:
Since the end of the sixties a specific characteristic of the 
Bolognese metal-mechanical workers' experience is the enduring 
interest in the organization of work considered as the meeting 
point of every strategic problem: wage, work environment, pace 
and intensity of production and career development.28
Focusing on work organization assisted the FIOM in successfully 
contesting management's efforts during the 1970s to improve produc 
tivity by simply speeding up production rather than exploring a more 
efficient organization of production.
The success of FIOM's bargaining position influenced manage 
ment's decision to initiate a new investment cycle through the intro 
duction of computer-numerically-controlled equipment. During this 
phase of technological change and reorganization, the FIOM pursued a 
policy designed 'to contest the capitalistic work organization and to 
build up the power of the workers over their work conditions." Overall, 
the strategy was quite successful and workers gained significant power 
within the firm; piecework was done away with, "the whole wage was 
a bargained wage" with wage differentials based on skill, and a 35- 
hour workweek was established.
Management attempts to divide craft activities, such as those of 
machine tool workers or design engineers, into many unskilled jobs 
was also resisted. Instead, the FIOM insisted upon an open career for 
each craft-like activity. Career mobility would be encouraged by 
requiring that rotation and recomposition schemes be linked to broad- 
based education courses, rather than more limited task-specific train 
ing. These achievements may seem modest, yet when compared to 
counterparts in the rest of the industrialized world, the FIOM has 
clearly succeeded where many others have failed.
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The FIOM's organizational presence and power inside the firm com 
pelled management to bargain and, in exchange for performance, to 
increase wages as well as allow for growing self-management over 
work conditions. However, by 1977 this strategy had reached an 
impasse; the expansion of outsourcing and supply firms, coupled with 
the introduction of new computer-based technologies and new organi 
zational criteria combined to erode the gains derived from the FIOM's 
policies.29
Searching for a new approach, FIOM concentrated on building up 
craft-based professional areas (technicians, design engineers, operators 
and fitters) but strong management pressure for increased flexibility 
limited the FIOM strategy to "a few small experiments."30 Given these 
unsatisfactory results, FIOM continued to search for a viable alterna 
tive.
The Search for an Alternative
The conceptual basis for FIOM's new approach is the belief that the 
world economy is in the midst of a new industrial revolution. In the 
emerging industrial order there is a growing tension between the "inte 
gration needs" inherent in the increasingly complex organizational and 
technical aspects of production and the model of social relations. In the 
"old" social model, employee cooperation was bargained for in a rigid, 
mechanical (Tayloristic) fashion, resulting in complex, hierarchical 
work rules. Within the emerging system of production, employee 
cooperation needs to be of an organic (flexible) nature, involving more 
interactive problemsolving than was previously the case.
To better comprehend the transition from mechanical to flexible 
cooperation, the FIOM initiated two research projects. The first aimed 
at understanding the impact of emerging economic conditions on the 
structure of the firm and work organization, while the second project 
concentrated on identifying and comprehending the subjective feelings 
of the workers about their work experience. 31 The results of these two 
projects were widely discussed as the FIOM debated a new strategy.
From 1985 to 1987, the FIOM began to pull together the methodol 
ogy needed to pursue an "alternative strategy." The starting point was a
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new educational scheme for unionists designed not to rely upon a pre 
fabricated set of solutions, but rather promote an interdisciplinary 
understanding of the new technological and organizational revolution 
currently underway. This new educational program was in turn linked 
to a participatory design process geared toward a radical reform of 
work organization and industrial relations.
Acknowledging that there are diverse strategies to achieve a more 
"organic cooperation," the FIOM decided to pursue a "democratic 
alternative" based on interactive work groups.32 The decision to pro 
mote work organization based on group activities was itself a risky 
one. As pointed out by the FIOM's chief consultant on the project:
Work organized by groups, like work carried out individually, is 
marked by contradiction. On the one hand, such groups can be 
manipulated by the mechanisms of management; on the other, 
they can use the bargaining process to reclaim the ability to man 
age themselves.
Embracing the dynamic of group experience does not mean 
adhering strictly to approaches which favor workers alone. 
Indeed, such an approach can only be subordinate to corporate 
goals. The issue is rather one of distinguishing between the work 
organization "produced" by the group in the framework of a given 
firm, and the group's relationship to worker identity—an equally 
critical process.33
Beginning in 1987, the FIOM began to sign a series of agreements 
aimed at establishing more participatory cooperation through group- 
oriented work organization. Briefly, two broad categories of agree 
ments have been signed. The first, and more limited set of agreements, 
established procedures whereby the unions and factory council dele 
gates would receive advance information on new technologies and/or 
changes in work organization. Once informed, the union and the dele 
gates can propose an alternative plan which management must review 
and discuss. The weakness of this first approach is that there is no obli 
gation to come to a mutually acceptable agreement.
The second approach includes the procedures of the first but goes 
further by establishing bargained patterns of work organization with 
considerable autonomy from management intrusion for some areas of 
the firm. In these agreements there are provisions which establish 
diverse, autonomous work groups. For example, certain agreements
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established "unified production groups." The main characteristics of 
these groups are:
1. The group has autonomy to decide its own task assignments, 
maintenance, and educational courses for skill development.
2. The group has a coordinator (usually a skilled worker) who coor 
dinates the management of the group. The position of coordinator 
rotates from every four to six months depending on the agree 
ment
3. The group workload is bargained for once a year and production 
beyond the agreed upon amount is rewarded. Other types of 
groups have been established in specific functional segments of 
the firm (e.g., design department groups), or for systems integra 
tion/assembly (e.g., the "fitting group," which assembles a com 
plex automatic machine).
The specifics vary from firm to firm and agreement to agreement, but 
the overall approach is consistent; the focus remains the control over 
the organization of production, autonomy from what is viewed as rigid, 
hierarchical management control, and "bargained results" where man 
agement agrees to reward productivity improvements but, because of 
the autonomy of the work groups, does not automatically obtain own 
ership of the method by which the productivity improvements were 
obtained.
The FIOM is also quick to point out the importance of how the 
group is established and its role in shaping the worker's identity.
The group planning phase is not a technical one, but is rather one 
of the processes by which workers' identity is formed in relation 
to both the company and the socio-political context. Hence the 
benefits of this reorganization of work are continuously channeled 
in two directions: towards the company and towards the workers. 
On the one hand, this approach results in the reduction of lead 
time and the improvement of product quality; on the other, it tends 
to strengthen the relationship between professional experience 
and identity.34
The importance of the group's autonomy from management is para 
mount for the FIOM. According to FIOM strategists, autonomy within
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the firm (intrafirm) could eventually be used to establish contact across 
firms (interfirm) without having to go through the normal channels of 
management hierarchy. The FIOM believes the results would be a 
more efficient and flexible system of production that acknowledges 
and rewards the efforts of members.
To date the FIOM of Emilia-Romagna has successfully signed doz 
ens of contracts which, to varying degrees, create autonomous work 
groups within the firm (see appendix).35 Still very much in the experi 
mental stage, the strategy did nevertheless receive a sympathetic hear 
ing at the FIOM's 1988 National Congress, but no formal endorsement 
was forthcoming.
The success at the intrafirm level has not yet been expanded to entail 
interfirm linkages; informally, however, on a problemsolving basis, 
work groups have begun to communicate across firms. At the Ferrari 
factory in Maranello, a suburb of Modena, the installation of a sophis 
ticated flexible machining system(FMS) to machine engine blocks pre 
sented a complex set of problems that needed to be resolved quickly to 
bring the system on-line.
The FMS, a complex series of computer-integrated machining cen 
ters, is made by Mandelli in nearby Piacenza. Communication through 
the respective Ferrari and Mandelli management hierarchies proved to 
be a time consuming, inefficient way to debug the FMS. Therefore, the 
work group installing the system found it necessary to circumvent 
management hierarchies and establish direct contact with the Mandelli 
team that built the FMS. In this case, a telephone link from one shop 
floor to the other proved more effective than the established corporate 
channels of communication. 36
Although the contracts signed so far have involved mostly medium- 
sized firms, the metalworkers have not neglected the artisan firm sec 
tor, signing their first contract (involving all three metalworkers 
unions) with the National Confederation of Artisans (CNA) in 1984. 
Efforts to expand this precedent to other sectors have been slow to 
show results. A modest breakthrough occurred in 1989 when the textile 
workers unions signed a contract with the Emilia-Romagna CNA and 
continued to pressure the other small-firm associations.
At the national level, recent legislation extended employee protec 
tion from arbitrary dismissal to include the artisan firms, further incor 
porating the small-firm sector into the national industrial relations
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system. Still, much remains to be done within both the Italian and 
overall European contexts to bring small firms into a more regulated 
system.
The innovative bargaining approach developed by the FIOM of 
Emilia-Romagna, and the results achieved, argue well for the possibil 
ity of a more democratic alternative to hierarchical, rigid production 
systems. However, the limited role of organized labor in many of the 
economic development agencies in Emilia-Romagna may prove to be 
an impediment to continued successful economic restructuring.
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Areas of Activity and Composition
Analysis (125) Design (1235) Production (25) 
Bargaining (1235) Supervision (12)
Education (1238) Analysis (12358) Design (1235) 
Production (123568)
Analysis (238) Design (1238)
Education (128) Analysis (238) Design (1238)
Analysis (235) Design (235)
Education (2358) Analysis (1234568) Design (1234568) 
Bargaining (236) Supervision (12)
Education (23) Analysis (12345) Design (2345)
Education (238) Analysis (1234568) Design (23568)
Education (23) Analysis (12358) Design (1235) 
Production (123568)
Education (12) Analysis (735) Design (1235)
Participants
1 - Department workers
2 - Worker's Council delegates
3 - Education Department of the metalworkers union
4 - Bargaining Department of the metalworkers union
5 - Organizational Department of the metalworkers union
6 - Metalworkers union secretary
7 - Representative from Bologna Camera di Lavoro
8 - Consultant
Adopted from: O. Marchisio, "La progettazione organizzativa fra negoziazione ed identitd: i 







In the democratizing societies of Europe and Latin America, politi 
cal officials of many subnational jurisdictions are likely to be elected 
on platforms of promoting economic development. As they formulate 
their policies, many such officials will predictably face similar institu 
tional and substantive constraints: few conventional economic policy 
instruments under their control; administrators inexperienced in man 
aging government agencies in a democratic context; few business own 
ers or managers with an adequate conception of how their industries 
can create and capture value in highly integrated market-oriented econ 
omies; innovation or entrepreneurship in business activity unlikely to 
be a cultural tradition; and government intervention through "plan 
ning" discredited in the public mind.
The search for effective combinations of policies, agency mandates, 
organizational strategies, and operational methods in such settings 
might be significantly aided by examining how the challenge of pro 
moting economic development was handled in one of Spain's poorest 
regions—Andalusia—after the nation consolidated its transition to 
democracy. The goal of improving the economic well-being of this 
region was codified in the Statute of Autonomy, which became law in 
1981. 1 The same commitment was embodied in the electoral program 
of the party winning an absolute majority in the 1982 regional parlia 
mentary elections. Once in power, the region's first political executives 
faced the institutional and substantive constraints listed above.
After a policymaking process described as an act of democratic 
planning, top regional officials announced a policy of achieving devel- 
opment-from-within. 2 Concurrently, the regional parliament created 
the Institute of Industrial Promotion of Andalusia (IPIA), whose man-
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date was to promote small and medium-sized locally owned industrial 
enterprises.3 IPIA's organizational strategy sought to involve the stake 
holders of a handful of industries in formulating and implementing a 
common competitive strategy4 and to persuade public and private 
financial institutions to extend credit and subsidies to participating 
firms.5 IPIA's operational method was to instigate an interactive plan 
ning process that focused stakeholders' attention on the need to 
improve natural resource utilization, product quality, marketing strat 
egy, infrastructure, plant and equipment, access to financing, procure 
ment, working conditions, and training. In addition, the planning 
process intended to identify a large number of actions that would per 
mit the region's firms to create and capture more value as a result of 
their work.6 This process entailed negotiating what was termed a com 
prehensive and dynamic action plan.7
IPIA's most successful action plan—given the policy of develop- 
ment-from-within and the agency's mission and strategy—involved 
Andalusia's white marble mining and fabrication industry, which is 
clustered around the mountain communities of Macael (pronounced 
Mahk-eye-el) County in Almerfa province. During the first phase of the 
Macael Action Plan (1983-87), the industry's sales revenues expanded 
fivefold. The Macael firms' new ability to compete in the growing mar 
ket for quality finished marble construction materials accounts for the 
prodigious growth in revenues. Analysis of this case shows that IPIA's 
operational method—championing the formulation and implementa 
tion of a negotiated, comprehensive, and dynamic action plan— 
enabled Macael firms to compete in the marble construction materials 
industry.
The skills needed to employ IPIA's operational method success 
fully—in Andalusia as elsewhere—include leadership, negotiation, 
and political management. Skilled leaders can mobilize people to face 
their problems, search for solutions, make informed decisions, and 
accept change. Skilled negotiators can forge networks of value-creat 
ing agreements, often involving significant degrees of cooperation 
among people and institutions. Skilled political managers can influence 
the policy and operational decisions of people and institutions without 
the aid of formal authority.
Arguably, officials responsible for agencies such as IPIA can only 
develop the skills of leadership, negotiation, and political management
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through practice and coaching. It is conceivable, however, that a prior 
skillful performance in one setting may leave a residue of clinical 
knowledge, which, if identified and utilized, would improve the skill 
displayed by officials subsequently using the same operational method 
in other settings. In an effort to begin cumulating clinical knowledge 
relevant for operating in policy contexts bearing a family resemblance 
to Andalusia in the mid-1980s, this paper offers a series of narrative 
accounts and interpretations of how the successful Macael Action Plan 
gradually unfolded.
Initial Conditions
When the Macael Action Plan was initiated in 1983, some 150 fam 
ily-owned firms employing an average of seven workers were engaged 
in marble mining and/or fabrication. Business owners followed the 
production and marketing practices of their forebears, resulting in tech 
nological backwardness. Dynamite, rather than precision saws, was the 
principal means by which marble was loosened from hillsides. Few 
fabricating shops were equipped with mechanical cutting and polishing 
devices. Even fewer firms were able to establish brand name recogni 
tion and none had the capacity to fill a major construction order. As a 
result, 70 percent of extracted marble was sold to manufacturers in 
other regions in Spain, who produced quality goods for the huge 
national construction industry, while Macael fabricators limited their 
production to a narrow line of artisanal goods. This pattern of eco 
nomic activity had characterized the marble industry in Macael for 
decades, resulting in static revenues and ingrained resistance to 
change. Overcoming such impediments would have required some 
degree of collaboration among firms. However, for Macael's individu 
alistic business owners, collaboration was anathema.
44 Managing Local Development
The Joining-Up Process
Events at Macael
IPIA's first contact with Macael business owners took place in their 
own quarries and fabricating shops. Accompanied by the local mayor, 
IPIA's director general spent two days touring these sites before the 
idea of holding a meeting was broached with business owners. The 
director used this opportunity to learn about the industry's work and. 
Macael's deteriorating economy. Through his presence, manner, and 
line of questioning, IPIA's director also sought to demonstrate his gen 
uine concern for the industry and to spark curiosity about why IPIA 
had come to Macael.
By then, it had become common knowledge that a man from IPIA 
was in town. When the mayor called an impromptu meeting of the 
employers association and trade unions, their leaders came. The direc 
tor, Ricardo Sa"nchez de la Morena, explained that IPIA's aim was to 
build on the strengths of Andalusia's land and people to promote entre- 
preneurship in the region. He noted that those he had spoken with dur 
ing the previous two days felt the local marble industry was in crisis 
and that a solution was not evident. He did not offer a diagnosis, 
though he mentioned that deficiencies in infrastructure and equipment 
were clear. He invited the people in attendance to work with IPIA in 
developing an action plan to "totally modernize" the local industry.
The Macael Action Plan, the director explained, would be unlike 
most development plans. It would deal with all issues concerning the 
marble industry, including technology, products, finance, infrastruc 
ture, and working conditions; it would be dynamic, beginning with a 
diagnosis of the problems and opportunities of the local marble indus 
try; and it would focus on changing the reality of the industry. The 
Macael Action Plan would not be formulated by IPIA, but rather would 
be negotiated by the assembled group, with IPIA serving as general 
coordinator. Sa*nchez de la Morena also promised that IPIA would use 
its influence to mobilize resources from banks, utilities, and govern 
ment agencies—so long as the group agreed unanimously on every ele 
ment of the Action Plan.
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Knowing that the audience's aspirations for economic betterment 
were checked by anxieties about participating in such a group process, 
IPIA's director wanted to build immediate commitment to an action 
plan. He gave them a stark choice: either agree unanimously at that 
moment to work with IPIA on a comprehensive, negotiated, and 
dynamic action plan, or forfeit the chance to enlist his support for mod 
ernizing the Macael marble industry.8 After some discussion, a vote 
was taken. It demonstrated that the balance of sentiments had tipped 
uniformly in favor of initiating the process.
Clinical Interpretations
The initial meeting must include the active participation of the 
industry's professional associations. No one would be in a better insti 
tutional position to speak on behalf of business owners than top offi 
cials of the employers association. The participation of local 
governmental officials and union leaders may also be essential for sub 
stantive and political reasons.
How the regional government frames the problem and describes an 
action plan is of paramount importance. While it is valuable to leave 
open the question of substance to the industry's own sense of its situa 
tion and potential, it is equally important to emphasize the defining 
characteristics of an action plan: that it is negotiated, comprehensive, 
and dynamic, and that all decisions must be unanimous. These features 
ensure that each component of the local industry will be a full partner 
in the action plan and that the interests and concerns of all participants 
will be addressed during the planning process.
Whether IPIA's brinkmanship during the first meeting at Macael 
was generally appropriate can be debated. The chief merit of this 
approach is that it frames as sharply as possible the question of 
whether to continue sliding into crisis or to work together towards a 
common solution, drawing to some degree on outside help. Putting the 
issue to an immediate vote serves other purposes as well. It forces the 
attendees to make a public commitment to the agency and to each 
other. If the vote is positive, some of the anxieties about the process 
will likely be suppressed. Imposing the unanimity rule also serves to 
embed this important process norm in the group's experience from the 
start.
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Negotiating the Action Plan
Events at Macael
In advance of the first official meeting of the planning committee, 
which took place in September 1983, IPIA wrote and distributed a 
draft document that enumerated what it regarded as the key issues and 
problems of the local marble industry. Hie broad categories of issues 
were production, commercialization, and personnel. IPIA's director 
general began the meeting by presenting the draft outline. As the dis 
cussion developed, it became apparent that opinions differed sharply 
on factual premises as well as on what should be done. Before closing 
the session, IPIA urged the committee to adopt a work plan for prepar 
ing its next meeting. The employers association said it would survey 
the industry to count the number of firms and workers belonging to 
each branch of activity and to gauge each firm's level of technological 
development. In addition, subcommittees on production, commercial 
ization, and personnel were formed. These groups were charged with 
the task of drafting preliminary reports about their respective areas of 
interest, to be presented to the full committee at its October meeting. 
Each report was to identify problems, proposed solutions, and suggest 
who would be responsible for followup.
The director came away from the meeting convinced that IPIA 
needed to be in constant, if informal, contact with the subcommittees 
during this critical phase in the process. Since travel time between 
Macael and the Institute's headquarters in Sevilla exceeded eight 
hours, he could not play this role himself. Sa*nchez de la Morena there 
fore asked a consultant in whom he had complete confidence to spend 
the following weeks or months in Macael.
While the work plan did not allow time for formal studies to be 
done, the subcommittees did have access to advice from knowledge 
able individuals. As an example, the production subcommittee inter 
viewed on several occasions the chief of the mining section of the 
central government's provincial delegation. The expert, Rafael 
Escribano, shared with the committee the limited information that was 
known about Macael's white marble deposits and suggested a number 
of specific studies that he believed would be valuable.
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The full committee debated the draft reports during two days of 
meetings in October. While many disagreements persisted, they were 
muted by three factors: some disputes about facts were resolved by 
investigation or expert opinion, committee members had experienced 
working together, and every participant felt ownership of at least one 
subcommittee's draft report. By the end of the second day, IPIA's 
director believed that agreement on the issues was sufficient to support 
the fonnalization of an action plan. He promised that IPIA would use 
the subcommittee reports in preparing a full draft of the plan, which 
would serve as the basis for discussion at the meeting scheduled for 
November.
Apart from summarizing the problems, the draft identified a number 
of lines of action, including revising contractual mining rights, com 
missioning geological and engineering studies of the area's marble 
deposits, establishing an office for technological support, contracting 
with designers for assistance in gauging the artisanal goods market, 
setting standards for product quality, improving roads, expanding elec 
trical networks, planning industrial sites, creating a purchasing cooper 
ative, conducting market research, founding a marketing cooperative, 
improving occupational health and safety, sponsoring educational pro 
grams, and seeking official financing. Each line of action identified the 
problem it addressed, conceptualized distinct phases, set a time frame 
for each phase, and assigned responsibility for implementation to spe 
cific subcommittees. A slightly modified version of IPIA's proposal 
was unanimously adopted by the full committee in November 1983 
and became the official "Comprehensive Action Plan of the Area of 
Marble of Macael."
Clinical Interpretations
When the planning process begins, knowledge about the environ 
ment mostly reflects each committee member's respective experience. 
Intense conflict is to be expected when people whose perceptions of 
reality are untested interact for the first time.
Conflict can be productive if it motivates committee members to 
inquire into questions that they had considered settled. In striving 
towards this ideal, the action plan coordinator must be willing to play a 
leadership role in the planning committee. This role entails taking
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responsibility for structuring the initial discussions, as well as ensuring 
that diverse viewpoints are heard. Offering a roster of key issues is one 
way to focus attention. In managing the ensuing discussion, the 
regional promotion agency should not suppress differences of opinion, 
but rather should seek to help stakeholders to work through their dis 
agreements.
Subcommittees can bear much of the burden of detailing definitions 
of problematic issues, proposing lines of action, and fostering the par 
ticipants' sense of ownership of the planning process. An action plan 
coordinator can influence the pace of the subcommittees' work by ask 
ing them to report by a certain date to the full group. The coordinator 
also can influence the substance of this work through ongoing informal 
contacts, which may require establishing a personal presence in the 
community during this phase of the process.
The realities of the planning process suggest it is incumbent on the 
coordinator to press for unanimous agreement on the action plan 
before the industry's problems are systematically studied. It might be 
thought that this approach is tantamount to putting the cart before the 
horse. However, the coordinator has to be concerned with building a 
cohesive planning committee, with creating a sense of momentum and 
accomplishment, with expressing respect for what the industry 
believed was true, and with projecting a unified image to agencies that 
would be asked to fund the studies recommended by the committee. 
Negotiating the first official version of the action plan before the 
research phase can place an industry in a better position both to obtain 
resources for high quality studies and to make effective use of what 
can be learned from expert inquiry. An additional advantage of this 
seemingly "inverted sequence" is that it embeds deeply into the fabric 
of the planning group's experience the norm that an action plan is 
negotiated and dynamic. 9
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Envisioning the Future
Events at Macael
IPIA's first major task in implementing the Action Plan was to 
arrange for studies of the area's geological structure and mining prac 
tices. Preliminary contacts with a state-owned research enterprise, 
ADARO, indicated that the proposed studies would cost more than 100 
million pesetas (roughly, $US 700,000) to complete. Under the 
national mining promotion law, the Ministry of Industry's General 
Direction for Mines could fund three-quarters of such costs. Since nei 
ther IPIA nor Macael could afford to make up the difference, Sa*nchez 
de la Morena decided to ask the Ministry to fund the full project. He 
invited Macael's mayor and the president of the employers association 
to accompany him at a meeting with Ministry of Industry officials in 
Madrid. In making their case, the trio claimed that Macael was fully 
committed to finding common solutions to its current crisis, as evi 
denced by its ability to reach unanimous agreement on its comprehen 
sive Action Plan. Studies of Macael's geological structure and mining 
practices were, they argued, crucial to the further development and 
success of the Action Plan. In the end, the Ministry agreed to fund 100 
percent of the ADARO studies.
Thanks to the active role played in formulating the plan by Rafael 
Escribano, the provincial mining official, participants on the planning 
committee knew from the outset what information they wanted to 
obtain through the geological and mining studies. They were looking 
for an authoritative measure of the magnitude of Macael's marble 
deposits. They wanted to know how the quality of the area's marble 
compared with that of other regions in Spain and with that of Carrara, 
Italy's premier white marble-producing area. They hoped to learn how 
to reduce the debris generated in huge quantities by the technique of 
blasting marble blocks and boulders out of quarry frontages. They 
sought ways to prevent landslides in the mines. In addition, they were 
curious about how the spatial distribution of the area's various marble 
formations related to the boundaries of their respective quarries. Some 
committee members were also interested to know how this information 
might be used in planning the industry's development.
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Since much of ADARO's work took place in the field, many busi 
ness owners came into direct contact with the activities of the Action 
Plan. Some business owners gained additional familiarity with the geo 
logical and mining research studies by attending periodic meetings, 
called by the employers association, at which interim results were dis 
cussed. At one event, for instance, Rafael Escribano and ADARO 
researchers explained the significance of detailed aerial photographs 
that had been taken of Macael's surroundings. At a subsequent meet 
ing, it was announced that Macael possessed Spain's largest endow 
ment of white marble, which ADARO said would likely remain 
plentiful for at least a few generations, and that Macael's marble was 
more durable than Carrara's.
With the aid of science, IPIA was able to draw out the competitive 
implications of these facts about nature: If Macael's white marble was 
the most plentiful in Spain and more durable than Carrara's, then the 
area should strive to become a formidable competitor in the national 
and European marble industry. As to why Macael was suffering an eco 
nomic crisis, despite its potential competitive advantages, scientific 
studies provided an alternative answer to a lack of subsidies: the 
boundaries of the existing quarries did not correspond to rock forma 
tions and the use of dynamite reduced the yield of valuable marble 
blocks. This analysis implied that Macael needed to seek solutions to 
its problems, such as restructuring property rights and introducing 
major technological change, that were not part of the industry's usual 
way of looking at itself. These conclusions did ring true for a sizable 
number of Macael business owners, as indicated by their eventual 
enthusiasm for both kinds of changes.
Sensing that business owners were emboldened by the news that 
Macael was richly endowed with marble of the highest quality, yet 
anxious about the recommendation that mining rights be restructured 
and technology updated, IPIA created an opportunity for members of 
the employers association, along with a few other planning committee 
participants, to travel to Carrara. IPIA and the employers association 
agreed to share the projected travel expenses of 3 million pesetas ($US 
25,000). The trip to Italy by bus was an important experience for those 
who went along, most of whom had yet to travel beyond Spain. In Car 
rara, they toured quarries, fabricating shops, and residential areas, find 
ing little resemblance between the world of Macael and the one they
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were coming to know. In many quarries, for example, they saw fully 
automated machines, equipped with industrial diamonds, cut huge 
blocks out of marble veins. In the fabricating shops, they observed the 
operation of automatic saws mat sliced marble blocks into thin sheets, 
which were then mechanically polished into finished floor tiles and 
steps. During the stay, the visitors from Macael also had a chance to 
meet with their local counterparts and representatives of Italian equip 
ment manufacturers. Some members of the delegation came away from 
this experience saying to themselves, "We are nobodies in this busi 
ness." The term "total modernization," which had been bandied about 
by IPIA even since S£nchez de la Morena first proposed the idea of 
working on an action plan for Macael, suddenly had a fuller meaning.
Clinical Interpretations
An important task at this stage in the process is to draw out the com 
petitive implications of objective knowledge about the physical and 
economic environment of the industry. Once business owners become 
accustomed to thinking that the operating environment can be under 
stood with some degree of objectivity and that the local industry is a 
valid unit of analysis, action plan coordinators should help work out a 
detailed, shared vision that expresses what the industry as a whole 
wants to achieve. A vision is not so much a statement of objectives as a 
shared cognitive and affecting image of a state of affairs that individu 
als sense is worth striving toward. Shared visions motivate individual 
and collective action and foster agreement on what operational steps 
should be taken.
When most people reflect upon what they want to achieve, they look 
for role models. It is reasonable to infer by analogy that a traditional 
industry's effort to envision an attractive future will be aided if its 
stakeholders are familiar with traditional industries which overcame 
the competitive disadvantages of fragmentation. Bringing action plan 
participants into contact with potential role models could well be the 
most cost-effective investment a coordinator can make.
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Building Institutions and Planning Investments
Events at Macael
During 1984, while the ADARO studies were in progress, members 
of the planning committee began to explore ways to solve certain prob 
lems common to all firms in the area. Almost everyone felt, for exam 
ple, that the dirt roads leading into the quarries were a problem. They 
were dusty in summer, muddy in winter, and generally unsafe for the 
large trucks that drove along them hauling away marble stones and 
boulders. The narrow, winding paved roads that connected the several 
municipalities of the Macael area to one another and to the major pro 
vincial roads were also considered inadequate. Knowing that the 
regional government, which was responsible for roads, was short on 
funds, the employers association proposed that its members and the 
government share the costs: if the regional government would pay for 
the asphalt, the firms would supply the labor to lay it on the roadbed. 
After some delay, the initiative succeeded. This event set the stage for 
a more comprehensive agreement in mid-1985 for road improvements, 
signed by Macael and two departments of the regional government. 10
A second major problem upon which all could agree was the need to 
improve the availability of electricity in the industrial and mining 
areas. Solving this problem required the cooperation of the privately 
owned electric power utility of Andalusia, the Compaflfa Sevillana de 
Electricidad. IPIA took the lead in pressuring the utility to invest in 
Macael. As a result, the company invested about 74 million pesetas 
($US 500,000) in the area in 1984, up from 13 million pesetas the pre 
vious year. 11
The Macael Action Plan called for studying the feasibility of creat 
ing several industrywide institutions, which were strongly favored by 
IPIA and the local government. One of these proposed institutions was 
a purchasing cooperative, which would take title to inputs it acquired 
in bulk and stored in its own warehouse until they were repurchased by 
Macael firms. The proposal did not spark much resistance since inter- 
firm rivalry focused on sales, and business owners recognized that they 
could purchase supplies at lower prices by concentrating their buying 
power. Moreover, a similar arrangement among extraction firms for the
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production and delivery of compressed air—a key blasting input—was 
already in place. Once the industry agreed in November 1984 to create 
the purchasing cooperative, plans were made for constructing the 
warehouse and a former local priest was hired to manage the operation.
The issue that generated the most conflict was the proposed joint 
sales and marketing cooperative. Both Macael's mayor and IPIA 
expected this institution to solve such key problems as small firms' 
inability to fill the large orders of major construction firms, field a sales 
organization, and fund promotional campaigns. They also hoped that it 
would mitigate tendencies of local firms to compete with each other for 
sales principally on the basis of price. Business owners, however, 
viewed this proposal as a threat to their individual autonomy. The firms 
whose commercial connections were better developed, furthermore, 
did not see how they would be advantaged by the marketing coopera 
tive. Despite stiff resistance from the employers association, both IPIA 
and the mayor pressed ahead with the feasibility study called for by the 
Action Plan. The opposition of the employers association relented in 
mid-1985, when agreement on a relatively weak marketing cooperative 
was hammered out. 12
In early 1985, IPIA shifted attention to the idea of creating a corpo 
ration whose principal asset would initially be the brand name, "Mar 
ble of Macael." This corporation, at a minimum, would prepare audio 
visual materials on the industry's products, represent the industry at 
trade fairs, and promote the name of Marble of Macael in the media. A 
more ambitious conception was to give the corporation the power to 
prohibit local firms from using the brand name if they failed to meet 
specific quality standards. This latter suggestion, however, foundered 
on business owners' unwillingness to have the quality of their products 
judged by such an organization. IPIA and the mayor believed it was 
more important to launch the brand name corporation, the "Sociedad 
de la Marca 'M£rmol de Macael,' S.A.," than to hold out for more 
restrictive bylaws. The two camps reached an agreement in November 
1985. 13
A second major objective of the Action Plan in 1985—in addition to 
building institutions—was to translate the general vision of Macael's 
modernization into a plan for investing in plant and equipment. Such a 
plan was to be used in attracting financing from official and private 
institutions and in inducing changes in the operations of individual
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firms. Formulating the industrial restructuring model required detailed 
knowledge of firms' existing product lines, scale, output quality, access 
to raw materials, plant, equipment, production management, sales 
capacity, administrative skill, and the like. This information was col 
lected by a consulting firm hired by IPIA and the employers associa 
tion. The interim product of this effort was a classification of Macael 
firms by product line, based on their existing capacities and what their 
future role in the industry might be.
This formulation of the industrywide plan for firm-level investments 
generated some controversy at meetings of business owners convened 
by the employers association. The consulting firm modified the pro 
posed model somewhat before recommending investments for each 
category of firms.
In November 1985, the planning committee made the industrial 
restructuring model and its investment plan part of the official Macael 
Action Plan. 14 Shortly thereafter, IPIA announced that it would cover 9 
percent of the investment costs of the larger firms and 18 percent of 
those of smaller firms, so long as these firms' proposed projects were 
consistent with the industrial restructuring model.
By the beginning of 1986, about two years into the implementation 
of the Action Plan, Macael was thus well positioned to respond to the 
rising domestic demand for marble construction materials. Some infra- 
structural improvements were complete and many more were planned, 
including the development of industrial sites equipped with electrical 
lines, telephone circuits, and water supplies. Business owners were 
beginning to collaborate with one another, as long as their autonomy 
was not genuinely threatened. As a symbol of this new willingness to 
cooperate, a centrally located building containing the offices of the 
employers association and the warehouse of the buyers cooperative 
was about to be inaugurated. The Sociedad de la Marca was gearing up 
to promote the brand name, Mdrmol de Macael. Many business owners 
were primed to invest in new plant and equipment; a few had already 
begun to do so by reinvesting whatever profits they had been earning. 
The idea of a comprehensive and negotiated action plan for the mod 
ernization of Macael's marble industry, furthermore, had been given a 
detailed, logical expression in the industrial restructuring model. But 
IPIA and the industry knew that even the best laid plans for Macael 
could founder on the absence of external financial support.
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Clinical Interpretations
An action plan should eventually offer a clear conception of how the 
industry as a whole intends to compete in the national and international 
marketplace. It should also embody specific plans for designing, pro 
ducing, and selling products. And it should offer a framework for plan 
ning and evaluating the array of firm-level and collective investments 
that would make it possible to carry out the strategic business plan.
At the time a shared vision begins to form, such a detailed plan can 
only be a distant objective. In deciding what issues to take up, in what 
order, and with what duration of inquiry, an action plan coordinator, 
therefore, should also seek to achieve some interim process objectives. 
One such objective is to sustain industry leaders' newly generated opti 
mism about the prospects for meaningful change and to help their 
respective constituencies share this attitude.
An action plan committee may create a sense of momentum by ini 
tially working on issues that tend to generate modest conflict (e.g., 
road paving and the purchasing cooperative in Macael). When commit 
ment to the action plan concept is strong and a specific vision is begin 
ning to form, the planning process can handle intense conflict (such as 
that generated by the marketing and sales cooperative issue).
In managing intensely conflictual issues, an action plan coordinator 
might best take a long-term view of its goals. The critical short-term 
interest includes educating business owners about the prospects of 
their industry and demonstrating to the outside world that the industry 
is overcoming the effects of fragmentation. In the short run, it may be 
less important to enforce common standards of quality, for instance, 
than to enlarge business owners' experience with collaborative institu 
tions.
Handling controversial issues sequentially is useful in containing 
conflict, building decisionmaking capacity, and distributing the plan 
ning committee's workload over time. Yet, dealing simultaneously 
with a range of issues, such as infrastructure, plant and equipment, and 
collaborative institutions is necessary for planning to result in a com 
petitive strategy before too long.
In advancing simultaneously along these lines without overtaxing 
the planning committee, it is almost certainly necessary to use the ser 
vices of consulting firms. Action plan coordinators can reduce the risks
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of involving consultants by educating them about the premises and 
precepts of the process. In addition, it is advisable to arrange for at 
least one of the other planning committee members to share the costs 
of the consulting work. This arrangement strengthens the norm that the 
planning committee is responsible for making the decisions that shape 
the local industry's future. It also facilitates the interactive relationship 




IPIA's early fund-raising efforts on behalf of the Macael Action Plan 
met with considerable success. As discussed above, the Ministry of 
Industry agreed to cover the entire cost of ADARO's scientific and 
engineering studies. The Compaflfa Sevillana de Electricidad and 
Telef6nica were persuaded to greatly increase their rate of investment 
in Macael. The regional government, as well, invested $3.5 million 
during 1984-85 in roads, market research, warehousing facilities for 
the buyers and marketing cooperatives, office space for the employers 
association, and a medical clinic for Macael's workers.
Despite these early successes in channeling funds towards research 
and infrastructure projects, IPIA was extremely anxious about deliver 
ing on its commitment to help firms finance investments in plant and 
equipment. The pressures on the Institute to fulfill business owners' 
expectations became especially acute in late 1985, when the planning 
committee approved the industrial restructuring model. 15 This detailed 
plan called for investments of more than 3 billion pesetas ($US 25 mil 
lion) in Macael's fabricating shops (i.e., seven times the amount gener 
ated by the Action Plan so far).
IPIA's anxiety about delivering on its promise to mobilize resources 
was further heightened by several facts. IPIA knew that most Macael 
firms had never obtained subsidies from the central government 
Andalusia's regional government, moreover, remained short on funds 
while the fiscal system for Spain's 17 Autonomous Communities
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evolved. And Macael firms could not yet finance a high proportion of 
these investments from operating profits.
IPIA also entered into discussions with the Ministry of Industry, 
which managed the national industrialization fund for Andalusia, to 
reduce the bureaucratic obstacles that had impeded Macael firms' 
access to this funding source. In early 1986, the Ministry agreed to pro 
vide the highest degree of financial support it could, namely, up to 25 
percent of those planned outlays for plant and equipment judged by 
IPIA to be consistent with the restructuring model. It was also agreed 
that IPIA would serve as a conduit for subsidy proposals.
IPIA also sought to make it easier for Macael firms to borrow funds 
from private sources. Commercial banks in Andalusia were historically 
wary of loaning funds to small enterprises. In the years immediately 
preceding the Action Plan, banks practically refused to extend credit to 
Macael firms, including Banco Popular, which had maintained a 
branch office in Macael for 30 years. As the result of negotiations that 
began in January 1986, this bank agreed to extend five-year loans 
instead of its usual short-term loans for industrialization projects. The 
regional government, in turn, agreed to provide an interest rate subsidy 
of 2 percent for projects that implemented the Action Plan. A similar 
agreement was reached later in the year with the quasi-public savings 
bank of Almerfa (Caja de Ahorros). 16
When meeting with banks and agencies, IPIA usually noted that 
Macael's proven marble reserves were plentiful and that the demand 
for the area's products would grow markedly. The ADARO studies and 
the sharp upturn in demand that occurred in 1985—as construction 
activity revived along Andalusia's Costa del Sol—gave credibility to 
these points. Citing investments in infrastructure, IPIA also sought to 
demonstrate the public sector's commitment to eliminating bottle 
necks. At such meetings, the president of the employers association 
argued that the area's business owners were committed to making 
Macael a major force in the national and European marble industry.
In mobilizing resources for Macael, the Institute anticipated that 
social and political arguments would be as persuasive to some audi 
ences as economic ones. Andalusia's weak industrialization was 
widely considered to be a pressing social problem. Many institutions, 
moreover, were extremely sensitive to the fact that the socialist party 
had won an absolute majority in the regional parliament after cam-
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paigning on a platform of social and economic development. 17 S&ichez 
de la Morena explained that IPIA's specific mission was to find ways of 
manufacturing valuable products from Andalusia's rich endowment of 
natural resources and to stitch together the region's economic fabric. 
He pointed out that Almerfa province was otherwise virtually bereft of 
industrial activity. By implication, financing investments at Macael 
represented an excellent way to advance the industrial development 
goals of the regional government and of the Andalusian public.
The Macael planning committee promoted this concept through a 
variety of means. For example, the employers association in 1985 
invented the Premio de Mdrmol, a prize to be awarded annually to an 
individual or institution who made a significant contribution to the 
local industry. The association's leadership chose the award recipients 
carefully. In 1987, for instance, a Premio de Mdrmol was given to the 
editor of a national news magazine, Cambio 16, who had previously 
worked for a prominent newspaper in Almerfa; to the director of a 
major provincial bank, Caja Almerfa; and to the trade association of 
eastern Andalusia's architects. In this way, special ties were fostered 
with national media, banking, and customer organizations. Members of 
the planning committee found additional ways to draw influential out 
siders to Macael. As just one example, the regional government's pres 
ident came to inaugurate the warehouses for the buyers and marketing 
cooperatives in March 1986. Apart from these special events, planning 
committee leaders created hundreds of opportunities to project 
Macael's image as an industry and community on the move. 18
The combined efforts of IPIA and the Macael Action Plan leaders 
succeeded in generating about 700 million pesetas ($US 5 million) in 
government grants and about 1,850 million pesetas ($US 15 million) in 
loans for investments in plant and equipment during 1986-88. The 
goals for aggregate investment in plant and equipment, set out in the 
industrial restructuring model, were practically reached before the end 
of 1988, thanks in large part to an extremely high rate of profit rein 
vestment. The total investment in Macael, including infrastructure, 
research, and institution-building, exceeded 5 billion pesetas ($US 42 
million) during the first five years of the Action Plan.
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Clinical Interpretations
Once the coordinator votes in favor of an action plan proposal 
requiring external financial resources, it is obligated to use its institu 
tional muscle with banks, government agencies, and utilities in order to 
implement the agreed upon plan. In many cases, banks and govern 
ment agencies are reluctant to invest in industries of the past When 
decisionmakers are naturally skeptical of investing resources in tradi 
tional industries, it is advantageous to expose them to the action plan 
process. One way to do so is for the coordinator to be joined by other 
key planning committee members at negotiating sessions; another is to 
invite decisionmakers to make site visits. The action plan's numerous 
diagnostic and prescriptive studies are another important tool for 
explaining how implementing the plan will enable the local industry to 
compete.
If agencies are seeking to make their programs visible in the public 
eye, it makes sense to intimate that a formal agreement will be publi 
cized and that credit for the overall success of the action plan will be 
shared. If funding agencies and banks are looking for ways to serve 
small and medium-sized firms efficiently, it is advantageous to explain 
how the framework of the action plan will reduce the transaction costs 
of evaluating individual project proposals. To underscore this advan 
tage, action plan coordinators might serve as a conduit between partic 
ular firms and these large institutions.
Outcomes
While total quarry output increased 33 percent between 1983 and 
1987, the production of marble suited for construction materials rose 
by 75 percent. 19 As a result of improvements in mining and fabrication, 
some 20 firms became major suppliers of building materials. By 1987, 
only 30 percent of sales were accounted for by unprocessed marble, 
while annual revenues reached 15 billion pesetas ($US 125 million).20
The industrial restructuring study recommended that firms that 
could not produce raw materials economically focus on the fabrication 
of decorative objects. The extent to which firms have followed this
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recommendation cannot be estimated with available data. It is, 
however, clear that some shops have purchased equipment to mecha 
nize this production process.
The number of firms that complied with the Action Plan and 
received subsidies from the regional government increased from 16 to 
64 between 1985, when the industrial restructuring study was com 
pleted, and 1987.21 Total investment in plant and equipment during 
1984-88 reached $US 30.6 million.22
The Sociedad de la Marca has been extremely active in promoting 
the brand name "Mdrmol de Macael" Between 1986 and 1987, it 
administered an advertising promotion budget of more than 70 million 
pesetas (about $US 600,000). Its activities, along with the objective 
improvements in product quality, have made the name "Macael" a 
potent signal of value in the national marble industry.
Macael firms have utilized their purchasing cooperative. It is diffi 
cult to estimate, however, the magnitude of the cost savings it gener 
ated. The sales and marketing cooperative has not been utilized by 
firms catering to the construction industry. Most firms have been sell 
ing directly all they can produce, thanks to a boom in luxury construc 
tion activity in Spain.
Conclusion
The use of the operational method of coordinating a negotiated, 
comprehensive, and dynamic Action Plan helped to achieve results in 
Macael that were congruent with the political platform of Andalusia's 
elected leaders and public policies, as well as with IPIA's mandate and 
organizational strategy during the 1982-87 period. These results were 
achieved despite such constraints as distrust of governmental eco 
nomic or regional planning, a weak enterprising tradition, and the 
regional government's minimal direct control over economic policy 
instruments. The Macael case shows that this combination of policies, 
mandates, organizational strategies, and operational methods can be 
remarkably effective in contexts such as Andalusia, where subnational 
governmental officials were committed to promoting economic devel 
opment in the aftermath of a transition to democracy.
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An action plan is an operational method whose effectiveness in pro 
moting the aims of public policy depends significantly on the skill with 
which it is managed. While some skilled performances may be based 
solely on personal and inarticulate knowledge,23 coordinating an action 
plan is not one of them. Practitioners' skill in using this method may be 
enhanced by expanding their clinical knowledge.2* This paper expands 
clinical knowledge about the use of this operational method by inter 
preting why specific actions in Macael helped achieve the public pol 
icy aim of developing locally based industries in Andalusia.25
To be skilled practitioners, coordinators of action plans also need a 
way to conceptualize or frame the role they play. Role frames "deter 
mine practitioners' strategies of attention and thereby set the directions 
in which they try to shape the problematic situations they confront."26 
Judging from the Macael case, an appropriate role frame for action 
plan coordinators may be grounded in conceptual networks such as 
service management, issue framing, leadership, social learning, negoti 
ation, and political management.27 The literature about these concep 
tual networks—which structure an emerging American conception of 
public management—is a useful source of precepts for developing the 
role frame of action plan coordinators, as indicated below.
1. Service Management. Treat the stakeholders in an industry as cus 
tomers. Imagine how customers are likely to experience initial contacts 
with agency personnel. Assure stakeholders that the agency wants to 
provide a service rather than to exercise administrative control. Indi 
cate that if stakeholders reach agreement on an action plan, the agency 
would champion it in contacts with government agencies, banks, and 
other resource providers.28
2. Issue Framing. Choose carefully the categories employed to define 
the situation. 29 Identify goals that are attractive to all stakeholders, 
given the dominant ideology of the period. 30 Indicate that the problem 
is multifaceted, involving production, marketing, finance, and working 
conditions.
3. Leadership. Develop a transactive relationship with the stakeholders 
conducive to mutual learning. 31 Explain that the action plan should be 
theirs, not the government's. Insist that the purpose of an action plan is 
to achieve change, not just to study problems. Provide a certain amount 
of structure for stakeholders' involvement in the planning activity.32
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Empower stakeholders to perform leadership functions.33 Modulate 
conflict among stakeholders so that they are stimulated to master the 
situation they are facing, while not overwhelmed by the task.34 Gener 
ate small wins and celebrate successes.35
4. Social Learning. Create an experiential and institutional basis for 
joint inquiry and action. Use formal inquiry and analysis to create 
movement in the group process.36 Ensure mat expert knowledge is col 
lected or developed in response to stakeholders' perception of a need 
for it.37 Give stakeholders an opportunity to accept, amend, or reject the 
results. Help stakeholders fashion an attractive and realistic vision of 
the future. Focus attention on how the local industry fits into the 
broader environment.38 Let specific objectives emerge in the course of 
ongoing inquiry and action. 39
5. Negotiation. Negotiate networks of linked agreements consistent 
with public policy and the agency's strategy.40 Provide incentives for 
firms to collaborate when it is beneficial for the local industry as a 
whole.41 Seek firms' compliance with the action plan by making it the 
basis for allocating subsidies and credit.
6. Political Management. Publicize the planning process and results. 
Use analysis as an instrument of persuasion.42 Highlight stakeholders' 
commitment to achieving their vision for the local industry. Remind 
audiences of the relationship between public policy and the operational 
method of action plans.43
The conceptual networks within which these precepts are embedded 
emerged in the mainstream literature about public administration as the 
result of decades of criticism of a vision of good government as cen 
tralized, hierarchical, and staffed by experts. They reflect many con 
temporary American beliefs about social problemsolving and 
governance in a decentralized liberal democracy. As elected officials 
and managers in Eastern Europe and Latin America look for role 
frames appropriate to both their positions in democratic institutions 
and the substantive problems of postauthoritarian situations, they may 
find the experientially grounded conceptual networks of public man 
agement attractive.
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Worker participation hardly existed in French enterprise before the 
victory of the Left in 1981. Enterprise committees ("comite*s d'entre- 
prise"), created after World War II, were concerned almost entirely 
with external activities (travel, holiday, cultural and educational pro 
grams). Trade unions competed vigorously for control of enterprise 
committees, whose sizable budgets offered opportunities for employ 
ment of union militants and shaping of working-class attitudes. But 
enterprise committees did not share meaningfully in management
It was the intention of the Left government in 1981 to transform 
authority relations within enterprises. The stated goal was eventually to 
achieve economic democracy, summed up in the slogan "autogestion" 
(literally, self-management). Roundly condemning both capitalism 
(Socialists agreed with Communists on the need to break with this evil 
system) and Russian-style communism (Communists agreed with 
Socialists that the Soviet Union represented a form of authoritarian 
socialism that had to be transcended), the united Left pledged to enable 
workers to become masters and shapers of their own destinies. 1
In the summer and fall of 1982 a series of four laws was enacted by 
the National Assembly creating "new rights for workers," known pop 
ularly thereafter by the name of the Socialist Minister of Labor, Jean 
Auroux. The lois Auroux, or Auroux laws, mandated the creation in all 
enterprises employing over 200 people of "groupes d'expression 
directe" (expression groups), in which workers would be able to speak 
up directly and collectively on any aspect of their workday life. Impor 
tant new powers were also devolved upon the enterprise committees, 
whose members are elected only by workers. Management was 
required to inform enterprise committees ahead of time concerning any 
important decisions—including production and pricing strategy, intro-
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duction of new technology, and investment policies. And enterprises 
were also required to bargain collectively with unions every year. What 
happened? Did the French Left find a "third way" between grasping 
capitalism and authoritarian socialism?
To judge by the accounts that have appeared so far outside of 
France, very little of consequence has happened,2 Foreign observers 
have tended to downgrade the changes introduced by the Auroux laws. 
W. Rand Smith demonstrates convincingly that the laws have not 
enabled workers to challenge the basic power of private (and, we may 
add, public) employers to make decisions. Hence, autogestion (defined 
as the exercise of control over workplace decisions), he says, has not 
been achieved. Indeed, employers have turned the Auroux laws to their 
advantage, so that worker control is farther away than ever. The laws 
are an attempt to "modernize" labor-management relations, Smith con 
cludes, "by giving workers an opportunity to express themselves and 
by encouraging collective bargaining."3 Hence, French practice has 
merely been brought into line with practice elsewhere.
Bernard Moss affirms also that the Auroux laws have failed to bring 
about a change in the balance of power. He sees continuity in labor- 
management relations as the major feature of the modern period in 
France, described as "the cycle of managerial supremacy interrupted 
by waves of radical protest which have characterized its industrial 
past"4 Similarly, Duncan Gallic concludes that the laws did little to 
modify the traditional structure of French industrial relations. 5 A slight 
difference of emphasis may be noted in the appraisals of these observ 
ers. "Modernized" managerial supremacy presumably is not the same 
as an immutable traditional structure.
Why didn't the French Left break with capitalism? The reasons 
mentioned by Smith and Moss include: the inherent ambiguity of the 
notion of autogestion, the rivalry between Socialists and Communists, 
divisions among the unions, and government-sponsored austerity mea 
sures. "Under these conditions," Moss observes, "it was not surprising 
that managerial adversaries rather than union supporters derived the 
greatest satisfaction from the application of the new laws."6 In addition 
to the unfavorable circumstances, Smith adds, the Socialist party was 
not able to adopt a program capable of translating its aspirations into 
reality. The implication is that under favorable conditions—unity of 
the Left parties and of the working class, a period of economic growth
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and prosperity, and a firm political will to break with capitalism—the 
goal of autogestion would be within reach. As the French would say, 
"Vouloir, c'est pouvoir" (where there is a will, there is a way).
These critics are thoroughly familiar with labor-management rela 
tions in France, and with the excellent studies by French labor sociolo 
gists on the implementation of the Auroux laws.7 Each point in their 
argument is well taken. But they have underestimated the importance 
of changes in the climate of labor-management relations and have 
drawn partial conclusions. The purpose of this essay is to call attention 
to new developments in industrial relations in France since the adop 
tion of the Auroux laws, and to show that the failure to achieve the 
stated goal of the French Left sheds precious light on the theory of eco 
nomic democracy.
Managerial Supremacy—But Why?
Agreement may be registered at the outset on one key point: the par 
ticipative structures created by the Auroux laws have come under the 
domination of management. To understand why, let us take a closer 
look at these structures. Between 1983 and 1985, when the Auroux 
laws were reviewed, amended, and reenacted by the National Assem 
bly, some 6,000 agreements were reached between management and 
the representatives of workers (either unions or enterprise committees), 
leading to the creation of about 100,000 expression groups. Typically, 
an expression group consists of 15 to 20 people who meet two or three 
times a year and have the right to "express" themselves on any aspect 
of their working conditions.
Some major trends were immediately evident. Better educated 
workers tended to speak up and monopolize the time of most groups; 
only skilled leadership was able to prevent this from happening. As 
predicted by the skeptics, apathy set in after the initial period of enthu 
siasm. Workers generally lost interest in attending meetings, even 
though they were on company time. Within two years, about one-third 
of the expression groups had ceased to meet altogether, and another 
one-third met only intermittently.
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Expression groups that meet regularly share a crucial characteristic: 
their worker-members are mobilized and actively supported by man 
agement. As one French sociologist put it, successful expression 
groups have been a creation of "the Prince."8 This development 
resulted from a turnaround of business policy on workforce participa 
tion. Immediately after the adoption of the Auroux laws, the Conseil 
National du Patronat Frances (CNPF)—which had fought their adop 
tion tooth and nail—encouraged its members to play the game accord 
ing to the changed rules in order to prevent the Communist-led 
Confederation Generate du Travail (CGT) from taking over. An 
Estates-General of the CNPF in 1983 urged managers to train foremen 
and supervisory employees (cadres) as discussion leaders and to throw 
their resources and energies into the struggle to control the new groups.
Managers were advised through the business press to take the fol 
lowing steps: set up training courses for cadres; reward cadres for tak 
ing the lead in groups; make sure that questions and criticism receive 
the attention of the hierarchy; rapidly resolve problems thus called to 
the attention of superiors; and communicate this information to the 
groups. When managers were reluctant to take these measures (either 
because they were unconvinced of the need, had too much difficulty 
with cadres who wished to preserve their traditional prerogatives, or 
were harassed by a strong union leadership), expression groups faded 
away or were easily contained.
It was virtually impossible for the CGT or Confederation Franc.aise 
Democratique du Travail (CFDT) to displace management in giving a 
firm lead to the groups. Most militants were formed in the school of 
class conflict, and were not ready for instant conversion into apostles 
of class cooperation. Nor did their training prepare them to be adept at 
two-way communication between rank-and-file at one end and man 
agement at the other. In rare cases where unions were able to mobilize 
and guide workers, management was able to contain unruly expression 
groups by ignoring them. After a while, discouraged workers simply 
gave up.
An unforeseen development after 1982 was the phenomenal expan 
sion, not of expression groups but rather of all things, quality circles. A 
handful of French businessmen, inspired by Japanese production meth 
ods during an Asian tour, had founded the Association Franc,aise des 
Cercles de Qualite (AFCERQ) a year before the passage of the Auroux
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laws. The attempt to introduce Japanese-style quality circles was a fail 
ure—considered by workers to be the latest of many business-spon 
sored schemes to intensify class exploitation. It was only after the 
passage of the Auroux laws that the quality circle movement took off. 
As of 1988, AFCERQ had presided over the creation of some 40,000 
quality circles, and the principle was extended by the Chirac govern 
ment to the civil service.
How did it happen? Managers were advised to consider the expres 
sion group as a useful technique for involving workers in their enter 
prise and identifying problems. In a second step, workers were to be 
encouraged to help resolve problems—through quality circles. 
AFCERQ consultants warned that quality circles would wither unless 
substantial resources, time, and energy were invested in them. Success 
ful quality circles, according to AFCERQ, would require: commitment 
from top management; organization of study groups for travel to the 
United States or Japan; weekend seminars for all managers and cadres 
in order to consider the recommendations of the consultants; discus 
sion by all employees of the new procedures; and, finally and only 
then, creation and constant care of the quality circles.
The pressure on workers to enter and participate in the quality 
movement was irresistible. The unions, including even the CGT, gave 
up their boycott. Alas (for management), quality circles are subject to 
the same trends of apathy that wreaked such havoc with expression 
groups. The most recent development is to make emphasis on quality 
part of the productive process through work teams, suggestion boxes, 
and collective participation in definition of goals for the enterprise, 
along with expression groups and quality circles.9
Equally disappointing to advocates of worker control has been the 
performance of enterprise committees. In the original conception, dele 
gates elected by workers are to give an opinion on all important deci 
sions by management before they are taken. Management is also 
required to submit annual reports to enterprise committees, which are 
permitted to hire specialists (such as accountants, lawyers, or engi 
neers)—at company expense—to help them understand these reports. 
Great hopes were placed in enterprise committees, suitably aided by 
outside experts, union headquarters, and political parties, to counter 
management proposals with their own. Enterprise committees were to 
constitute a rival power within the structure of enterprise, and perhaps
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prepare the way for the assumption of managerial prerogatives by 
workers. The Communist party planned to use enterprise committees 
to impose its celebrated "new criteria of management"— production 
for use rather than for profit—throughout the economy.
Enterprise committees suffered the same fate as expression groups, 
and for much the same reasons. Management could ignore recommen 
dations from hostile enterprise committees with relative ease. More 
positively, management made the agreeable discovery that it could 
communicate more effectively with workers through their elected dele 
gates, and with delegates through their hired experts. Instead of chal 
lenging capitalism, enterprise committees and expression groups for 
the most part were enrolled in a vast campaign to strengthen it—in 
order to protect jobs and raise salaries.
The fate of participative structures thus points up the inherent diffi 
culty of maintaining worker autonomy against the formidable pressure 
that can be brought to bear by the concentrated power of management. 
Only one effective counterforce can be envisaged: the unions. But 
worker autonomy has meant, in France, independence of workers from 
all external constraints, including that of unions, which are bureaucra- 
tized and linked to potentially domineering political parties and the 
State. Worker control is not the same as control by unions and parties 
in the name of workers. 10
The failure of enterprise committees to offer a feasible alternative to 
management policies is highly instructive. Almost immediately after 
the passage of the Auroux laws, the CFDT found that its resources 
were stretched too thin to be able to take on managerial functions as 
well, and it stopped submitting counterproposals. The CGT, on the 
other hand, drew up a number of counterproposals, particularly in 
industries threatened by layoffs or plant closings.
Invariably, the CGT counterproposal consisted of a detailed inven 
tory of customer needs, and of functions performed by each work post, 
all leading to the triumphant conclusion that the enterprise is viable 
and not a single job need be lost. What if there is no longer a market? 
That is because management is thinking in terms of short-term profit 
instead of social use. Plenty of customers are out there, in the Third 
World and in Eastern Europe. How those customers would be able to 
pay for goods without subsidies from French taxpayers is never 
explained. Part of the standard counterproposal was also elimination of
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bothersome imports, while foreigners presumably would be happy to 
go on buying French goods without any thought of retaliation. CGT 
proposals were considered unconnected to reality, not only by manage 
ment of private enterprises, but also (perhaps even more forcefully) by 
the Socialist State responsible for the nationalized industries. 11
Why has it been impossible to maintain worker autonomy against 
bureaucratic pressure? For Edmond Maire, perhaps the most important 
advocate of autogestion in the 1970s, the reasons go beyond the con 
tingent factors mentioned by Smith and Moss (unemployment, auster 
ity, lack of political will). It is the very notion of worker autonomy that 
he calls into question. For a long time, Maire concedes, the labor 
movement contrasted monarchical enterprise (where the boss wields 
absolute power) with models reflecting the belief that workers can 
decide everything. But now we must go further, declares the former 
general secretary of the CFDT, and recognize the specificity and legiti 
macy of the managerial function, which cannot be the result of collec 
tive deliberation. Autogestion, he concludes, remains a valid ideal, but 
is not a model for enterprise. The need today is not for a "break with 
capitalism" (termed by Maire "a dangerous illusion and nonoperative") 
but vigorous defense of workers' interests and "logic" within enter 
prises. In effect, virtually every plank of the CFDTs radical program 
of the 1970s has been discarded since the adoption of the Auroux 
laws. 12
"Capitalism Ain't What It Used to Be"
A new model of enterprise has emerged in France, and it has 
become dominant within the large, professionally managed sector of 
the economy (both public and private). Before 1981, it was taken for 
granted that management made all decisions, which were then trans 
mitted downward to employees. Negotiations with unions took place 
mainly at the branch or industry level (not within individual enter 
prises), following guidelines set by the State. In turn, business was 
expected to follow the lead of the State, whose top functionaries were 
presumed to have a sense of national interest. This patriarchal model 
reflected the prevailing belief within the French political class after the
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Liberation that French capitalism was backward, and that only a 
dynamic State, served by specially trained civil servants, could accom 
plish the task of rapid modernization.
"Le capitalisme n'est plus ce qu'il e*tait," exclaimed Edmond Maire, 
who can hardly be accused of special sympathy for the profit motive. 
Capitalism has undergone a "cultural revolution," observes Pierre 
Rosanvallon, not an admirer of capitalism in the past. And Henri 
Weber, former Trotskyist and now close collaborator of Laurent 
Fabius, speaks of a "mutation" of French capitalism.13 What they all 
refer to is the new model of the dynamic sector, based on a freer flow 
of information throughout enterprises oriented to the market rather 
than to the State. A significant portion of the budget of a modern 
French enterprise (about 5 percent of the total payroll) is now devoted 
to securing information from the base, circulating it through the hierar 
chy, and ensuring collaboration of employees, cadres, and managers in 
the achievement of agreed-upon goals. This emphasis on permanent 
dialogue, two-way communication, and service to customers rather 
than carrying out the commands of the State is a break with past prac 
tice.
However, management's very success in creating participative 
structures opens the way for a possible counterattack by unions and 
workers from within the citadel. The process of dialogue changes atti 
tudes and affects power relationships. In an enterprise fully committed 
to participation, managers must eventually recognize the legitimacy of 
a "workers' logic," to use Edmond Maire's term, and the importance of 
workers' contribution to production. Absolute monarchy is converted 
into at least a rechtstaat, or rule of law, with democracy perhaps in the 
offing. But industrial democracy in this sense means interaction 
between managers (who retain their prerogatives) and workers, not the 
absorption of elites into a self-governing community.
The new model enterprise poses a formidable problem for unions, 
which lost half of their members between 1976 and 1988. Pierre 
Rosanvallon estimates union membership as of 1988 as follows: 
600,000 for the CGT; 400,000 each for the CFDT and the Force- 
Ouvriere (FO); and 200,000 for the teachers' union. 14 The virtual col 
lapse of unions, says Rosanvallon, is due to their inability so far to 
cope with the cultural revolution that has taken place in enterprise. 
Unions traditionally represent workers in negotiations with business
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and the State, and also in social security and welfare councils. They 
have not been oriented towards participation in an "informational" 
enterprise in which workers, cadres, and managers are in direct com 
munication with each other and collectively regulate daily life. To meet 
this immense challenge, unions must recast their structures and create a 
new culture based on communication rather than either confrontation 
or meek submission. Only CFDT leaders have thought through the 
problem, but so far they have not been able to gain the support of their 
own militants in bringing about the necessary reforms.
Primacy of the Political
Political factors have been and remain crucial determinants of the 
nature of labor-management relations in France. Paradoxically, it was 
the victory of the Left that led to an expansion of managerial power. 
Before 1981 all attempts by business and parties of the Right to inte 
grate workers into enterprise were rejected by unions and the parties of 
the Left. But when the Left, in power, vowed to "break with capital 
ism," workers and unions were carried into new structures of participa 
tion on a wave of enthusiasm. Radicalization of the Socialist party was 
a deliberate tactic by Francois Mitterrand to outflank the Communist 
party on its Left, and to demonstrate to workers that they could have 
socialism of a democratic rather than an authoritarian variety. Autoges- 
tion was an integral part of a Socialist program designed to reduce the 
Communist party's appeal; it was a useful fiction. But, as it turned out, 
once workers entered into the structures created by the Auroux laws 
they could not resist domination by cadres and managers.
When the Socialists returned to power after the legislative elections 
of 1988, they did not revive the ideological battle cries of 1981. On the 
contrary, Prime Minister Michel Rocard fully accepted the principle of 
worker participation and free flow of information within enterprise. He 
embraced quality circles, instructed every ministry to draw up plans for 
improving quality, and called for constant dialogue between workers 
and managers as a top Socialist priority—thus trying to appropriate the 
quality movement for the Left. The Socialists are seeking ways to push 
the balance of power back in the direction of workers and unions—an
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extraordinarily difficult task. The experience of the Auroux laws so far 
demonstrates that management enjoys an inherent advantage in the 
contest for control of decisionmaking within enterprise.
To further complicate matters, the Socialist party did not have an 
absolute majority in the National Assembly. The Communist party 
made a slight comeback, gaining enough representation in the National 
Assembly to command respect The strategy of both the Communist 
party and the CGT was to take a militant line, resort to confrontational 
tactics, and compel the Socialists to turn toward the Left instead of 
opening to the Center. Class collaboration may prove to be as elusive 
as the Socialist commonwealth.
Were the Auroux laws, in the final analysis, a failure? I suggest that 
this attempt to create a worker democracy was actually an extraordi 
nary success, because it permitted Francois Mitterrand to attain his 
supreme goal: to reduce the influence of both the Communist party and 
the CGT. Many workers were now persuaded that the Socialist party 
indeed had their interests at heart. They responded by turning away 
from the Communists, enabling Socialists to dominate the Left; the 
way was thus cleared for genuine alternation in power between the 
Right and a now respectable Left. As a result, the climate of labor- 
management relations in France has changed significantly.
Worker democracy was always an unrealistic goal; but giving work 
ers a say in enterprise is a major progressive development. Only the 
victory of the Left in 1981 and the Auroux laws made it possible to 
break down working-class and trade union resistance to participation 
in enterprise. Management was able to dominate participatory struc 
tures easily enough in a first step. But French business is beginning to 
realize that there is a distinctive and valuable workers' logic (as 
Edmond Maire put it). For French enterprises to compete effectively, it 
is now currently accepted, they must convert to models in which infor 
mation flow is circular rather than merely from the top down. The bat 
tle between labor and management, and between Left and Right, is 
now being redefined within a transformed economy.
The social base of French politics is no longer what it was before the 
passage of the Auroux laws. The major actors within the system—busi 
ness and labor—have in the past decade undergone at least the begin 
ning of a mutation. Labor-management relations in France have not 
reverted to their pre-1981 status; nor have they become a copy of for-
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eign models. Traditions of Jacobinism, business paternalism, revolu 
tionary syndicalism, and mass communism have produced unique 
conditions for the ongoing experiment in workforce participation. 
Industrial relations surely will continue to evolve and to reflect a dis 
tinctively French political culture somewhere this side of Utopia.
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After losing $28 million over a four-year period, and faced with 
increasing pressure from OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) 
demanding that Trico Products reduce their product costs, Dick Wolf, 
the president of the company, announced his plan to lay off 1,400 out 
of 2,000 workers in November 1985. The "Big Three" automakers 
were forcing Trico to reduce their costs by 30 percent in three years in 
order to retain their contracts. Trico decided, with the encouragement 
of Ford executives, to move the bulk of plant operations to Mexico and 
Texas in order to remain competitive, as this move would result in sig 
nificant wage reductions. Little was done to investigate the feasibility 
of cutting operating costs in order to remain in Buffalo; it seemed that 
these costs were accepted as a given that could not be changed.
The projected plant closing and move from Buffalo was a major 
departure from the company's traditions. Trico Products had been 
founded in Buffalo in 1917 and was still controlled by a Board of 
Directors mainly based in the city. For years, a basic concern of this 
board was to keep jobs and manufacturing in their area, yet the plan to 
set up plants in Mexico and Texas seemed to them to be the only prac 
tical way to remain profitable.
Soon after hearing of the relocation plan, I contacted both Dick Wolf 
and Tom Monaghan, the regional director of the United Auto Workers 
(UAW), to explore an alternate approach. I suggested that they con 
sider the possibility of restructuring the existing Trico plants in order to
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reduce manufacturing costs and improve production quality, thereby 
obviating the need to relocate. The proposal included the development 
of small groups of workers and managers as Study Action Teams 
(SATs) who would work full time on analyzing manufacturing proce 
dures and the costs of production, and then propose alternative cost- 
cutting methods. This approach was based on a process that I had 
helped to establish at the Xerox Corporation in 1982-84, which elimi 
nated the need for substantial layoffs by reducing production costs by 
30 percent. 1 In my work with the PEWS (Programs for Employment 
and Workplace Systems) group at the Cornell School of Industrial and 
Labor Relations, I had continued to refine this method successfully in 
working with several other companies and unions. 2
Wolf was initially reluctant to discuss the possibility of a Study 
Action Team process at Trico, because he had already given up on the 
attempt to make the Buffalo operation profitable. However, he finally 
agreed, after six weeks of discussions, to meet with local 2100 of the 
UAW and with Vincent Tese, director of the New York State Depart 
ment of Economic Development, to at least consider the proposal. At 
this meeting, he was persuaded to set up Study Action Teams with 
three purposes: to examine ways to improve efficiency in Trico's man 
ufacturing operations, to identify specific methods to reduce yearly 
costs, and to improve the quality and timeliness of product delivery. 
The Department of Economic Development would share the costs with 
Trico for Cornell consultants who would help to establish and guide 
the SAT process. While Wolf agreed to establish the Study Action 
Teams, he refused to set targets for each SAT, or to commit the com 
pany to a reversal of its relocation plan if the SATs were in fact suc 
cessful. Despite this, the UAW informally set a 30 percent cost 
reduction target for the teams, which was the amount of the cost reduc 
tion required by Ford. It was decided by Wolf and the union that three 
SAIfc would be established and have 18 weeks to work on this project. 
Two teams would each study a different area of the plant—the tool 
room and linkage assembly areas—and the third would analyze the 
possibility of constructing a new plant to replace current obsolete facil 
ities and compare the costs of this with constructing new plants in 
Mexico and Texas.
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Method of Analysis and Action
The Trico Study Action Teams for the toolroom and linkage assem 
bly areas consisted of two workers (union representatives) and two 
managers from each of the departments. Each team was assisted by the 
Cornell staff and by a manufacturing engineer from Rensselaer Poly 
technic Institute (RPI). The third SAT consisted of members of the 
executive committee of UAW local 2100, the manufacturing engineer 
from RPI, and an architect from Boston to study new plant construc 
tion. In addition, a joint Labor-Management Steering Committee of 
middle and upper management of the company and the executive com 
mittee of the union was established to meet with the three teams every 
two weeks.
The role of the Steering Committee was to provide overall guidance 
to each team, help link and integrate their work, and remove road 
blocks to obtaining technical assistance and production/customer 
information. It would also help judge the value of projects and imple 
ment solutions.
All three SATs worked full time on their respective tasks. Technical 
and financial assistance was obtained from Trico employees upon the 
written request of the teams. However, towards the end of the SAT pro 
cess, access to accounting staff became hard to obtain, so the consult 
ing manufacturing engineer from RPI was asked to analyze and 
evaluate many of the final proposals.
In addition to the three SAT projects, Cornell conducted a study ana 
lyzing the successes and problems of firms that had relocated to the 
Texas-Mexico border where Trico planned to move. This study, which 
was included in the final report to Trico, examined the type of work 
performed, the skills and wages of workers in the area, and the avail 
ability of technical specialists.
Training for Study Action Teams
Study Action Team and Steering Committee members took part in 
an intensive four-day training program which included exercises in 
problemsolving and team building; cost-accounting procedures (cost- 
benefit analysis); presentation methods; team meeting skills; tech 
niques to obtain technical and financial information; breakdowns of the
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cost structure of the toolroom and linkage departments; methods for 
conducting surveys and questionnaires; methods for involving employ 
ees in changes within their departments; and methods of evaluating the 
workflow of production. Former SAT members from the Xerox Corpo 
ration participated in two training sessions and presented techniques 
they had found successful for identifying, analyzing, and implement 
ing solutions.
Plant visits were also arranged for the SAT members to meet with 
labor and management of Packard Electric, a major supplier of parts 
for General Motors, and Harley Davidson. At Harley Davidson, work 
ers and managers are engaged in cost reductions, product improve 
ment, and restructuring of the decisionmaking roles of labor and 
management. Meeting and observing other teams in action provided 
the Trico SAT members with suggestions for changes and specific 
areas to investigate, and helped them better understand their roles.
Initial Outcomes
At the end of 18 weeks, the two in-plant SATs presented their rec 
ommendations for changes to the Trico management, regional UAW 
representatives, local 2100 executives, and New York State govern 
ment officials. All of the recommendations had been analyzed by the 
appropriate production areas prior to this meeting and had received the 
approval of line operators.
The toolroom SAT proposals included: a new layout of equipment, a 
comprehensive training program for all employees in CAD/CAM to 
improve their capacity for insourcing work, improved workflow within 
the department, a gainsharing compensation plan, and a flexible time 
schedule for workers. The most controversial recommendation was a 
wage increase, which was suggested because 38 skilled workers had 
quit during the past 18 months due to the low pay in comparison to 
other companies in Buffalo.
The linkage SAT presented over 60 cost-saving projects. Savings 
amounted to over $9 million per year for this department—consider 
ably more than the $8 million (30 percent cost reduction) target origi 
nally set by the team. Included in this proposal were suggestions for a
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substantial redesign of almost all jobs and a new layout of equipment 
and material storage. Recommendations by this team focused on the 
elimination of production supervisors: all operators would be trained 
and have responsibility for the quality of each stage of the production 
process. An investment in high-speed presses and modification of old 
equipment were recommended to enable the assembly area to reduce 
set-up time, improve servicing of equipment, and increase their ability 
to make quick die changeovers. New equipment and accessible areas 
for storing component parts were to be integrated into a just-in-time 
inventory control system. These changes would eliminate the need for 
their expensive computerized Materials Information System. As a 
result of these restructuring activities, extensive amounts of in-process 
inventory would also be eliminated. Inventory would consist only of 
what was immediately needed. Adjustments in compensation were also 
suggested by this team, including the elimination of the piece-rate sys 
tem and the development of a plantwide gainsharing process.
Final Outcomes and Agreements
A final meeting was held at the Department of Economic Develop 
ment office in New York City on October 8, 1986 to review all of the 
recommendations of the SAft. This meeting was held with Dick Wolf, 
Vincent Tese, the manufacturing engineer consultant, the shop chair 
man of the UAW, and myself. Our final report summarized the total 
cost savings based on the findings of the two in-plant SATs, and the 
work of the third SAT, which had analyzed the cost savings as a result 
of consolidating all operations in Buffalo and constructing a new plant 
at square footage costs equal to those in Brownsville, Texas. The com 
bined work of the three SATs amounted to the identification of cost 
savings of $37.5 million per year, amounting to 30 percent of operating 
costs—the initial target. Although the consolidation into one plant 
would result in a loss of 250 direct and 100 indirect jobs, most of these 
reductions would be achieved by retirement and attrition. The UAW 
agreed to these reductions as part of the total proposal.
Our report also concluded that, no matter where the plants were 
located, it would be critical for Trico to change its production philoso-
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phy and not just chase low wages if it wanted to achieve a just-in-time, 
flexible, high-performance work system. The report also stressed the 
need for technological breakthroughs by acquiring modular assembly 
parts such as electric motors, since the Big Three were moving towards 
modular assembly units. The report maintained that although competi 
tors might find it easy to manufacture where wage rates are low, they 
would not have the skilled workforce and technical resources of New 
York to continue to improve their production system.
In summary, the report stated that the lack of a skilled workforce 
and technical resources in Brownsville and Matamoros, coupled with 
the cost-saving analysis of the three SAIfc, proved that the strategy to 
move south was "economically unsound" and, further, would eventu 
ally erode Trice's technological superiority. It also concluded that 
going forward with the plan to move would likely result in the loss of 
all manufacturing jobs in Buffalo. Vincent Tese offered Dick Wolf 
funds to help pay for release time for training employees in the new 
work systems and in how to use new equipment, R&D funds to assist 
in acquiring the new motor for modular assembly, and the development 
of a high-tech training center to be located adjacent to the new factory.
In February 1987, after months of meetings between Trico and the 
UAW, a final agreement on the SAT proposal was reached between 
Trico Products and UAW Local 2100. Although Trico decided not to 
reverse their decision to move, the company did decide to keep an 
additional 300 jobs in Buffalo over what they had originally planned. 
(Left behind was to have been a skeleton staff of 600 employees to do 
basic engineering, research and development, and low-volume work.) 
The 300 additional jobs resulted from productivity improvements sug 
gested by the linkage SAT in several of their low-volume areas. A 
strong severance package was established for all workers to be laid off, 
which included continued medical insurance for several months, cre 
ation of an outplacement center, and additional pay for years of ser 
vice.
The toolroom suggestions were implemented by Trico, except for 
the proposed wage increase, which was tabled for future discussion. 
The linkage assembly proposal to enable operators to inspect their own 
work and eliminate the need for final inspectors was also implemented, 
and several joint labor-management committees became a permanent
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part of this department for training and to investigate the best use of 
equipment.
A significant focus of the union during negotiations, aside from the 
number of jobs that would remain in Buffalo, was the need to establish 
a new production system with appropriate compensation. It had 
become apparent to the leaders of UAW local 2100 during the SAT 
process that significant changes would be needed in the production 
system in order to save the jobs of Trico workers in the future.
General Risks and Benefits 
of the Process for Participants
The entire SAT process was a risk for the union, management, and 
the state. For management, the possibility of reversing their decision to 
relocate involved losing approximately $5 million of construction 
costs already committed to building a new plant. If it were not for the 
fact that they were locally owned and that there was considerable com 
munity pressure to reduce the continued erosion of manufacturing jobs, 
they would probably never even have considered the SAT proposal.
The union took a risk in getting involved in the SAT process 
because they had no guarantee from Trico that the plan to move would 
be changed. However, they were facing a no-win situation anyway, at 
best being able to bargain for keeping only a few hundred jobs. The 
gamble paid off as the Study Action Team process evolved into a con 
structive method which saved an additional 300 jobs.
The SAT process provided union representatives with extensive 
access to financial and production information, giving them skills for 
evaluating financial balance sheets and production accounting, and 
giving them valuable information about advanced manufacturing 
methods. The experience gained in these areas proved to be useful dur 
ing the final negotiations for severance pay and benefits and for keep 
ing more jobs in Buffalo.
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Risks and Benefits of the SAT Approach
There are several questions raised concerning the Trico project, 
some of them related to the SAT process itself. How effective is this 
process, and why? Why does this method of analysis identify more 
comprehensive changes and a more realistic implementation process 
than traditional approaches?
Another important area of analysis concerns the overall outcomes 
and what could have strengthened the ability to keep jobs in Buffalo. 
What could have been done differently? Should unions support activi 
ties such as Study Action Teams? If this is a useful process for unions, 
are there better ways to establish such activities? Some of these ques 
tions may be answered by comparing the SAT process to traditional 
methods.
First, the SAT process helped to integrate the day-to-day knowledge 
of shop-floor employees, who know specific details of problems, with 
the broader knowledge of technical specialists. In traditional studies 
done by management, the ideas and perspectives of the workforce are 
rarely examined or considered. As a result of the integrated perspec 
tive, new ideas and solutions emerge. Independently, the observations 
of labor and management are significantly different and are rarely 
brought together. 3
The second and perhaps most important aspect of the Study Action 
Team process is that it helps to establish a commitment to implement 
changes by the workforce and management. Analyses done solely by 
technical and financial specialists rarely convince plant management 
and workers to make changes. Without the commitment of key 
employees, and support from both management and labor, solutions 
agreed upon by specialists often remain just good suggestions which 
are never actually implemented.
Another beneficial aspect of the SAT process is that it enables an 
organization to identify and then find solutions to politically risky 
problems. Since the union members of SATs cannot be fired for voic 
ing their ideas and concerns, the SAT process allows major problems 
to be identified which in the past might have been overlooked. Manag 
ers are often reluctant to raise problems because they are fearful of 
admitting to these situations in their departments or in the organization
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as a whole. A fairly common feeling among managers is the fear that 
raising such questions could cost them their jobs. Also, the very pro 
cess of engaging the employees who will be directly affected by a 
major organizational change creates an environment in which they are 
more likely to be committed to working in structures which they 
understand and have helped to develop.
To some extent, the entire SAT process at Tttco Products was hin 
dered by the president's initial and ongoing reluctance to establish a 
formal agreement. Although he accepted in principle the use of the 
three SATs and provided them with access to technical and financial 
staff, he never signed an agreement nor agreed to cost-saving targets. 
The experience at Xerox showed that having clear cost, productivity, 
and quality targets from the beginning of the process helped to keep 
the SAT process on track even when several managers left in the mid 
dle of the project because they were promoted into the manufacturing 
plants.4
The UAW decided that the practical course of action at Trico was to 
make the best of the situation rather than further delay getting the 
teams started or decide to withdraw from the process entirely. They felt 
they had no other choice than to continue even without having every 
thing in place. In hindsight, another approach might have been tried to 
obtain a formal agreement from Dick Wolf. Requesting involvement 
and an agreement from the Board of Directors might have helped cre 
ate a more accountable process.
The information on cost structures, production information, and 
new product requirements of customers which local 2100 and region 9 
gained through the SAT process had never been made available to 
them before. This information gave the union a new tool for protecting 
the interests of workers by examining and then making recommenda 
tions for changing production methods. Traditionally, when there were 
severe economic problems in a particular firm, the UAW became 
involved in negotiating cost problems solely in terms of what they 
knew best and had control over—wages, benefits, and employment of 
workers. Specific productivity improvement changes had rarely been 
identified as an alternative to cutting wages or laying off workers. 
Although the members of the shop committee of local 2100 had no 
previous experience in analyzing and improving manufacturing pro 
cesses, they quickly became experts.
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The results of the Trico project and similar activities at Xerox sug 
gest that the SAT process can give unions an opportunity to explore 
extensive changes in production, material control, and general costs, as 
well as customer-supplier relations. Rather than just battling over 
wages, benefits, and employment, solutions can be identified to reduce 
overhead and indirect labor and material costs, as well as improve the 
efficiencies of equipment and manufacturing processes. As David 
Steinwald, chairman of the shop committee, noted at the end of the 
SAT process, "it would have been nearly impossible to have saved an 
additional 300 jobs or obtained the severance package using traditional 
bargaining methods and lacking access to financial and productivity 
information."5 The above conclusions have been seconded by the lead 
ership of local 2100 and the regional director of the UAW, Tom Fri- 
cano.
The final agreement between the UAW and Trico was reached 
largely because of the factual results of the studies conducted by the 
SAIs. These findings identified the importance of keeping specific 
high-volume operations in Buffalo rather than relocating them to 
Texas. By agreeing to changes in work responsibility and manufactur 
ing approaches in the toolroom and linkage departments, the union put 
itself in a strong position for negotiating an extensive severance pack 
age and the development of outplacement services.
In retrospect, it would have been extremely helpful to have been 
able to start the SAT process as soon as there were signs that Trico was 
in bad shape. If the process could have been established earlier, Dick 
Wolf and his Board of Directors might have been more receptive to a 
comprehensive approach for achieving cost reductions and changes, 
rather than focusing solely on labor costs.
In order to spread the knowledge of the methods and results of the 
SAT process to the UAW leadership in region 9, a workshop on the 
risks and benefits of SATs was held at their annual retreat in August 
1987. The SAT process used at Trico Products was presented by mem 
bers of the teams, who examined both the positive benefits and the 
areas of weakness. Many delegates to the meeting showed a strong 
interest in learning more about this new approach in case their local 
membership faced a similar plant closing or major layoff problem in 
the future.
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Government Involvement
The Study Action Team process was an innovative and challenging 
experiment for the New York State Department of Economic Develop 
ment. Prior to the Trico project, the strategy of this agency had been to 
focus on trying to attract new business to relocate to New York and 
improving access to on-the-shelf technology by existing factories. 
Although the Department of Economic Development and the governor 
felt comfortable with the concept of joint labor-management programs, 
such activities had not been seen as a practical process for solving sig 
nificant productivity problems of firms.
Pressure from the governor's office was important in getting Dick 
Wolf to sit down and agree to the SAT process. The state did not accept 
the conclusion of an earlier consulting report to Trico management 
which stated that "Trico's middle managers and hourly employees 
could not change their nonproductive ways."
After seeing the results of the SAT process at Trico, Vincent Tese 
decided to create the Industrial Effectiveness Program to provide 
development and implementation funds to companies and unions that 
establish SAT activities. By providing funding and holding workshops 
and seminars to promote the Study Action Team approach, New York 
State is helping to make the SAT process more accessible to other firms 
and unions; it is encouraging an aggressive examination of cost reduc 
tions rather than relying solely on wage reductions and layoffs when 
companies are faced with extensive needs to reduce costs. Vincent Tese 
commented at the end of the Trico project that "the Trico experience 
will make us better prepared to respond in the future...it sets a model 
that can be used to work with other companies."6
Future Issues
Study Action Teams are currently being used not only in New York 
State and around this country, but also in Poland to help improve effi 
ciency and to create new work structures in some of their plants. The 
process is also being used to increase the opportunity for workers to
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contribute to a more democratic form of decisionmaking as Poland 
changes to a social market economy.
There is an ongoing need to examine how to effectively integrate the 
ideas and concerns of employees at all levels of plants, and particularly 
at times of crisis such as Trico Products faced. The involvement of 
workers in the manufacturing and production decisionmaking areas of 
companies has not generally been considered important, but it seems 
likely that unions will need to consider the use of this approach more in 
the future as traditional methods used to negotiate saving jobs become 
less effective. In order to use this particular approach in the future, a 
careful analysis of the risks and benefits are needed, as well as proper 
training to help establish these activities.
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In 1989, the Pennsylvania Departments of Commerce and Labor 
and Industry designed the Manufacturing Innovation Network Initia 
tive, or MAIN, to test whether the state could stimulate regional con 
centrations of related firms to organize consortia. Firms were 
considered to be related to each other if they served similar markets. 
These consortia were expected to strengthen the competitive position 
of the firms by developing new business services, transferring best 
practices between firms, and forming new production relationships 
among firms.
Rapidly changing technology and high standards for quality and 
speed of delivery are forcing firms to cooperate in new and significant 
ways. 1 The number of strategic partnerships is growing, and the range 
of issues around which they are organized is increasingly significant. 
For instance, companies are joining together for research and develop 
ment, capital investment, concurrent engineering, product develop 
ment, and to provide technical assistance to suppliers.
Most examples involve cooperation between large companies. 
However, there are many examples from Europe and Japan, and to a 
lesser extent the United States, of smaller firms joining together at a 
regional level to strengthen their competitive position.2 These firms 
tend to be clustered in close geographic proximity to each other and are 
joining forces to achieve a number of goals, including: combining their 
complementary manufacturing capabilities to produce goods for the
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final market; establishing service centers that provide shared market 
ing, engineering, design, and testing services; developing lending con- 
sortia that provide investment capital to member firms; and organizing 
export, training, and educational reform programs.
MAIN, which is managed by the Department of Commerce's Office 
of Technology Development, is built on two premises. First, some 
problems are simply too large for individual firms to address alone. 
Second, collaboration among firms and between firms and unions can 
create a learning system which can be a powerful force for manufactur 
ing modernization and other innovations.
With respect to the first premise, about 95 percent of Pennsylvania's 
17,500 manufacturing establishments employ fewer than 250 workers. 
Pennsylvania considers firms of this size to be small firms. While small 
firms are often innovative and flexible, they face certain vulnerabili 
ties. These would include insufficient resources (capital and people) 
for research and development, training, marketing, and exporting. 
They often have problems securing investment capital for moderniza 
tion. Finally, they are unable individually to improve the local business 
infrastructure that supports them; for example, they are unable to 
reform the educational system, open up new sources of investment 
capital, or strengthen the local economic development institutions that 
provide business services.3
The second premise of MAIN is that collaboration between firms, 
and among firms, associations, and labor organizations where they 
exist, creates the potential for a learning system that stimulates mod 
ernization and innovation. An example from the knitwear industry in 
Carpi, Italy illustrates this point.4 About 10 years ago, 600 small 
knitwear firms in this northern Italian city designed and financed, with 
government assistance, a service center which enables them to share 
the costs of marketing research, design, training, and other activities 
that would be too expensive for individual firms to support. While 
these services alone are of value to the firms, the interaction between 
the firms' owners at the service center is of equal importance, for it 
leads to valuable information exchange and peer pressure to keep pace 
with the more innovative firms. This stimulates modernization and 
innovation. The MAIN initiative limited itself to supporting projects 
targeted at regional concentrations of related firms to maximize the
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chances that firm representatives would personally interact with each 
other.
Through MAIN, the state is testing these two premises in four geo 
graphically concentrated industries: the apparel industry in the Lehigh 
Valley, where there are about 250 apparel companies employing 
15,000 workers; the plastics industry in Erie, where there are 80 plas 
tics companies employing over 8,000 workers; the tooling and machin 
ing industry clustered in Erie, Pittsburgh, Lancaster/York, and the 
Philadelphia areas; and the foundry industry in Pittsburgh, where there 
are between 50 and 60 foundries employing 6,000 workers.
The state identified these industry clusters using a request-for-pro- 
posal process, not an extensive economic analysis. Trade associations, 
trade unions and nonprofit economic development organizations were 
encouraged to submit bids. It was especially hoped that trade associa 
tions would respond, assuming that firms would be most likely to iden 
tify with them. In addition, we expected that, as a result of this project, 
trade associations would discover new ways to help their members 
through the delivery of innovative services.
The state received eight responses from seven trade associations and 
one economic development organization. Proposals were evaluated by 
a team of representatives from the Departments of Commerce and 
Labor and Industry and from academia. The evaluation criteria were as 
follows: a demonstrated understanding of the industry; the formation 
of an industry-led steering committee; a realistic project design; the 
strength of the management team; and the level of private sector finan 
cial support.
Based upon the recommendations of the evaluation team, four 
projects were funded. Three of the four projects were managed by 
trade associations and one was managed by a nonprofit economic 
development organization. Two of the projects received $90,000, one 
$80,000, and one $25,000.
While the proposal guidelines for MAIN were very general so that 
each industry could design a project tailored to its needs, the evalua 
tion committee placed the greatest emphasis on two criteria. The first 
was the formation of a strong Steering Committee comprised, at a min 
imum, of business representatives from the industry and trade union 
representatives if the industry was unionized. The membership of the 
Steering Committee could be expanded to include others from the
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community with a special interest in the industry. For example, some 
Steering Committees had representation from local economic develop 
ment organizations, vocational-technical schools, and community col 
leges. The second requirement was a detailed description of how the 
Steering Committee would use a strategic audit process to identify the 
industry structure, key market trends, common problems and opportu 
nities, patterns of innovation, and strategies for improvement.
The importance of the Steering Committee to the success of the 
MAIN projects must be emphasized. The Steering Committee had 
three roles; first, to direct all phases of the project and to ensure that it 
was industry-led and industry-driven; second, to coordinate and inte 
grate services available in the region that can support the industry; and 
third, to resolve conflicts between stakeholder groups in the industry.
It is also useful to highlight the importance of the strategic audit 
process. The strategic audit produces information and often surprising 
results that can lead to what Chuck Sabel of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology has described as "cooperation through studied consen 
sus." This is especially true if the audit relies on personal interviews 
with industry leaders. Used in this way, the audit becomes a tool to 
draw more firms and unions into the project, uncover industry leaders, 
develop new cooperative relationships, and organize the industry for 
improvement projects.
Key problem areas emerged in all four projects almost immediately 
after the strategic audits started. Tooling and machining firms identi 
fied as their most critical problem a shortage of tool and die makers 
and, in partnership with high schools, launched a youth apprenticeship 
program; foundries began to develop a strategy for disposing of 
foundry sand; plastics companies identified the need for new types of 
equipment that would be shared by the firms, as well as new training 
and export programs; and apparel firms focused on developing tech 
nology, marketing, new services, work organization, and supervisory 
training strategies.
Since 1991, the MAIN initiatives have been managed by Pennsylva 
nia's Industrial Resource Centers (IRCs). The IRCs, which were estab 
lished by Governor Robert P. Casey in 1988, are regionally based, 
industry-led, nonprofit corporations. Overseen by the Office of Tech 
nology Development, the IRCs are the manufacturing equivalent of the 
agriculture extension service. Staffed by professionals with industrial
Collaborative Restructuring Efforts 95
and economic development experience, they help firms in their regions 
adopt modern manufacturing technologies and techniques. The IRCs 
accomplish this goal by working one-on-one with individual compa 
nies, and by forming networks of related firms as in the MAIN 
approach.
This report focuses in detail on one of the MAIN initiatives—the 
Lehigh Valley Apparel and Textile Innovation Network. This project 
distinguishes itself from the others by a high degree of union involve 
ment. As such, it is an important example of how a labor-management 
participation process at the industry level could help spark the restruc 
turing and modernization of a regional industry.
The Lehigh Valley Apparel and Textile 
Innovation Network
In 1988 there were approximately 125,000 people employed in the 
apparel and textile industry in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
accounting for 13 percent of the total manufacturing employment sec 
tor. Over 50,000 of these employees were members of either the Amal 
gamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) or the 
International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU).
The apparel and textile industry of Pennsylvania has been under 
severe competitive pressure in recent years. Both production and 
employment have declined sharply as a result. In 1988, apparel alone 
accounted for over $21 billion or 15.5 percent of the total U.S. trade 
deficit Approximately 60 percent of U.S. expenditure on apparel went 
to foreign-made garments, and the great bulk of these imports origi 
nated in low-wage countries. The failure of this industry to respond to 
competitive pressures was readily apparent, and Pennsylvania was par 
ticularly hard hit. For example, from 1974 to 1985, the industry 
declined more than 37 percent within the Commonwealth, while 
nationwide the decline was 16.5 percent.
This innovation effort centers on the Lehigh Valley, including the 
municipalities of Easton, Bethlehem, and Allentown, and the counties 
of Northampton and Lehigh. Textiles and apparel represent the largest 
employment sector in the area.
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The industry in the Lehigh Valley has changed from one based on 
local competition for long runs of limited styles, to one facing short 
runs, new fabrics, rapid style changes, higher quality standards, and 
worldwide competition.
Strategy
It was believed that competitive advantage could be returned to this 
industry by improving production methods and work organization to 
meet the changing demands of retailers for quick response capability 
and improved quality. Firms in the Lehigh Valley can take advantage 
of their proximity to the market by moving from the lower price point 
niche to the higher end, which is less price-sensitive and more con 
cerned with characteristics such as quality, design, delivery, and rapid 
response to style changes. Firms able to supply products with these 
attributes to manufacturers and retailers would be less vulnerable to 
competition from lower-priced imports.
Relationships
Over the past decade, joint labor-management efforts in planning 
and problemsolving have produced significant results in individual 
organizations. Improvements include fuller use of human resources, 
higher quality products and services, and closer coordination between 
departments, divisions, and plants. Most of these systems have been 
developed separately in individual firms. However, based on this expe 
rience we believe that many of these lessons could be applied to the 
problems of smaller firms in a specific industry clustered in a particular 
geographic region.
It was critical for the firms within the apparel and textile industry to 
be able to constantly adjust their responses to pressures from domestic 
and international competitive forces. Flexible and adaptive economies 
are dependent on a high level of trust among the participants. The 
industry needed to develop vehicles for increasing the trust level and 
productive working relationships.
Goals
There were four specific goals in mind as Pennsylvania developed 
this initiative:
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(1) Create a joint effort on the part of labor unions, owners and man 
agers of firms, trade associations, economic development agencies, 
educational institutions, and state and local government to design and 
direct an effort toward developing a common understanding of the 
problems of the apparel and textile industry in the Lehigh Valley, and 
develop a joint approach toward implementing solutions to these prob 
lems.
(2) Demonstrate that economic development efforts in this and other 
fragmented industries can more effectively be directed to a specific 
sector concentrated geographically, rather than to individual firms.
(3) Develop vertical and horizontal linkages between firms to deal 
with inefficiencies, and create new learning opportunities in this frag 
mented industry.
(4) Establish in the Lehigh Valley an ongoing structure and process 
dynamic enough to continue to evaluate the needs of the industry and 
generate solutions.
Steering Committee
The first step of this project focused on the Steering Committee. 
This group met every month and represented the varied constituencies 
within the industry, as described above. In order to form a cohesive 
group, we wanted to establish a common base of understanding of both 
individual and group needs. The problem of industry fragmentation 
was mirrored in the Steering Committee, so the process of creating a 
common vision for the industry had to start with this group. Through a 
planning process, and by discussing the findings of the strategic audit, 
a common understanding of the problems of the industry and a com 
mon vision of a direction for the industry were developed. Relations 
between members began to improve, as members shared information 
on training, technology, marketing and labor force recruitment.
The Steering Committee's membership was as follows:
•the Executive Director of the Atlantic Apparel Contractors' Associ 
ation and the President of the Valley Apparel and Textile Associa 
tion
•four owners or senior managers of firms
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•four International Union Vice-Presidents (two from the ILGWU, 
and two from ACTWU)
• the Executive Director of the Bethlehem Industrial Resource Cen 
ter
•the Superintendent of the Easton Area School District
•the Director of the Computer-Integrated Manufacturing Laboratory 
at Lehigh University
•the Dean of Community Education, Northampton Community Col 
lege
•the Principal of Northampton Vocational-Technical School
In organizing the Lehigh Valley Apparel and Textile Innovation Net 
work, we attempted to ensure that:
•all stakeholding organizations were represented in a meaningful 
way;
•the Network continued to organize itself through working groups, 
allowing for the broadening and deepening of involvement;
•the activities of all groups resulted in a process of mutual education 
of each organization's needs, concerns and goals;
•the Network became a forum where the groups could work toward 
solutions to problems;
•trust relationships developed between the various stakeholders, 
which would serve as a foundation for additional activities.
Working Groups
The Steering Committee formed working groups made up of its own 
members and representatives from individual firms, as well as outside 
resources. Such a mix results in a pool of skills and serves as a method 
to both broaden and deepen the industry's involvement. The working 
groups, which are both educational and organizing vehicles, were 
formed around labor force recruitment and retention, public relations, 
marketing, and technology.
The results of the Exit Survey, a study of employee turnover, helped 
the Labor Force Working Group develop an integrated approach to the
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issues of recruitment and retention by developing an entry-level skills 
training course through the Commonwealth's Department of Com 
merce and a local community college; an industry-specific supervisory 
training program; and a strategy for upgrading the skills of the existing 
workforce in conjunction with the local vocational-technical high 
school.
These activities of the Labor Force Working Group had the added 
benefit of teaching the various stakeholding organizations about each 
others' concerns and issues. Another activity was the development of 
internal resources within individual firms to improve communications, 
problemsolving, quality, and planning. These internal resources are 
available as trainers in the plants and facilitate group problemsolving.
The Technology Working Group focused on the development of an 
apparel-specific technology training course at a local area community 
college. This activity also included the development of a videotape 
presentation of the new technology available to apparel firms in the 
hopes of encouraging broader use.
In addition to the above activities, another working group has been 
developing a program to promote the industry and to improve its 
image. Such an activity can help local recruitment as well as make 
New York City manufacturers (the source of most of the work sewn in 
the Lehigh Valley) aware of innovations taking place within the Lehigh 
Valley.
Labor's Role in Economic Development
Organized labor can play a unique role in this type of economic 
development activity. First, labor can project democratic values into 
decisions regarding the selection of new technologies (such as Unit 
Production systems, CAD/CAM applications, Programmable Sewing 
Machines, and Modular Manufacturing) and how these technologies 
are deployed. If the decisions are made without labor's input, then the 
cooperation needed to fully take advantage of these investments will 
be limited. Labor unions must be prepared to serve as the voice mecha 
nism that resolves workers' fears about displacement, or fears of hav 
ing their skills rendered obsolete. Furthermore, this voice function can 
encourage substantive input into the selection of the technology and 
the organizational design that accompanies the technology's deploy 
ment
100 Collaborative Restructuring Efforts
Second, labor competently trained in business strategy and manage 
ment is uniquely able to add value, providing substantive input, con 
tributing to the competitive success of the industry. Union officers have 
been trained by their unions to think critically about management deci- 
sionmaking, not simply in terms of economic costs and benefits and 
rates of return, but also in terms of social costs. Furthermore, both the 
ACTWU and ILGWU have long histories of providing industrial engi 
neering and technical expertise to employers with whom they have 
contractual relations.
Labor unions can play a role that assures their traditional concerns 
for democratic values and principles are projected into the managerial 
decisionmaking process. Unions can provide a valuable review func 
tion by an independent, competent body. In order to fulfill these 
responsibilities, however, labor needs to obtain the required skills at all 
levels of its organization.
Strategic Audit
The Steering Committee is responsible for defining and managing 
an economic development initiative for this industry. A critical tool in 
this effort is an audit of firm business, marketing, and human resource 
strategies to identify both the major pressures facing the firms in this 
industry and their most effective responses—what was working and 
what wasn't Meaningful information regarding firms' strategic 
choices is needed in order to describe how successful firms compete. 
We expected the following results:
•Identification of overall industry strategies
•Judgments about future direction
•Identification of subgroups within the industry and the strategy of 
each
•Descriptions of patterns of development and opportunities these 
present for creating interfirm industry networks.
In conducting this audit we focused on 50 leading firms identified 
by the unions, employer associations, or other firms as examples of 
success, innovation, or leadership. Strategy, specific adjustments, and 
choices made over the last five years were examined, as well as trends 
the firms expect will shape direction over the next few years. It was
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important to understand their market niche and any changes they antic 
ipated in price point, quality, delivery, product mix, and batch size. 
Particular attention was paid to innovative relationships contractors 
developed with manufacturers and retailers involving new products 
and services.
The audits involved management and production systems, including 
the organization of production, and the integration of technology. The 
research also covered relationships between contractors, subcontract 
ing arrangements, and opportunities for networks to share information, 
resources, and services. An assessment of training activity was 
included to determine the skill levels currently pursued by the industry.
Finally, we explored the institutional responses of the ILGWU and 
ACTWU to the restructuring taking place. The unions' strategies for 
the future were of interest, as were the responses by the employers' 
associations, one of which bargains directly with the ILGWU repre 
senting its members.
In summary, the strategic audit has become a way for the Steering 
Committee to:
•describe where this industry is currently positioned and the strate 
gic choices that have already been made;
•identify a strategic vision for the industry; and
•develop a plan to close the gap.
Preliminary Results of Strategic Audit
The apparel industry has changed from one based largely on domes 
tic competition and regional markets, to one based on global markets 
and international competitors. This has meant a proliferation of prod 
ucts, an increase in season and style changes, and a growth of market 
niches. Products are more specialized for particular market segments, 
and quality demands have increased. Further, retailers have sought to 
minimize their risk and financing costs by dramatically reducing their 
inventory levels. By reducing inventories, they have also attempted to 
minimize the need for discounting. They have moved to smaller orders 
and shorter lead times, hoping to be able to respond to market trends 
through a reorder strategy dependent upon quick turnaround produc 
tion. Since contractors typically have no experience in marketing, 
sales, piece-goods sourcing, design, and relations with retailers, they
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are ill equipped to deal directly with these market changes. Finally, 
some low-cost market segments that have continued to provide long 
runs of standardized products have gravitated to low-wage countries.
There did not appear to be any single strategy followed by the 
majority of the 50 contractors we visited and interviewed. However, 
responses by firms to changes in the competitive environment seem to 
fall into three categories: integrative strategies, partial strategies, and 
nonresponse.
Integrative Strategies
Our study revealed that 25 to 30 percent of the firms were experi 
encing significant growth in sales, profits, or employment These suc 
cessful firms were union as well as nonunion, some older and well 
established and others in business for less than 10 years. Our audit of 
firm business and marketing strategies revealed that these firms have 
developed innovative ways to deal effectively with the new competi 
tion by breaking out of the traditional contractor-manufacturer rela 
tionship and structure. The new relationships and strategies have some 
common characteristics which appear to be transferable to other firms.
The most general characteristic that these firms share is that they 
have increased the services they provide to manufacturers and retailers. 
These services include the following:







•coordinating production among a group of firms
•ensuring quality control in subcontractors
•sourcing and financing piece-goods
•managing all of the above services among a group of firms (total 
packaging)
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While few contractors provide all of these services, it is important to 
note that traditionally these functions were controlled by manufactur 
ers. Contractors are offering services they have traditionally never pro 
vided. They provide these services for retailers' private labels or for 
manufacturers who now want to shift responsibility to contractors for 
such services as design, patterns, grading, and marker-making, thus 
allowing for more rapid response to market trends through co-locating 
design and production, and involving multiple firms (contractors) in 
the design, marketing, and product development end of the business. 
Contractors in some cases collaborate with manufacturers on "design 
for manufacturability," so that they can increase the speed of design/ 
style changes for new seasons. These collaborations are also geared to 
lower production costs and improve quality. Multiple innovative con 
tractors are able to specialize in a variety of market niches and thereby 
simultaneously offer a range of products and delivery times that single 
manufacturers could not develop on their own. Those who provide 
these services have broken out of the mold of the typical contractor and 
benefit through increased sales.
Contractors decrease turnaround time and their ability for quick 
delivery response by increasing their line flexibility for rapid change- 
overs and broader product mix. In some cases 'lead contractors" go 
beyond their own firms and take responsibility for coordinating large 
orders among a network of contractors for a given manufacturer. Con 
tractors also go beyond the boundaries of their own shop and take 
responsibility for quality assurance away from the manufacturer, in 
some cases sending their inspectors to other subcontractors.
Firms in this category have been able to successfully change their 
relationship to the market, offering new products and services to manu 
facturers and retailers, and asserting control in relationships where pre 
viously there existed only dependency.
These firms attempted to institute changes in each of the critical 
dimensions identified (see Figure 1). Further, they appear to have 
achieved some measure of internal consistency in their systems, inte 
grating across multiple dimensions.
Partial Strategies
These responses were directed toward a particular dimension, i.e., 
technology, workforce, or other related topics. They tend to be specific 
programmatic changes in the operations, such as new equipment or
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training programs. These responses were not directed toward changing 
the relationship to the market, i.e., manufacturers or retailers. Further, 
they tended not to be integrated across dimensions. Approximately 40 
percent of the firms interviewed fell into this category.
Figure 1
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Nonresponse
Finns in this category were simply hoping their competitive situa 
tion would improve, and they were not proactive in responding 
through strategic changes in their operations. Approximately 30 per 
cent of the firms interviewed fell into this category.
Making the Transition
In trying to understand how the innovative plants were able to break 
out of the traditional relationships between contractors and manufac 
turers, we detected three general patterns which distinguished them 
from the balance of the firms in the sample. We have called these pat 
terns generational, skill-based, and new entrants. The firms character 
ized as generational appear to be making the shift into new services or 
business strategies as a generation of new owners takes over from the 
earlier generation. Members of this new generation either ignore the 
structural boundaries that define the role of a contractor, or simply do 
not feel the constraints their parents did, and are expanding what con 
tractors typically offer.
The group characterized as making a skill-based shift are people 
who come into the contracting business with nontraditional skill bases 
such as design, sales, or expertise in computer technology. These peo 
ple use their skills to drive new competitive strategies, such as product 
design, CAD/CAM production, or piece-goods sourcing.
The group characterized as new entrants is based on a population of 
new immigrants to the Lehigh Valley from both the Far East and Mid 
dle East. These immigrants contract in a nontraditional way, possibly 
because they had a different tradition in their country of origin, or they 
didn't see the same constraints. The innovative firms identified have 
one of these characteristics, having redefined their business by break 
ing out of traditional patterns.
Labor Force Retention
The apparel and textile industry of the Lehigh Valley in Pennsylva 
nia has faced a severe labor shortage. The industry has experienced 
great difficulty in its efforts to recruit and retain workers. An assump 
tion by both unions and management has been that the majority of peo-
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pie who left this industry did so primarily because of layoffs, shop 
closings, or dissatisfaction with compensation levels.
We conducted a survey of 3,213 people who have left this industry 
in the Lehigh Valley over the past few years in order to better under 
stand what improvements could be made to retain the current work 
force. Almost 60 percent of those leaving the industry in the last five 
years left voluntarily, not as the result of layoffs or shop closings. Fur 
ther, the primary factors cited were "treatment" issues—supervisors, 
underutilized abilities, lack of opportunities for advancement, and the 
pressures of the piece-rate system. These four treatment issues 
accounted for more than 51 percent of the responses when people indi 
cated what would be their primary reason for departure, while pay was 
the main factor for only 26 percent of the respondents.
The importance of these treatment factors was reinforced when the 
new jobs people have taken in other industries were compared with 
their old apparel jobs. The new jobs were rated consistently higher on 
factors such as treatment by supervisor, opportunities for promotion, 
and whether workers felt a sense of accomplishment.
Further, workers in the apparel and textile industry perceived that 
their old sewing jobs required less skill than their new jobs. This per 
ception might exist, in part, because of the lack of formal training in 
the apparel industry and the significant amount of training reported by 
employees in their new jobs.
Improvement of treatment factors may provide the apparel and tex 
tile industry the greatest opportunity to retain workers, and the industry 
itself has significant control over this area.
Conclusions and Implications
These findings have implications for the management systems used 
by apparel firms in the Lehigh Valley. If this industry is to be success 
ful in retaining the skilled workforce necessary to compete in a global 
marketplace, it will have to adopt new methods of training, supervi 
sion, and compensation. In addition, new systems of production are 
necessary to meet the changing demands of the market for higher qual 
ity products in smaller volumes, with more rapid style changes and
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quick turnaround production. We believe that the same factors of work 
organization and skill development that have implications for work 
force retention are also critical for marketplace competition. While 
addressing treatment factors will not solve all of the competitive prob 
lems this industry faces, increasing skill levels and allowing for greater 
use of workers' capabilities can contribute to building and retaining a 
skilled and motivated workforce, thereby improving quality, produc 
tivity, and market responsiveness. This means integrating technology 
and participation in a way that supports positive human resource prac 
tices as well as the changing needs of the market. The Lehigh Valley 
Apparel and Textile Innovation Network must explore and demonstrate 
new ways to solve both the competitive problems this industry faces 
from outside and the very human problems it faces from within.
The effort in the Lehigh Valley is developing some new approaches 
for solving problems associated with industrial restructuring and 
increasing competitiveness. One of these innovations is a process of 
joint labor-management strategic planning at the industry level to iden 
tify a future direction for this region, as well as to put in place a more 
supportive infrastructure. The systems emerging are both social and 
technical, involving the development of new relationships as well as 
new systems of production.
The Lehigh Valley Network attempts to help contractors unable to 
make these changes on their own by providing workshops, confer 
ences, training, direct technical assistance, and access to best-practice 
examples. The Network helps noncompetitive firms improve by expos 
ing them to new models, and providing the resources and leadership 
necessary to make the transition.
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75.
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in the State of Michigan
Michael Schippani*
The 1980s was a period of extensive experimentation in industrial 
policy in the State of Michigan. The need for a new strategy was obvi 
ous to those who were struggling with the rapid changes in the struc 
ture and vitality of the economy. The state was hit very hard by the 
recession in the early 1980s. The global reorganization of the auto 
industry meant massive job loss, fiscal crises for government, and a 
declining standard of living for many citizens.
In 1983, first-term Governor James Blanchard and his economic 
policy staff responded by organizing a policy advisory group to craft a 
strategy for maintaining and revitalizing the industrial base. The group 
was led by Douglas Fraser, former president of the International 
Union, UAW, and Lee lacocca of the Chrysler Corporation. The delib 
erations resulted in a three-pronged strategy based on a vision of the 
future of Michigan as an international center for the development and 
application of manufacturing technology.
The first part of the plan was to develop an applied technology strat 
egy. The goal was to design public and private programs, and ulti 
mately build institutions, that would be in the business of developing 
and applying technology to the manufacturing base in Michigan and 
the nation.
The second part of the state's strategy was to complement the pri 
vate capital markets with new innovation capital and capital-gap 
financing. A new institution called the Michigan Strategic Fund was 
developed to perform a variety of financing functions in an attempt to 
bridge the gaps perceived to exist in the private financial markets.
The last area of concern was titled "workforce learning and work 
relations"; that is, education, training, and innovations in labor rela-
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tions to meet the needs of the changing workforce and to help adapt to 
the changing labor relations structures and practices in the workplace. 
This third part of the strategy, investing in "human capital" and reform 
ing the related institutions, proved to be the most difficult part to craft 
change strategies that could be measured for their effectiveness.
The three-part effort was an aggressive state intervention strategy to 
create new public investment and program vehicles and to turn around 
the faltering industrial economy of the early 1980s. These new institu 
tions were expected to deliver a steady stream of services into a revital 
ized industrial base.
Publicly Supported Institutions for Manufacturing
To implement the overall strategy, state government, with the assis 
tance of private foundations, supported the development of the Indus 
trial Technology Institute, a nonprofit organization staffed by 
manufacturing engineers and social scientists. The original design for 
the Institute was to create and develop new technology for manufactur 
ing. The strategy has since been adjusted to include the application of 
existing and appropriate technology and production processes into the 
Michigan industrial base by leveraging resources and concentrating on 
particular geographic areas, industries, and technologies.
The second institution created was the Michigan Modernization Ser 
vice (MMS), which was designed to serve as the state's major outreach 
service to the small and medium-sized manufacturers. It is the largest 
public organization of its kind in the United States with the mission of 
delivering strategic advice to small and medium-sized firms on tech 
nology, training, and marketing issues.
MMS functions through consultations with individual firms and by 
working on projects with groups of firms. The consultations are carried 
out by three-person teams with expertise in manufacturing methods 
and technologies, workforce training, and market analysis and market 
ing planning. The typical case involves five days of work from each of 
three members of the team. One of the products is a detailed written 
report analyzing the firm's performance and a series of recommenda 
tions for change.
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The individual firm consultations typically cover several areas, 
including strategic business planning, technology utilization, produc 
tivity improvements, general management issues, quality control, 
workforce training, labor relations (in unionized settings), and market 
analysis and planning. The service is provided at no cost to the firm.
MMS also works with groups of firms to encourage cooperation 
among firms and between groups of firms and other players in the 
economy. This program is carried out through grants to groups of 
firms, trade associations, or unions. Projects that have been funded 
include: production networks in the metal working and furniture indus 
tries; research and development strategies for the machine tool indus 
try; and a program for auto parts suppliers, represented by Region 1-A 
of the United Auto Workers.
MMS has an annual budget of approximately $4 million. The staff 
consists of a combination of state employees, private contractors, and 
employees of private, nonprofit organizations such as the Industrial 
Technology Institute in Ann Arbor.
Focusing on the Smaller-Firm Sector
As a number of researchers have noted, firms with 20 to 500 
employees produce over 40 percent of the value added in American 
manufacturing. MMS and the Industrial Technology Institute made a 
decision to target the small-firm sector because (1) the smaller firms 
did not have the resources or the market opportunities that the larger- 
firm sector had, (2) the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
were increasing the amount of outsourcing to the supplier sector, and 
(3) the productivity gaps between the large firms and the small firms 
was growing (see Figure 1). As a result of the restructuring of the 
industrial system, wage gaps were growing, unionization rates between 
the small and large industrial firms were growing apart,1 and there was 
a need to focus public attention and, indeed, public investment on the 
small-firm sector of the industrial economy.
In Michigan, there are about 6,000 small to medium-sized manufac 
turing firms, employing 500,000 workers, with a total payroll of about 
$11 billion. In all, they account for close to half of the Michigan manu-
112 Labor and Industrial Relations Strategies in the State of Michigan
factoring economy. The proportion of the manufacturing base repre 
sented by the smaller-firm sector has been steadily increasing. The 
percent of manufacturing employment in smaller firms increased from 
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As the new flexible technologies reduce the importance of econo 
mies of scale, and as the large U.S. manufacturers continue to see mar 
ket share threatened, more and more employment will be in small and 
medium-sized shops. Unless more is done to improve productivity and 
thereby raise wages, benefits, and conditions, the high industrywide 
living standards that exist will be threatened.
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A Role for Unions and Workers
Throughout the 1980s we have seen many of the country's leading 
industrial states treat technology as a central element in the emerging 
equation of international competitiveness. It is usually only on an ad 
hoc basis, however, and often during a crisis, that those most affected 
by technological change—the workforce—are brought into the process 
to play a role in designing change strategies.
The goal of a technology strategy that includes unions and workers 
would be to mitigate the negative impacts of new technology and begin 
to empower workers to participate as an equal partner in the process of 
technological change. To do so would involve the development of pro 
grams that include a clear assessment of the effects of technology, an 
awareness of the possibilities for influencing changes, the exploration 
of options, and availability of appropriate technical assistance.
The Michigan Modernization Service is a strong actor in the state's 
technology thrust. Up until very recently, MMS has defined its cus 
tomer base to include only the management of the companies served 
by the organization. There has been no formal process to communicate 
with the workforce or union on any of the issues discussed by the 
firms' management and MMS consultants.
Beginning in 1988, the state Departments of Commerce and Labor 
supported the development of a labor-management effort that would 
provide information and services to strengthen and improve labor- 
management relations in smaller workplaces where workers are repre 
sented by a recognized trade union.
After an intensive period of research and development, the labor- 
management project developed tools to (1) analyze the union-manage 
ment relationship in smaller firms within the context of business condi 
tions and the needs of the workforce, (2) recommend appropriate 
changes, and (3) deliver training on participation strategies.
After field testing the service to over 30 firms and their unions, the 
state's labor-management project began to transfer the labor relations 
assessment and training instruments to existing public and nonprofit 
institutions like MMS. As a result of a strategic planning process, 
MMS agreed to incorporate a role for the union and the workforce as a 
part of the consultation process. The case of Philips Drop Forge, out-
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lined below, provided additional evidence to MMS leadership of the 
importance of involving unions in designing change strategies.
The Case of Philips Drop Forge
The primary business of Philips Drop Forge is the production of 
steel forgings with conventional drop hammers. Most of the production 
is for automotive applications. Founded in the early 1900s in down 
town Detroit, the company has just under 100 employees who are rep 
resented by a local of the International Union, UAW. Due to the change 
in materials (from forging to castings and powdered metals), newer 
processes and overseas competition, the firm needed to restructure to 
remain in business. The owner indicated a need to see a restructuring 
plan in place and indications of a turnaround before the end of 1990 as 
a requirement for the continued operation of the business.
A local UAW representative, through the union's regional office, 
requested that the state consider providing turnaround assistance to 
Philips Drop Forge. The request was made to the state's Labor-Man 
agement Project. A decision was made to offer the assistance of both 
the Michigan Modernization Service and the Labor-Management 
Project
Figure 2 shows a comparative analysis by the state's Labor-Manage 
ment Project of the separate turnaround recommendations by MMS 
and the union shop committee at the plant. The reader should look 
across the boxes to understand the alternative perspectives. For exam 
ple, while the MMS staff recommended a generic "employee involve 
ment" program as a response to the poor economic conditions of the 
business, the union leadership insisted that a joint union-management 
steering committee be organized, trained, and empowered to plan and 
manage a change agenda for the facility.
The importance of the specific proposals put forward by the union is 
that (1) they reflect the significance of the collective bargaining agree 
ment, and (2) they emanate from a clear recognition of a worker's 
organization that has ideas based on experience and that is independent 
from management with different goals and values.
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Figure! 
Philips Drop Forge/U AW
Comparable Issues/Different Perspectives
MMS Action Plan 
Recommendations
a. Introduce employee involvement by 
communication from owner on poor 
financial condition of company
b. Management and workforce 
training on problemsolving, SPC, 
teambuilding, hammerman
c. Track incoming material inspection 
data
d. Conduct hot inspections with cheap 
fixtures
e. Group purchasing and better 
utilization of material
f. Preventive maintenance program 
g. Explore viability of gainsharing
UAW174 Action Plan 
Recommendations
a. Empower joint union-management 
steering committee to manage and 
plan the change agenda
b. Address qualifications of 
supervisors; provide personnel 
skills training
c. Smarter steel ordering to reduce 
scrap
Identify sources for better quality 
steel
d. Management must make effort to 
repair and maintain equipment
e. Gainsharing plan must be evaluated, 
fully implemented so that payoff of 
new initiatives is clear to the 
workers
Different Issues
MMS Action Plan 
Recommendations
a. Closer relationship with major 
customers
b. Track inventory
c. Tool control program
d. Quality team on high-value part
UAW 174 Action Plan 
Recommendations
a. Company has too many supervisors, 
white-collar staff
b. Collective bargaining agreement 
will not be opened as a result of this 
activity
c. Entire workforce must be informed 
and educated about the problems 
and plans for change
d. UAW research department should 
analyze finances.
e. Create health and safety joint 
training program
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Recommendations by MMS for restructuring the manufacturing 
process at the facility were presented to both top-level management 
and the entire workforce at an off-site meeting. The proposals were 
debated and an action plan for the future was agreed upon. Company 
management, recognizing the need to more formally and completely 
involve the union in the change process, agreed to support the develop 
ment of a top-level joint steering committee which would assume 
responsibility for implementing participation strategies to meet the 
objectives of the action plan.
Labor as Catalyst to Strengthen an Industrial Sector
Beyond the individual workplace level are a variety of structural 
issues that planners ignore at their peril. Globalization of manufactur 
ing processes due to capital mobility and the existence of cheap labor 
havens around the world are seriously affecting the U.S. auto supply 
industry. Suppliers, faced with higher demands from automakers for 
quality, just-in-time delivery, lower-cost production, and greater design 
capabilities have found it increasingly difficult to succeed in a more 
competitive marketplace. The number of U.S. suppliers has declined as 
U.S. automakers limit contracts to those suppliers who provide a fuller 
complement of services and can meet increasing demands. Likewise, 
most U.S. suppliers have not been successful in winning over Japanese 
automakers more accustomed to doing business based on long-term 
relationships.
To respond to this environment, and in the face of inadequate fed 
eral policy measures designed to introduce fair trade practices into the 
system, management and labor must equip themselves to save their 
businesses and their jobs. However, they must also recognize that each 
firm acting alone does not have the resources or the expertise to be able 
to respond effectively at every turn in the road.
Regional Director Bob King of UAW Region 1-A, representing over 
100 independent parts suppliers in southwestern Detroit, developed a 
plan for a labor-management Council of Independent Parts Suppliers. 
The Michigan Modernization Service provided a planning grant to 
begin the process. The Council's goals include (1) providing the union
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and management with new tools to improve company performance and 
save jobs; (2) strengthening labor-management relations in small sup 
plier shops; (3) developing a program that will help stop job losses and 
plant closings in the small-shop sector; (4) building a new government/ 
labor/management collaborative process; and (5) targeting appropriate 
publicly available education, training, and technical services to the 
union and companies involved in the Council.
The project began with solicitations to 10 firms to establish the 
Council. Over 20 firms ultimately formed the organizing committee of 
the Council, with both top management and union leadership from 
each plant attending meetings.
Over the course of several meetings, participants heard presenta 
tions describing the current state of the auto industry and global exam 
ples of interfirm strategies. A day-long planning session was held to 
develop priorities. Groups were organized around (1) interfirm strate 
gies to improve competitiveness; (2) skill development; (3) participa 
tion strategies; (4) health, safety, and environmental issues; and (5) 
employee assistance programs.
As a result of the planning meetings, the membership of the Council 
crafted a two-part strategy. First, a Market Development and Job 
Retention program was created to help meet the challenges of external 
demands. The program included (1) documenting the technology, 
skills, and production capabilities of member firms; (2) establishing a 
formal relationship between the Council and the sourcing managers of> 
the large manufacturers; (3) aggregating the production capabilities of 
member firms and identifying co-production possibilities; and (4) con 
ducting industry-specific research and auto industry information-shar 
ing sessions.
The second part of the strategy involved an Individual Firm Perfor 
mance and Quality Jobs program. This program was established recog 
nizing the fact that the implementation of any restructuring effort 
would need to be accomplished at the individual firm level, and that 
the interrelationship between the nature of industrial relations and the 
economic performance of the firm was a determining factor. Included 
in the action plan for the program was (1) implementing UAW Right- 
To-Know training; (2) developing a cost-sharing program; (3) imple 
menting labor-management training programs; and (4) analyzing the
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skill demand needs of member firms to determine the content of a 
training agenda.
The key for this union-led project was to strike a balance between 
worker needs and business realities, on the one hand, and between edu 
cation/information and action, on the other. At a recent Council plan 
ning meeting, one firm owner stood up to declare "for me this Council 
represents an opportunity to recognize the union in my plant as a stra 
tegic weapon in our effort toward industrial growth and renewal."
The Need for a Strategic Response
Union-initiated industrial restructuring activity raises important 
strategic questions for trade unions and public policymakers. What 
institutional resources need to be developed to significantly increase 
the participation of workers and unions in this environment? How do 
we shape existing institutions toward the objective of addressing work 
ers' problems in the workplace and strengthening the unions for future 
struggles in both the workplace and in economic policymaking?
Models of government support for strengthening the role of unions 
and workers in firm and industry decisionmaking exist in Canada and 
Western Europe.3 Many of these competitively successful countries 
have established high standards of living by investing in modern edu 
cation, labor market, and industry-specific policies and programs 
designed by innovative institutional partnerships between government, 
business, and labor; a partnership where labor plays a more co-equal 
role than that experienced in the U.S.
The development of a more strategic role for trade unions in the 
restructuring process is an important part of the process to stop the 
decline of unionization and to save the U.S. manufacturing base. State 
government, by commanding or effecting the deployment of technol 
ogy, training, and financial services could act as a catalyst to counter 
the short term bias of current federal policies and private sector behav 
ior. A public policy of assistance to workers and unions that comple 
ments and underpins all other interventions in the industrial economy 
can greatly enhance the prospects for maintaining good jobs and 
improving industry performance.
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Epilogue
With an 11,000 vote margin, the newly elected Republican gover 
nor, by the stroke of a pen, closed down many of the programs serving 
Michigan's industrial community in the winter of 1990. Calling them 
"tinsel on the tree," the new governor shut down programs such as the 
Michigan Modernization Service. As a result, hundreds of smaller 
firms and thousands of workers would no longer have the benefit of 
publicly supported technical assistance in their struggle to maintain 
jobs and competitiveness.
Along with the loss of MMS went the start-up grant to help the 
UAW Region 1-A Labor-Management Council of Independent Parts 
Suppliers. To survive, the leadership organized a membership fund- 
raising effort among the local unions and participating firms. Over 20 
firms and the related union locals raised enough membership dues 
money to maintain the organization and staff, and bought some time to 
reorganize and identify outside funding sources.
The reorganization plan apparently satisfied federal IRS officials, 
winning tax-exempt status for the group and building the basis for 
attracting private foundation funds. The newly named Labor-Manage 
ment Council for Economic Renewal serves as the education arm of 
the more action-oriented Labor-Management Suppliers Council.
More recently, the group was the recipient of a grant from the Man 
ufacturing Technology Center (MTC), located at the Industrial Tech 
nology Institute. The MTC is one of five centers around the country 
sponsored by the government-financed National Institute of Standards 
and Technology. The MTC's Cooperative Capability Project, with the 
UAW/IPS Labor-Management Council, is assisting member firms and 
union locals in identifying and building interfirm production activity, 
or networks, with the goal of capturing business that is disproportion 
ately being outsourced to the nonunion sector by the original equip 
ment manufacturers.
The International Union, UAW, made an industrial policy proposal 
in 1983 that called for national coordination, democratic decisionmak- 
ing, a strong role for government, and the use of social accounting 
principles in the evaluation of industrial and employment policies and 
programs. Looking back, it appears that some people were listening.
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Michigan in the 1980s was a positive example of the old democratic 
value that ordinary people and honest employers could depend on gov 
ernment for help in the effort to rebuild industry and create jobs. Mich 
igan in the 1990s is a much different place, as jobs disappear and 
whole industrial sectors deteriorate. And no one appears to be listen 
ing.
NOTES
•At the time of writing, Mr. Sdiippani worked for the State of Michigan. He is now employed 
in the research department of the United Automobile Workers union.
1. A July 28, 1990 Detroit Free Press article showed that independent automotive suppliers 
whose workers belong to unions went from 62 percent in 1976 to 22 percent in 1988. Unioniza 
tion of Big Three assembly plants, however, stayed constant relative to the overall decline in 
employment
2. Testimony of John Cleveland, director of MMS, to the Senate Subcommittee on Innovation, 
Technology and Productivity, December 19,1989.
3. The most recent example is the Technology Adjustment Research Program funded by the 
Ontario government Administered by the Ontario Federation of Labor, the purpose of the pro 
gram is "to assist the Ontario trade union movement in developing constructive and progressive 
responses to change in the workplace."
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Applying Skills-Based Automation 
Through Participatory Management
The Center for Applied Technology
Frank Emspak 
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Origins of the Center for Applied Technology
The Center for Applied Technology was first proposed in January 
1987. Governor Dukakis wanted a program that would bring state-of- 
the-art technology to the traditional industries of Massachusetts as a 
means of preserving employment. He also wanted to show his concern 
for issues affecting working people. He asked the Secretary of Labor to 
cooperate with other state agencies to devise a program. The Secretary 
worked with agencies such as Massachusetts Centers of Excellence 
Corporation, the Massachusetts Product Development Corporation, 
and the Industrial Services Program—all quasi-public corporations, 
most under the budgetary authority of the Department of Economic 
Affairs (Commerce). During the spring of 1987, the Centers looked at 
other state industry-university partnership programs, especially those 
in Pennsylvania and Michigan. These programs focused on building 
industry-university partnerships to foster innovation in manufacturing.
The Center for Applied Technology (CAT) was constituted along the 
lines followed in other states—with one important exception as dis 
cussed below. The CAT board reflected the industry-university connec 
tion and the technocratic bent of the administration. Thus the members 
of the board included representatives from three of the most prominent 
engineering schools in the Commonwealth, business representatives 
from two high-technology firms, and state agencies dealing with eco 
nomic development issues. The Center for Applied Technology for 
mally began operations on November 1,1987.
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CAT searched for ways to encourage worker participation in the 
technology design and implementation process. It was this dedication 
to the notion of worker participation in the design process that distin 
guished CAT from other agencies in the state or elsewhere who were 
attempting to assist manufacturers modernize their productive facili 
ties. CAT's work in this area was supported and encouraged by the 
CAT board.
CAT and Worker Participation
Generally speaking, the labor movement has little influence on the 
industry-university model of innovation and economic development. 
CAT wished to alter this traditional model. The objective of worker 
participation was met through both administrative and program initia 
tives.
As an example of an administrative action, the Secretary of Labor 
chaired CATs advisory board. It was felt that by placing the Center 
under the titular direction of the Department of Labor, a signal would 
be sent to the labor movement that CAT was open to labor participation 
in economic development issues. In addition, meaningful participation 
of working people in the economic development process also required 
defining programs in such a way as to encourage participation from all 
groups using manufacturing technologies.
CAT approached this problem by requiring worker participation in 
order for university-industry research partnerships to get financial sup 
port CAT did not specify the form that worker participation should 
take in the research projects, however, it was one of several funding 
criteria. Financial support by CAT for firm-specific technical assistance 
also required that a union, if any, or representatives from the workforce 
be included in any committee that helped define the problems to be 
solved. In addition, all CAT conferences (there were four) were orga 
nized to include both management and labor participation.
While these organizational changes were important in themselves, 
the actual impact of labor/worker participation on the shape and con 
tent of the projects needs to be assessed case by case.
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In CAT'S view, this formal representation is not enough. CAT was 
searching for ways that rank-and-file workers could speak in their own 
right regarding questions of technology design and implementation. 
CAT was aware of the action research models employed in Scandina 
via which might serve as models. However, there are stronger institu 
tions, especially unions, that serve as support for these projects. This 
country does not have that trade union institutional structure that can 
lend support to research projects.
Each project was to try to find a way to involve the user-workers in 
its research. Eventually each research project developed a means of 
involving the end user. For example, the University of Lowell shop- 
floor programming project actually hired machinists to evaluate soft 
ware under review. That phase of their project devised criteria for judg 
ing how the software under discussion was designed, referencing the 
procedures that skilled machinists employed in making a specific part.
Program Development
At the outset of the Center for Applied Technology formation pro 
cess, the Massachusetts Centers of Excellence (MCEC) had a view of 
applying state-of-the-art technology to traditional industry via indus 
try-university partnerships. However, it was not clear to CAT that this 
could be done. While manufacturing in Massachusetts has pockets of 
modernity, a good deal of manufacturing is also not up to current tech 
nical standards. If computers are in use, they are generally in the office 
and not integrated with the shop-floor manufacturing process.
In September 1987, the author made a presentation to the CAT hir 
ing committee proposing a different model of technology implementa 
tion and transfer as an alternative to the state-of-the-art university- 
industry partnership model. Rather than try to apply state-of-the-art 
technology, the author suggested that CAT use the resource that is most 
abundant in the metalworking sector of manufacturing in the Com 
monwealth—skilled workers. Based on the availability of one resource 
(skill) and the lack of another (capital), CAT argued that a skill-based 
strategy which emphasized better use of existing technologies was 
both immediately applicable and would have the most immediate and
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lasting impact on industry. Eventually a successful skill-based 
approach would also put the metalworking industry in a position to use 
more advanced technologies if they made sense. Thus CATs idea was 
to apply appropriate technology, defined as worker-centered and skills- 
based.
From a design point of view, CAT took traditional engineering crite 
ria for machine or process design—such as speed, repeatability, and 
accuracy—and added the enhancement of skill as criteria for designing 
or applying new production methods to a particular shop. In addition 
CAT was sensitive to ergonomic considerations including noise. After 
all if workers can't hear because there's too much noise, they probably 
can't think either.
An industrial system that focuses on skill requires greater emphasis 
on process and on the worker so, automatically, the worker becomes 
more central to the picture than the machine. The CAT technical assis 
tance project at the Pneumatic Scale Company in Quincy, Massachu 
setts met these criteria. Pneumatic was actually two projects—a 
retraining of the assembly workers, who were among the most skilled 
craftspeople in the plant and organization of a manufacturing cell to 
produce spare parts. Deputy CAT director Dr. John Hoops assisted the 
firm and the union in organizing a training program for the assemblers 
with Wentworth Institute that allowed the mechanical and electrical 
assemblers to combine their knowledge with increased familiarity with 
electronics and hydraulics. Thus the assemblers' skills could keep pace 
with the changing machinery they produced. The skilled work was 
kept in the bargaining unit. The jobs of assemblers were kept unified 
by adding an enhanced technical component.
The work cell was an answer to the chronic problems with spare 
parts availability and delivery. Placement of the machines was the least 
difficult task. The organization of production, the role and skill levels 
of the workers, and the proper provision of work and orders to the 
work cell became the focus of the union-management discussions, 
assisted by CAT.
In both examples at Pneumatic, the people were upgraded—not the 
equipment. Organizational solutions which focused on enhancing skill 
were the chosen path. Implementation was aided, and indeed made 
possible, by the active participation in planning and development by 
the unionized workforce.
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From Theory to Practice
CAT's challenge was to take a concept of applied technology based 
on skill, that is, the worker, and turn it into a legitimate, accepted eco 
nomic program. The CAT concept had two parts: an engineering notion 
called skills-based automation, and an implementation pathway based 
on user (worker) participation. In order to make the concepts real, CAT 
decided to fund three distinct types of services. First, they funded the 
Massachusetts Manufacturing Resource Center, a source for informa 
tion about skills-based automation. Second, CAT funded applied 
research in the area of manufacturing. Third, CAT staff organized and 
CAT funded a technical assistance service.
With the organization of three distinct program areas, CAT trans 
formed itself from the conception that the governor had of high-tech 
and state-of-the-art applications. CAT became an organization that pro 
vided down-to-earth advice and assistance to small manufacturers. The 
name didn't change, but the content did. The nature of the project 
changed from a grant-giving institution for research with industry, with 
no labor participation, to a subsidized technology transfer and consul 
tation business with strong labor participation and a supporter of 
research with a strong bias to labor.
The Massachusetts Manufacturing Resource Center
In June 1988 CAT established the Massachusetts Manufacturing 
Resource Center (MMRC). CAT's initial vision for the center was 
drawn from organizations such as the Science Center in Berlin, the 
Norwegian Computing Center and the Worklife Center. CAT hoped the 
MMRC would be a place where unions and manufacturers could come 
together to learn about skill-based manufacturing methods. CAT 
wanted the Center to publicize the concept and explain the benefits. 
CAT also wanted the Center to establish a current, and preferably on 
line, collection of articles and materials to provide examples of 
attempts to employ a skill-based method. The MCEC and CAT boards 
saw the MMRC as a major component of the CAT program and 
devoted one-third of the program budget to the MMRC.
The project was located at TXifts University and at the University of 
Lowell. The University of Lowell is one of the Commonwealth's best
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engineering schools and has a close relationship with industry. It also 
houses an environmental and health and safety program which enjoys 
widespread industry and labor support. TUfts has a focus on engineer 
ing and technical policy issues. CAT felt that the MMRC could draw 
on the expertise of both institutions to establish itself as a source of 
both engineering and policy information.
Program work was divided between the two institutions. The Lowell 
branch established the MMRC library. It collected articles, case stud 
ies, pamphlets, and materials from unions, universities, and companies 
regarding work organization, skills-based automation, and attempts to 
implement skills-based systems. The Lowell team also emphasized its 
contacts with labor, doing some outreach to labor unions and the Mas 
sachusetts State AFL-CIO.
The 1\ifts end of the program began to specialize in the develop 
ment of a network, as one aspect of making the information available 
to potential users. Tufts also worked with some manufacturers to 
assess their views on a skills-based approach with a view to recruiting 
them to the Board of Directors of the MMRC.
CAT made two assumptions in the original thinking regarding the 
MMRC. First, they assumed that as the ideas of alternative manufac 
turing strategies were publicized by the MMRC, business would be 
willing to use the resources of the Center. Second, they felt that as 
unions understood the value of a skills-based approach, they would 
also begin using the Center and vigorously support it CAT hoped that 
unions wanting to pursue a skills-based approach would have a 
resource to draw on for information that would also be 'legitimate" in 
the eyes of management. Therefore the concepts of skills-based manu 
facturing would get wider exposure, and the requisite political support 
from management and labor would develop so as to secure continued 
funding for the MMRC.
For a variety of reasons, the MMRC did not succeed in all of its mis 
sions. From the start there were organizational difficulties engendered 
by the dual location of the MMRC. Problems of coordination and 
focus were magnified by the location of distinct functions at different 
institutions. Second, the MMRC did not stabilize as an organization in 
the first year. A strong board, representing business, labor, and the uni 
versities, and which could and would support the MMRC, never really 
got off the ground. This contributed to the growing lack of financial
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support. In its original plans, CAT intended to support the MMCR at a 
high level for three years, by which time it was felt that the organiza 
tion would have had time to prove its worth. However, under the pres 
sure of continuing and severe state budget cuts, CAT was unable to 
maintain that high level of support. Although a significant level of sup 
port remained, the MMRC had to find other sources of support after 
only 18 months. Therefore, on one level, the inability of the Common 
wealth to make a long-term investment in an alternative manufacturing 
pathway eventually fatally wounded the MMRC.
The combination of different missions on different campuses com 
bined with limited funding possibilities intensified MMRC's drift away 
from its original purpose. As mentioned, one part of the Center (Hifts) 
began to concentrate on electronic networking. In part the theory was 
to help bring about the type of close cooperation between small metal- 
working plants that tends to distinguish northern Italy. The system 
serves to link small concerns for the purpose of marketing and infor 
mation sharing. Eventually it is intended to be a means with which the 
smaller firms can get information on-line from the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) regional technology centers, espe 
cially the one located at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI). How 
ever, while the project has done some extremely interesting work, it 
has also moved away from the skill-based technology aspects. Lack of 
state funding means that now the network receives most of its funding 
from the NIST and increasingly is integrated with the NIST center at 
RPI. As an economic development initiative, especially in regards to 
technology innovation, the network idea has great potential. It is 
unclear if, or how, the network will function on behalf of worker par 
ticipation in the application of technology or proselytizing for skills- 
based automation.
The University of Lowell branch of the MMRC acquired documen 
tation and information regarding skills-based concepts. From the first it 
focused more on building relations with the labor movement, which 
has fewer financial resources to commit to any activity and has rarely 
committed resources to engineering research/documentation. NIST 
and other federal agencies are interested primarily in technology trans 
fer or relatively technocratic models of technological innovation. Thus 
public, i.e., state support, for the Lowell activities is crucial. The Low- 
ell branch was unable to do enough outreach fast enough to establish
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an independent financial base before the fiscal crunch hit. CAT will be 
able to support the library and acquisition functions of the Lowell 
branch, but CAT will not be able to support the other functions at as 
high a level as wished due to changes in funding.
In short, for an MMRC to succeed, a higher level of institutional, 
political, and hence funding commitment will be needed. It may be that 
such an institution is beyond the capacity of one state. It is also clear 
that an MMRC-type institution needs a champion outside of state gov 
ernment—either in industry or labor— in order to serve as a pole of 
attraction for political support.
Applied Research
CAT funded six applied research projects. An example of the 
applied research is the Shop-Floor Programming project that CAT 
sponsors at the University of Lowell. If the worker is central to the pro 
cess and not an afterthought, the design of the man-machine interface 
becomes important. For instance CAD/CAM systems are designed 
with the engineer in mind. Essentially engineers are writing the pro 
grams based on the steps they take when they use computer-aided 
design. The "thought process" in the CAM software mirrors the CAD 
thought process.
Do machinists visualize a problem of machining differently from 
engineers? The Lowell project demonstrated that indeed the answer is 
yes. Thus, if machinists are to have software that allows them to do 
parts programming, the internal architecture of the software must be 
redesigned to match the thought processes of the machinist. In this 
example, the idea of "user-friendly" takes on a different dimension. It 
is not a question of making a keyboard "easy" to use, or of providing a 
menu-driven system with limited selections, but rather a question of 
redesigning the system itself to more closely approximate the way a 
skilled machinist envisions a metalworking problem.
The project at Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) approached the 
problem of worker participation differently. Their objective was to 
develop a more user-friendly and flexible CAD/CAM system for the 
production of sheet metal parts. WPI organized a project with a spe 
cific metalworking shop and gradually over a period of months worked 
out a close relationship with the sheet metal workers in the shop. WPI
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designed a custom training program such that programmers were able 
to upgrade to more design, and machinists were able to do on-line 
shop-floor programming of their machines in response to customer 
demands. Simultaneously, the software was also configured to meet the 
needs of the machinist users. The CAD/CAM system and course is 
now available for distribution. A good deal of time was spent by the 
machinists off the floor at WPI learning the system and providing feed 
back to the researchers as to how it could be modified.
At the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, the problem was more 
difficult Labor relations at the industry partner were poor. The project 
in its initial phases was also pretty abstract in that it was to define 
mathematically the tool path for a grinding wheel doing a complex part 
(a cutting tool). After many discussions with the researcher involved, 
the company, and the unionized grinders, the grinders were able to par 
ticipate more fully in the project. The grinders were able to evaluate at 
the worksite the software produced and visit the University of Massa 
chusetts during working hours to get a better understanding of the 
entire process.
There are very difficult problems to overcome if we are to involve 
working people in a meaningful way in a research project. Institutional 
questions such as paid time off from work are one problem. But cul 
tural problems are another. The university is not the environment that 
most blue-collar workers are used to. Likewise, most professors are not 
used to taking the opinions of shop-floor workers seriously. There are 
also language problems. People speak differently and use different 
words. There may be a period of education needed, so that all partici 
pants in the project can comprehend the significance of the changes in 
software or tool design that they are advocating. This education period 
is not simply aimed at blue-collar workers, but also at researchers since 
they too must learn the significance of proposed design changes on the 
skills and environment of the worker.
Nonetheless, CAT feels it has taken important first steps in this area 
and crossed one crucial barrier. The individual professors involved 
became advocates of the idea. Perhaps, if funding allows, support for 
work in these areas can be deepened and broadened.
The research projects have led to some industrywide changes, and 
they do aid some specific firms. However, for a project such as the 
Lowell project to succeed, significant funding and additional time are
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needed. As of this writing, the funding outlook is not promising. How 
ever, a software development pathway emphasizing worker (blue-col 
lar) skills has significance and can offer a means to bring complicated 
programming functions into the shop in an economic and practical 
fashion.
In CAT's view, the research sponsored should be guided by the 
actual conditions in the field. CAT had to show the industry, by exam 
ple, that a skills-based, participatory model of technical innovation 
would work. CAT also realized that demonstration projects that actu 
ally performed a service to an industry would help make the program 
understandable to the legislature, other business, and local unions. 
Therefore CAT decided to organize "pilot technical assistance 
projects." In effect, CAT became a small industrial extension service, 
using a skills-based model of technical innovation. Some of the 
projects are discussed below.
Technical Assistance Projects
Direct services to the workforce and the manufacturer help validate 
CAT's other work and also provide models for a worker participation 
method of technology innovation. So far, CAT has worked in about 15 
different factories of varying sizes. Approximately 1,000 people were 
employed in the various firms. Projects have ranged from laying out a 
small factory, to designing and implementing a machining cell as part 
of a larger effort to restructure jobs, skills and the work flow in a siz 
able factory. As mentioned earlier, the Pneumatic Scale Company 
project involved not only the design of a cell, but also a general 
upgrading of skills throughout the affected areas. This, in turn, 
required a sizable training program. The objective of the project was to 
ensure the survival of the plant by reducing the time it took to get 
needed spare parts to the customer. In fact, the time was reduced, 
mostly due to paperwork types of reorganization, and the company is 
now prospering. A detailed description of this project would require a 
chapter in itself.
CAT chose to focus on small and medium-sized firms in the metal- 
working industry. The choice of firm size was driven by several fac 
tors. First, Massachusetts industry is characterized by the smaller firm, 
so to serve the Commonwealth the smaller firm should be the recipient
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of aid. Second, most small firms do not have the financial or engineer 
ing resources to adequately access the information they need to apply 
new means of manufacturing to their operations. Third, the number of 
people employed in smaller firms is a significant sector of the work 
force.
CAT chose metalworking for more parochial reasons. Metalworking 
was and is an important producer of wealth in Massachusetts. Metal- 
working supports more than its share of service jobs—one service job 
for each job in metalworking. Metalworkers—especially unionized 
metalworkers—are also the highest-paid manufacturing workers, so 
saving jobs in that sector is a priority. But for CAT, one other important 
reason for choosing metalworking was that the author had worked in 
the industry for 15 years and thus understood a good deal about manu 
facturing conditions and skill levels.
The important aspect of all of these technical assistance projects is 
the participation of the workforce in the projects. By participation, 
CAT means decisionmaking. In each project, CAT organizes a team of 
workers to be part of a committee comprised of management and their 
technical staff (if any), CAT consultant or CAT staff, and the work 
force. This committee figures out what needs to be done and how the 
project should proceed. CAT facilitates that process by providing rele 
vant technical expertise or organizational assistance. The point is to 
bring the workers' knowledge and expertise into the discussion in a 
proactive, meaningful way. This does not mean "cooperation" with a 
preset agenda, but a jointly developed plan for upgrading a particular 
plant or operation. Generally speaking, the union emerges from this 
process strengthened organizationally. If nothing else, the union or 
workers have a much deeper knowledge of the factory and how it 
works than they did previously. Since one of CATs design criteria is to 
enhance skill, most projects also result in an increase in the number of 
skilled workers and thus usually an increase in wages as well.
However, CAT programs also distinguish themselves in one key 
area from typical labor-management cooperation programs. CAT tried 
to organize its technical assistance work so that workers could have a 
meaningful voice in what technologies would be introduced and how 
they would be used. In other words, they sought ways to allow working 
people and management collectively to make the strategic decisions, as 
opposed to simply asking workers to help implement or make minor
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modifications. To CAT, the question of design was the starting point, 
not the problem of implementation.
CAT technical assistance projects also reemphasized a point made 
in 1950 when firms began experimenting with various productivity and 
quality programs such as the Scanlon Plan. Then Fortune magazine 
advised employers that the presence of a union was necessary for these 
plans to reach their full value. CAT technical assistance projects also 
showed it to be easier to work in factories where the union was well 
organized.
In unionized shops, there is an organization of people elected and 
trusted by workers with whom CAT could speak. They were not afraid 
to raise questions and could help define the problems with an indepen 
dence from management not demonstrated in nonunion shops. People 
could speak with less fear and more openly as they had a contract to 
protect them. In nonunionized shops, often the people management 
made available to CAT were those trusted by management. They were 
not necessarily the most skilled or competent (although they could be), 
but they owed their position on the committee to management, not to 
their fellow workers. Thus there tended to be considerable self-censor 
ship and/or willingness to allow traditional authority to define the 
issues. This process makes it more difficult to isolate and solve prob 
lems of production and design. Also, without a contract and grievance 
procedure, workers, in reality, do not have the ability to speak their 
mind.
Of course there may be reasons why the existence of a union could 
present additional difficulties. For example, there may be contractual 
regulations regarding job placement, training, removal, and pay levels. 
In addition, the union may decide to choose its representatives on a 
technology design/change committee. In the unionized plants at which 
CAT worked—Pneumatic Scale and Mitchell Machine—these so- 
called problems were not major issues. Regulations regarding job 
placement allowed CAT to work within a defined and accepted frame 
work. The existence of a union at Pneumatic allowed for an organized 
approach to training and pay problems. And just as management chose 
its representatives to the committee on technology/organizational 
issues based on a combination of knowledge of the area and ability to 
make decisions, so did the union.
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Of course in a union environment the union can always withdraw 
from a team and thus kill it However, it is also true that in serious 
questions of design in a joint worker-management setting, manage 
ment can withdraw. It has been CAT's experience that management is 
more likely to resist sharing authority as compared to the union's resis 
tance to gaining it. In other words, management resistance to empow 
ering workers to discuss design issues was the problem. Neither union 
withdrew or threatened to, even though in varying degrees the firms 
showed considerable concern with their participation at various points.
CAT has found that technical assistance projects are extremely diffi 
cult to organize and manage. Technical innovation is the least of the 
problems. Getting management to the table and willing to alter their 
plans at the request of the workers is often the greatest difficulty. Natu 
rally we are dealing with issues of control of the workplace, along with 
traditional styles of top down authority.
CAT also tries to make sure that the discussions take place in an 
atmosphere of equality when it conies to making technical decisions 
about fixtures, machines, etc. This often means that the firm must 
invest in an education program, or at least encourage team members to 
work with resources knowledgeable of the area under discussion. Two 
types of education usually need to occur. There has to be technical edu 
cation. Workers and management need to be familiar with the technical 
choices at their disposal. There also has to be education that enables 
the parties to do joint problemsolving and strategic thinking. In addi 
tion, the firm needs to allow time for the education process to take 
place. Naturally this should occur during the working day, not as an 
extracurricular activity.
The role of the consultant in these projects is particularly important. 
The consultant is often fulfilling two functions at once. On the one 
hand he/she offers technical expertise. On the other hand he/she tries to 
facilitate meaningful worker participation in decisionmaking. In gen 
eral, experience has encouraged CAT to provide a different consultant 
for each role. In some cases, CAT staff does the facilitating, but in 
larger projects CAT employs people who have expertise in teaching 
empowerment strategies, organization tactics, how to hold meetings, 
and so forth. When CAT hires consultants for their technical skills, 
they also strive to acquaint them with the larger CAT agenda as well.
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Over time, CAT has identified a number of people who are now more 
sensitive to the needs of all of their users.
CAT and Economic Diversification
Part of CAT's job is to service the needs of the small and medium- 
sized manufacturer. The objective is to maintain the manufacturing 
base. Massachusetts, however, has an extremely high defense depen 
dency. A good proportion of the work of many of the smaller firms is 
defense-related—mostly supplying parts to prime contractors. In many 
cases these firms need to find new customers very soon or they will be 
out of business.
For years, the discussion of economic diversification has turned on 
the question of product diversification. It is true there is a need for 
product diversification, and also for community- and worker-based, 
multiple-use committees to encourage that diversification. But that is 
not the whole story.
From CAT's perspective as an organization that works with the 
manufacturing process, many companies make useful products. But 
they are making them according to military standards and procedures 
and are, therefore, not competitive in the commercial market. Thus 
there is a role for a process-driven strategy of economic diversification. 
In other words, if CAT can fix up the manufacturing process so that the 
company can produce for the commercial market, then they have a 
chance to survive.
To this end, CAT has actively sought to have the various federal 
defense adjustment bills changed so that there is federal aid to the 
smaller firms via agencies like CAT to enable them to make the transi 
tion from one style of manufacture to another. Naturally, CAT would 
help firms make this transition using their normal criteria—worker par 
ticipation and a skills-based production design. So far, the process- 
driven approach has succeeded in reducing the defense dependency 
from 60 percent to about 20 percent in a plant that was producing for 
both commercial and defense markets. In this case, changes in manu 
facturing technique allowed the firm to lower unit costs and increase 
quality, thus allowing it to win a substantial commercial contract.
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Since its defense business is expected to decline, the ability to manu 
facture for the commercial sphere will save the firm and the jobs. 
Obviously a process-driven approach is not the only approach that can 
be of use, but for firms whose products are similar for the defense 
industry and for the commercial market, it does offer some assistance. 
In addition, a process-driven approach to diversification places real 
value on worker participation, since the changes CAT supports are 
dependent on the worker. In other words, the workforce is not a specta 
tor to the diversification process but a participant
CAT as a Political Organization
In certain ways, the CAT project director has a political rather than 
technical job. In order to move the CAT agenda forward industry, aca 
demics, and the labor movement must all support it. Just getting the 
notion across that technical innovation occurs least expensively and 
more efficiently when it is based on worker participation and skill is a 
big agenda item. Obviously, if firms refuse to even try the model, there 
will be no projects. If CAT cannot convince engineers and others to 
work with them and for them, they will not get the technical expertise 
needed. Likewise, AFL-CIO support has been critical for CAT in iden 
tifying plants that are in need of assistance and in working with local 
unions to encourage participation.
Worker participation is also a profoundly political idea. It is derived 
not only from common sense and experience in industry, but also from 
a view of how a state-supported agency should function. Most of the 
people in the state are working people. They pay the taxes. They are 
the "users." Therefore it seems only fair that economic development 
must explicitly serve the needs of all the users, not just the managers 
and technicians. After all, no industry favors the trickle down theory 
when it comes to their needs; public agencies should not favor trickle 
down ideas when it comes to the needs of working people either.
CAT has set out consciously to build a constituency of people who 
recognize the importance of the industrial base in Massachusetts. This 
is not a glamorous task. Given the extreme budget problems in the
136 Applying Skills-Based Automation Through Participatory Management
state, it takes a high degree of cooperation from the constituent base to 
maintain the program. So far, CAT has been successful.
Support for manufacturing can take many forms. CAT'S contribu 
tion to the discussion is trying to get across the notion that a state 
extension service for manufacturing is not a finance problem; in fact, 
most of it is manufacturing process. Looked at from a process point of 
view, workers and their organizations are put in the middle of the inno 
vation process, as opposed to participating later. A process-oriented 
program would favor in-plant education and apprenticeships. A pro 
cess-oriented program also focuses assistance on the recipients—the 
small manufacturer and the workforce—not intermediaries. Process- 
driven programs do not spend most of their resources at the university 
or insuring bank loans.
Overall, however, the weight of those who favor support for manu 
facturing is relatively weak. Even in good times, the Massachusetts 
programs did not match the scope and intensity of the industrial assis 
tance programs in most other industrialized states, or in many southern 
states. There is not yet a large enough consensus in the Commonwealth 
to support a manufacturing extension service in light of the fiscal prob 
lems facing the state.
What makes the CAT program unique is its commitment to a 
worker-centered, skill-based approach. As such, it has more worker 
involvement than most. It has also been successful in saving or 
enhancing manufacturing activity in a number of plants. Therefore, 
even though CAT is not expected to grow substantially over the next 
few years, it should be able to continue to function.
NOTE
This essay was written for a lecture presented in May 1990. It was edited in August 1991. By 
that time the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had disbanded the Centers of Excellence, CATs 
parent organization. CAT was able to move to another agency, but with no new funds appropriated 
in the 199 lor 1992 budget.
Frank Emspak was Project Director of the Center for Applied Technology from November 1, 
1987 until April 1,1991.
Can the End of the Social Democratic
Trade Unions be the Beginning
of a New Kind of Social
Democratic Politics?
Charles F. Sabel 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The title of this essay is a provocation directed at the smaller and 
smaller group of people in the advanced capitalist democracies who 
are viscerally disturbed by the trade unions' self-evident disorientation 
and loss of influence on macroeconomic decisions and the reorganiza 
tion of firms. We know who we are. Despite our differences, we 
believe that persons who cannot exercise their autonomy in choosing 
their work and how to do it are diminished in an essential aspect of 
their personhood; and we believe that autonomy in these things can 
rarely be achieved by individuals acting in isolation. Because our ideas 
about how good society can be are bound up with these beliefs, we are 
always looking for signs that the strongest trade unions—those in the 
social democracies of Northern Europe—are successfully adjusting to 
the new conditions of international competition, and that their renewal 
can serve as a model and guide to the reconstruction of more embattled 
labor movements.
The first half of the provocation, hinted at in the title and spelled out 
in the body of the essay, is that this hope is unwarranted. I will not 
belabor the end of the industrial proletariat and its consequences for 
traditional forms of trade unionism. 1 1 argue instead that social demo 
cratic unions suppose in their organizational foundations a certain con 
cept of corporations, of relations among them, of careers within them, 
and of the boundary between them, "private" life, and the public sec 
tor. As actual conditions diverge more and more from this concept, the 
social democratic unions have more and more trouble addressing the 
difficulties that employees face in their workday lives, and less and less
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ability to make effective use of their powers to regulate production. 
The first part of the essay gives a compressed analysis of the way the 
corporations' successful adjustment to the crisis changes their organi 
zation in the relevant dimensions. The second part argues that social 
democratic unions will very likely, but not necessarily, encourage these 
transformations, yet are just as likely to be victims of these successes. 
The other half of the provocation in the title and the essay is the idea 
that to the extent social democratic unions do adjust to the new envi 
ronment, they perform activities associated more with political entities 
such as parties and social movements than with trade unions, although 
neither political parties nor social movements today define themselves 
as performing these particular tasks. The argument is a bit devious 
here, so it is only fair to tip my hand. Thus, the third part of the essay 
looks at effects of corporate reorganization on career patterns and the 
conception of work as a distinct sphere of activity; the fourth part inno 
cently deduces the features of a labor movement which can take 
account of these effects. The concluding section asks much less inno 
cently whether an organization with those features is a trade union in 
any reasonable understanding of that term at all. It contends that it is 
not a trade union but rather a new form of political activity. The reader 
is left wondering whether, if true, this finding is a good or a bad thing. 
So we end the excursion all in the same boat.
The Reorganization of the Firm
There is widespread agreement that firms respond to the current 
economic environment in one of two very general ways. The first is by 
cutting the production costs of standard goods. This can be done 
through automation of traditional production lines, subcontracting to 
low-wage producers, or some combination of both. Firms pursuing this 
strategy are always at the mercy of new low-cost entrants. Hence, they 
are permanently tempted to cut costs by reducing pay, worsening 
working conditions, introducing machines that can be operated by 
cheaper or less labor, or shifting production to low-wage areas. This is 
or soon becomes a sweating strategy, whether pursued by large firms 
or small. It is hard watching, among other things, the current massive
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layoffs of middle managers in U.S. firms that did for a time pursue this 
strategy, to see how anyone given a choice could prefer it in the long 
run to the alternative.
The second response is a strategy of permanent innovation. The aim 
is to respond to and stimulate demand for products or services that cor 
respond to consumers' wants more exactly than mass-produced goods. 
All products are regarded in this strategy as if they were capital goods, 
and valued according to the relation between their price and their abil 
ity to satisfy particular wants (the more favorable the price/perfor 
mance ratio the better), rather than according to their absolute price 
(the cheaper the better). 2
This second strategy depends on the reintegration of conception and 
execution in production. Marketing, design, and manufacturing must 
proceed concurrently, with those responsible for building the product 
helping to define what it will be in the first place and vice versa. Only 
in this way is it possible to cut development times in the measure 
required to get products to market when they are still in demand, and to 
reduce development costs to amounts that can be recovered through 
sale of short runs of affordably priced goods.
The reintegration of conception and execution has among its many 
other consequences three closely related effects which are of immedi 
ate significance for the organization of trade unions. The first is to raise 
the general level of skill required in production. Skill is the ability to 
perform complex tasks guided only by indicative instructions. The 
more superiors at all levels in the firm are pressed by constraints of 
time and money to instruct their subordinates to "use their judgment," 
"do their best," or simply "solve the problem," the more the subordi 
nates are called on to exercise their skills. It is impossible to apply 
instructions where there are none, and the further a firm progresses 
down the track of permanent innovation, the less likely it is that the 
production of any particular product will be codified in rules. Notice I 
am not claiming that all employees in firms following this strategy are 
always acquiring and using all the skills for which they might poten 
tially have a use. The claim is simply that whereas in the sweating 
strategy model the tendency is toward de-skilling, the tendency here is 
towards skill acquisition.3
The second consequence is to change the relation between firms, 
particularly large firms, and their subcontractors from one of domina-
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tion to one of collaboration.4 Just as the reintegration of conception and 
execution within firms leads to increased cooperation among different 
departments and across grades of hierarchy, so too it requires increased 
cooperation among the firms jointly producing a single final product. 
Subcontractors were, in effect, treated like semiskilled workers in the 
mass-production system: they executed a set of detailed blueprints pro 
vided by the customer, and secured orders by entering the lowest bid 
for a particular job. In a system of permanent innovation, where even 
the largest firms cannot master (because they cannot reliably antici 
pate) all the key technologies necessary to define and build rapidly 
changing products, subcontractors increasingly collaborate in the spec 
ification of the design and manufacturing setup. Asked to build a par 
ticular component or subassembly, for example, a subcontractor may 
propose modifications that reduce its cost of manufacture or improve 
its performance; asked to contribute expertise in the formulation of a 
plastic compound for an automobile company, for another example, a 
chemical firm may install and oversee the operation in the customer's 
plant of the machinery which shapes the new compound. This is not to 
claim that there are not disparities of power in relations between large 
firms and subcontractors in this system. Again the contrast is with the 
organization of mass production, particularly as it is denatured through 
sweating. In mass production, subcontractors were permanently, but 
not necessarily increasingly, subservient to their large customers. In 
sweating, a bad situation gets worse. In a system of permanent innova 
tion, the tendency is for it to get better, though plainly not for all sub 
contractors all at once.
The third consequence is the regionalization of production, by 
which I mean the geographic clustering of firms providing similar or 
complementary products or services to the same or related markets.5 
This third effect follows in large measure from the first two. Thus, the 
shorter the product life cycles, the riskier it is to hold inventories at any 
stage of the production process—hence the need for just-in-time logis 
tics, in which parts are produced and delivered as needed. Often (but 
by no means always) this means establishing production facilities in 
close proximity to the customer; and once established, these facilities 
attract other customers of the same sort. The shorter the product life 
cycle, moreover, the more likely it is that indispensable knowledge 
about production will become local knowledge—embedded in the
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half-articulated practices of persons who are in daily contact and who 
alone are in a position to grasp the implications of what they say and 
do. The more knowledge is commonly known to be of this type, the 
more firms will want to locate in the locale where it circulates. Finally, 
the more specialized firms or operating units of firms become, the 
more they are likely to depend for some of the services they need on 
the public or cooperative institutions of their locale. Training, quality 
control testing, and industrial medicine geared to the needs of a partic 
ular branch or sector are all examples of services that firms may want 
to have provided collectively; and, once again, the provision of such 
services by municipal authorities or a cooperative of firms or some 
combination of both attracts other firms in the same line of business. 
Thus, just as the integration of conception and execution blurs the hier 
archical boundaries within firms and the frontiers among them, so too 
it blurs the distinction between the public and private sectors.
This does not suggest that there has been or will be a night-to-day 
transformation. Because firms will want to cluster some of their key 
activities does not mean that all will be clustered. It may often be more 
advantageous to purchase subassemblies or even services from an 
established supplier than to invest in creating a local supplier. But the 
expectation is that the established subcontractor owes its success in 
part to its location in a prospering regional economy specialized in its 
business. Thus regionalization of production can go hand-in-hand with 
internationalization in the sense that firms reinforce their own core 
locales by linking them to similarly organized production systems else 
where.
To sidestep several debates that are, I think, out of place here, con 
sider two general qualifications regarding the model of the flexible, 
high-wage economy as a whole. First, the permanent-innovation econ 
omy is not necessarily an economy of small firms, although it is, com 
pared to the world of mass production, an economy of small 
production units or establishments. The model supposes that econo 
mies of scale—the bigger the plant, the cheaper the product—are less 
and less important. Otherwise the specialized product would be prohib 
itively more expensive than the standard ware. Hence the size of estab 
lishments should be (and according to much evidence is) constant or 
falling, always with respect to the size distribution of plants in particu 
lar industries in the period of mass production.6 But firms can also
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grow through exploiting economies of scope: the more diverse the cur 
rent production, the lower the incremental cost of a new product. By 
providing financial, marketing, or research and development services 
to establishments in different but related lines of work, a corporation 
can expand by enabling its constituent parts to specialize and diversify. 
There is, however, no reason to think that these services must be pro 
vided by a corporation with a controlling interest in the operating units, 
as opposed to a bank, a trading company, or a federation of the (inde 
pendently owned) operating units themselves. Even if it is a corpora 
tion which does the coordinating, furthermore, the control it exercises 
will be radically different from the centralized, bureaucratic control 
typically exercised by the headquarters of an American corporation in 
the past. Economies of scale are achieved through specialization of 
resources: ever more dedicated or specialized machines, ever more 
narrowly (semi) skilled workers, and ever more centralized structures. 
Economies of scope are achieved by "generalizing" resources or turn 
ing them to more and more diverse uses. This means more and more 
flexible equipment, more skilled and autonomous workers, and more 
supple organizations. As a glance at the management literature will 
reveal, managers themselves are extremely worried that the decentral 
ized organizations they are building will fly fissiparously apart 7 People 
in the labor movement are obviously and rightly concerned with the 
distribution of power in firms. But these days the size of a corporation 
is a less and less informative indicator of how authority is distributed 
within it.
The second qualification has been anticipated by the repeated obser 
vation that the shift to a flexible economy is not ah all-or-nothing prop 
osition. The permanently innovative, flexibly specialized, high-wage, 
high-skill economy is a limiting case. Some markets or parts of mar 
kets remain stable; some technologies, however plastic by historical 
standards, are more refractory than others. It is risky to try to shift from 
mass production to permanent innovation in a single leap, partly 
because it is unclear what the new model corporation really is (the 
point made just above), partly because building it, whatever it is, 
requires resources such as skilled labor which cannot be conjured into 
existence where they do not exist, and partly because firms cannot be 
sure that the unstable environment to which they are adjusting will not 
unexpectedly stabilize in a way that is more hospitable to a variant of
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mass-production techniques. For all these reasons, firms hedge their 
bets on rationalization, preferring hybrid strategies that combine ele 
ments of mass and flexible production in a fashion that allows the firms 
to move in the direction of whichever pole is more attractive. In an 
unstable world, all irreversible decisions are dangerous traps, including 
the decision to abandon the ability to respond efficiently to stability. 
The consequence of these hedging strategies is that almost every firm 
and every group of firms deviates from the limiting case of permanent 
innovation. But for present purposes, that is less consequential than the 
fact that they deviate as well from the traditional models of firm orga 
nization upon which the modern labor movement in both Western 
Europe and North America is premised. Corporate reorganization has a 
long way to go before the typical firm resembles the ideal type 
sketched here. But it has already demonstrated its competitive virtues 
with such clarity that it is necessary to rethink how the labor movement 
can encourage such benefit from these changes.
Some of the Things We Don't Know About
How the Labor Movement Can Encourage and Benefit
from Corporate Reorganization
Inconclusive as the model of the fully flexible corporation is, it is 
still more substantial than our knowledge of how such firms are or can 
be created in a particular economy, or of how labor can help create 
them and benefit from its efforts. There is little in the current debate on 
the future of the labor movement to challenge this assertion directly; 
but there is a great deal which presumes knowledge of these matters 
that I do not think is in hand. The purpose of this section, therefore, is 
to look critically at the two major and related arguments that connect 
the idea of labor's participation in economic restructuring to the reor 
ganization of the labor movement. Being clear(er) about what we don't 
know strikes me at the least as a good way to avoid a comforting, semi 
conscious reliance on familiar models and tropes in rethinking the 
tasks and structure of the labor movement. At the most, a clear view of 
the inappropriateness of new variants of old models to current condi 
tions focuses attention more precisely on what is truly novel in the cur-
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rent situation. For what it is worth, I have at one time or another argued 
both of the positions I criticize, and I am therefore at least as discom 
fited as anyone else by the criticism.
The first explanation of why some national economies, and collater 
ally some national labor movements, move more quickly and success 
fully in the direction of permanent innovation is simply that even as 
they industrialized, some economies never went very far down the path 
of mass production.8 Smaller, more differentiated markets and craft tra 
ditions of production reinforced each other so that, despite appearances 
to the contrary, the key elements of a flexible economy—skilled labor, 
flexible equipment, and the managerial know-how to constantly 
recombine them—were constantly reproduced. Conversely, these same 
traditions put barriers in the way of a forced-draft extension of mass- 
production models. When the new conditions of competition put a pre 
mium on flexibility, the West German, Austrian, Italian, Japanese, and 
Swedish economies did what came naturally: because the strategy of 
permanent innovation had many affinities with past practice whereas 
the sweating model looked like a radical break with tradition, they 
"chose" the former as the safer proposition. Where, as in the United 
States and Great Britain, less of the craft tradition had survived, the 
balance of potential costs and benefits was reversed, and the firms 
moved the other way, at least initially. The lesson for labor in this view 
is simply to revive and adjust to current conditions in craft traditions of 
organization wherever they have not survived and adjusted automati 
cally.
As a description of what makes for competitive success and failure, 
this type of account is unbeatable. But as an explanation, it is circular 
to the point of vacuity. Suppose we call all the rules and routines that 
regulate the distribution of authority in production economic institu 
tions. Then this view explains the existence in a particular economy of 
institutions favoring flexibility as the result of the historical presence in 
that society of institutions encouraging flexibility (or at least encourag 
ing the creation of institutions that encourage flexibility). If you think 
you can explain the sedative effects of opiates by noting their forma 
tive powers, you will find this kind of account satisfying; otherwise 
not.
To see the practical limits of this kind of tautologous formulation, it 
is only necessary to look a little more closely at the suggestion to
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revive craft principles in the organization of labor. Surely the craft idea 
of defining union jurisdiction according to the materials worked in 
each task—pipes to the pipe-fitters, bricks to the bricklayers—is an 
invitation to permanent jurisdictional disputes in an age when the con 
stant introduction of new materials makes it hazardous to guess what 
will be made of what. But the craft tradition of hiring halls, labor 
exchanges, and chambers of labor, where unions take substantial 
responsibility for training and allocating skilled labor, can arguably be 
seen as an intimation or (exceptionally, as in the case of Sweden) even 
a precursor of the kind of labor market institutions appropriate to a 
flexible economy. If firms increasingly subcontract design and produc 
tion of key subassemblies, why can't labor become a systems supplier 
of skilled labor? If the tendency is toward more collaborative relations 
between workers and managers within firms and between firms and 
their subcontractors, why is collaboration between the firm and the 
union as organizer of the local labor market less probable?
The point here is that to elaborate the case against "craft" jurisdic 
tion over jobs and for "craft" organization of the labor market is to 
specify which of the structuring principles of the craft economy might 
efficiently structure the emergent flexible system and why. To do that, 
however, is to begin to replace the flexibility-begets-flexibility argu 
ment with a model or proto-model of a flexible economy that shows 
just how specific institutions prove to be adapted to the current envi 
ronment
This is just what the second argument promises to do. I will call this 
the model of resurgent social democracy, because many of the institu 
tional features it identifies as favoring the transition to a flexible econ 
omy and reinforcing the labor movement through that transition are 
characteristic of the Northern European social democracies, particu 
larly those in countries such as Germany, Austria, and Sweden. Indeed, 
the model is appealing in no small measure because it suggests that 
institutions indigenous not just to the West but to the left in the West 
could unexpectedly prove a politically palatable alternative to whole 
sale initiation of Japanese practices, which otherwise seems the humil 
iating price required to maintain economic competitiveness.
Like the more general institutional view, the model of resurgent 
social democracy identifies costs and benefits which move firms' 
choices away from sweating in the direction of the permanent-innova-
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tion strategy.9 The emphasis is on the costs imposed and benefits pro 
vided by the system of industrial relations broadly understood. The 
most important cost regards layoffs: a combination of legal and politi 
cal constraints obliges firms to negotiate expensive severance arrange 
ments whenever they seek to reduce the workforce. This makes 
management think twice and twice again before rationalizing, relocat 
ing, and subcontracting production work as prescribed in the sweating 
model. Labor, the familiar argument goes, is increasingly viewed as a 
fixed cost; and firms must consider carefully how to make efficient use 
of an asset of which they cannot dispose.
Here is where four key benefits of social democratic industrial rela 
tions come in. First, there is a system of plant-level dispute resolution 
based on considerations of equity and substance rather than precedent 
and procedure. Outcomes, in theory, are supposed to secure the firm's 
competitiveness while respecting the interests of employees, not to 
determine which employees are entitled to what given the language of 
the collective bargaining agreement and the common law of the plant. 
It would be easy to overstate the difference: workers in the social dem 
ocratic systems have plenty of legal and customary rights, and bargain 
ing in, say, the Anglo-American system is influenced by complex and 
encompassing ideas of equity.
But in the Anglo-American system, at least as it existed in the early 
1980s, the definition of rights was tied to the definition of jobs and 
seniority in ways that made reorganization at work a constant threat to 
established patterns of entitlement. 10 To accept changes in the defini 
tion and scope of one's job was to accept greater vulnerability to mana 
gerial discretion. In the social democratic system, standards are 
established to govern treatment of whole classes of employees—those 
above a certain age, the skilled, those with families, those requiring 
training—and so long as there are good prospects of satisfying these 
standards by any combination of, say, job transfers, compensatory 
training, and indemnifications, individuals do not have rights to partic 
ular places in the production system. Hence reorganization is not held 
hostage to adjudication of such rights.
The remaining features of the social democratic system as portrayed 
in this argument regulate relations between labor and capital outside 
the plant. The first and in many ways most important is simply labor's 
right to participate in the definition of administration of training pro-
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grams. 11 As demand for skill increases, labor's place in the institutional 
order becomes more central, the argument goes, because labor already 
occupies a central place in the training system; and this is true regard 
less of whether unions come to manage local labor markets on the hir 
ing hall model or in some other, unspecified way.
The second and third supra-plant features of the social democratic 
system are industrywide collective bargaining and the elaboration of 
framework labor regulations. Industrywide collective bargaining obvi 
ously establishes minimum wages and working conditions and guaran 
tees that flexibility at the plant and company level does not lead to 
company unionism in which workers and managers in each production 
unit try to advance their own (collective) interest, regardless of its con 
sequence for others in a similar situation. It also allows for experimen 
tation, industry-by-industry, with new ways of collectively establishing 
a fair distribution of the burdens of reorganization and adjusting the 
standards of equity applied at plant level to the new forms of work 
organization resulting from rationalization. Framework legislation, 
finally, coordinates public provision of training and social insurance 
with needs of firms and industries; it also protects and extends labor's 
right to gain, through some form of participation in managerial deci- 
sionmaking, the kind of information and veto powers necessary to 
make substantive regulation of industrial reorganization workable. 
Without the knowledge to judge what can reasonably be expected of a 
firm in a particular situation, and without the power to effectively 
obstruct solutions that violate its sense of equity, labor would have to 
seek protection through imposition of a much finer mesh of plant-level 
rules.
The net effect of the social democratic model is to make a choice of 
the sweating strategy of prohibiting expenses and the strategy of per 
manent innovation affordable and remunerative, if not painless. More 
over, the more rapidly the new strategy spreads, the better for the 
unions. The demand for skill draws unions more and more into the pro 
cess of reorganization itself, reinforcing their position with respect to 
the firms at the same time it refurbishes their appeal to their members. 
Indeed, if the process goes far enough, the unions will eventually come 
to exercise de facto rights of determination that they have not been able 
to obtain directly through legislation. Hence the resurgence of social 
democracy, and particularly social democratic industrial relations,
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which seemed threatened by the breakdown in the new world economy 
of tripartite or neocorporatist systems of wage bargaining that helped 
these countries reduce both inflation and unemployment in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. The lesson for economies that do not already have 
social democratic industrial relations systems as depicted in this model 
is clearly to build them, starting with the creation of training systems in 
which labor plays a central part.
This view certainly has more bite than the generic institutional 
explanation. The problem with it is not, I think, that it is vacuous but 
that, taken at face value, it is wrong. First, a strong labor movement in 
the sense of resurgent social democracy is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition to encourage restructuring along the lines of the 
permanent-innovation strategy. Moreover, there is good evidence that 
trade unions and the labor movement more generally are unexpectedly 
being weakened by the very changes that they are directly and indi 
rectly encouraging, including the changes that favor use of more highly 
skilled labor.
Developments in countries as diverse as Switzerland, Japan, and 
France show that a social democratic labor movement is not a neces 
sary condition for flexible adjustments. All these countries have 
adopted flexible adjustment strategies, although the shift in this direc 
tion is more recent and less comprehensive in France. Swiss national 
unions are nonentities by almost any imaginable standard; there is 
debate about whether Japanese unions are company unions in the sense 
defined a moment ago or rather in the perjorative U.S. sense of yellow- 
dog organizations which betray their members to do the bidding of 
their masters in management. But there is no doubt that they are com 
pany unions in one sense or another. In France, less than 9 percent of 
the workforce is organized in unions. The question publicly posed for 
debate in that country is whether there can be unions without mem 
bers. 12
It is, to be sure, possible to explain how firms in each of the coun 
tries were moved, at least partly because of the particularities of their 
relation to labor, to decide in favor of the flexible strategy. Japanese 
firms have practices of granting long-term job security to their core 
workforce dating back to the 1920s. French unions have by law the 
right to participate in the decisionmaking of a great number of public 
entities with responsibility for monitoring and shaping the labor mar-
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ket. Swiss firms have long traditions of flexible production, and corre 
spondingly developed complex formal and informal systems of dispute 
resolution consistent with that strategy. 13 But the more complex and 
particular each of these explanations becomes, the closer it gets to the 
generic institutional argument in which flexibility begets flexibility. If 
you nodded in approval as that argument was dismissed a moment ago, 
you cannot use it as a makeweight to save the resurgent democratic 
model. The strength of that model is its parsimony; and elaborating it 
in response to counterexamples only weakens its foundation.
The same difficulties arise in the defense of the claim that the social 
democratic model of industrial relations is a sufficient condition for 
extension of the flexible economy. The argument suggests that the 
stronger the unions in the social democratic sense, the more likely that 
firms will perceive the costs of the sweating strategy as prohibitively 
high and the costs of flexible reorganization as attractively low. 14 But 
all change, even change ultimately for the better for almost everyone, 
imposes short-term costs. Suppose the unions become so strong that 
they can successfully not only oppose a switch to sweating, but also 
pursue a variant of the high-skill strategy in which the costs of transi 
tion are fairly shared. The result, as illustrated in the bankruptcy of the 
Austrian state-owned steel and metalworking firms that are the tradi 
tional fortress of the country's trade unions, is first stalemate, then 
catastrophe. 15 However much one is inclined to favor the expansion of 
union influence, this is, at best, too much of a good thing.
Here too, of course, it is possible to patch the argument by specify 
ing that it holds only within a particular range: when labor has suffi 
cient power to block sweating but not enough to be tempted to believe 
it is invulnerable to changes in the environment, and is able to defend 
the status quo indefinitely. But insofar as the specification looks for 
ward to the outcomes it aims to include and exclude, it again arouses 
suspicion of circularity. Just as troubling, the notion that more trade 
union power is not necessarily better undercuts the (to me) politically 
attractive suggestion that the model of resurgent social democracy 
offers an alternative to democratization of the workplace through legis 
lation. Surely employers will tend to suspect that there is a point at 
which an increase in union influence on decisionmaking begins to 
impede flexibility rather than encourage it. If advocates of the model of 
resurgent social democracy concede that such a point exists without
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being able to locate it precisely, managers will voice those suspicions 
sooner rather than later.
Labor, indeed, may not merely reap fewer benefits from restructur 
ing than the model suggests. It may find its organizational integrity 
undermined by the very process of economic reorganization it encour 
ages and from which members benefit as individuals. Whether this 
happens or not depends on the influence of reorganization on back 
ground conditions that the model, in its appealingly parsimonious 
forms, ignores.
Take as an example the organizational consequences for German 
unions of increasing demand for skill and the resulting extension of 
training programs. 16 Traditionally, youths went to work full time upon 
completion of their apprenticeships and were assimilated into the over 
lapping worlds of the shop floor and the union in the years that fol 
lowed. Many would subsequently continue their educations by 
attending classes. But even when they left the shop floor to become 
technicians or engineers, often with highly responsible jobs, they 
remained attached to the values which had formed them, and tolerant 
of if not loyal to the unions. In any case they defined themselves as dis 
tinct from university-trained managers, for whom the idea of a career 
was associated with the idea of progression up a formal hierarchy 
rather than with growing technical prowess.
Today this pattern and the distinctions on which it is based are disin 
tegrating. Young people spend a shorter and shorter time on the shop 
floor between completing their apprenticeships and continuing their 
educations. For the most ambitious and talented, more and more of the 
time spent on the shop floor at any stage in their careers is spent in spe 
cial project groups where teams of engineers, managers, technicians, 
and skilled workers perfect new products or install new production 
systems. The union is simply not a constitutive element of the training 
system on the shop floor as these new cohorts of skilled workers expe 
rience it. They are, to all appearances, not antiunion, but quite indiffer 
ent to its existence. Because the most active trade unionists and the 
bulk of union officials have, in Germany as elsewhere, been recruited 
from among the skilled workers, this indifference threatens the organi 
zation's ability to renew itself, and is clearly perceived by union lead 
ers as doing so.
Social Democratic Trade Unions and Politics 151
A second German example concerns the effects of subcontracting 
and the blurring of the boundaries among corporations more generally. 
As subcontractors take more and more responsibility for design and 
production work once done in-house, the plant or firm-level institu 
tions that defend employee interests are less and less able to even mon 
itor, let alone control, developments. The problems are aggravated 
when, as is frequently the case, the work is subcontracted to firms in 
industries other than the client's, and hence organized by different 
unions: unionized seamstresses upholstering seats in an automobile 
firm are members of the metalworkers union in Germany, but members 
of the textile and garment workers union if employed by a seat-making 
firm supplying the auto plant just-in-time from an adjacent facility. The 
engineers and skilled workers designing the microprocessor used in an 
advanced fuel-injection system are likely to be working for an elec 
tronics firm that is not organized by any union at all. Given that the 
social democratic model of substantive dispute resolution presumes the 
possibility of making a comprehensive assessment of the costs and 
benefits of various possible compromises, the fragmentation of control 
over the process of restructuring endangers the capacity to formulate 
and assess just the kinds of comprehensive bargains upon which the 
success of the substantive system depends.
A third example concerns the effects of changes in the boundaries 
and operation of the public sector. The reorganization of the economy 
on flexible lines changes the division of labor between the public and 
private sectors. The earlier discussion of the regionalization of produc 
tion and the increased public provision of services to industry indicated 
one aspect of this change. Another regards the growing barrier against 
the entry of the unskilled into the flexible economy. So long as much of 
the skill needed for work could be learned on the job, the state could 
provide unemployment insurance and other forms of social assistance 
independent of systematic job training and placement. The state 
assured citizens of a subsistence income, and the economy eventually 
provided jobs which allowed those who wanted to work their way into 
economic and social security the chance to do so. The more necessary 
it is to possess substantial generic skills to get any job, however, the 
more important it becomes to integrate the provision of social services 
and training into a package customized according to the needs of par 
ticular clients or client groups.
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But this recombination and customization of services often requires 
a profound reorganization of social welfare bureaucracies, including 
decentralization of authority to the local level and devolution of the 
responsibility for providing many services to community or other non 
profit groups with the kind of local knowledge on which the effective 
ness of the program depends. These pressures for reorganizing the 
bureaucracy and opening it to the outside world are further increased 
by the ambition—often inspired by the experience and model of the 
large firms and their reconstitution—to break monopolies in the provi 
sion of services ranging from medical care to garbage collection both 
as a spur to efficiency and as a protection against administrative arro 
gance. 17
The cumulative effect is that the fluidity of production relations, as 
indicated particularly by an increase in subcontracting, is becoming as 
typical of the public sector as it is of private industry. And as in private 
industry, the consequence for unions is an increase in jurisdictional dis 
putes whose occurrence is a sign of an increasingly poor fit between 
the organizational boundaries of the labor movement and the bound 
aries of the relevant units of economic and social welfare activity. Swe 
den is the most clamorous example of disruption which can result 
when public- and private-sector unions fight each other over the right 
to represent employees or classes of work which have passed in one 
form or another from public to private control. In Sweden, as else 
where, these conflicts resonate with and thus amplify the jurisdictional 
disputes provoked by reorganization within the private sector. 18
The aim in criticizing the model of resurgent social democracy is no 
more to suggest that labor's role in organizing the training system of 
shaping corporate decisions is irrelevant to its future than criticism of 
the generic institutional model is meant to demonstrate that economic 
adjustment is not influenced by institutional patterns.
Historical barriers to the extension of mass production and historical 
dispositions for flexible economic organization, including especially 
those associated with the social democratic system of industrial rela 
tions, help stack the deck against pursuit of the sweating strategy and 
for a program of permanent innovation. The difficulty with both the 
general and the particular institutional arguments is that in identifying 
important continuities between the emergent flexible economy and its 
antecedents, the former is assimilated into the latter in a way that
Social Democratic Trade Unions and Politics 153
obscures vital differences between them: differences, indeed, which 
affect the role in the new economy of just those institutions such as 
training that appeared to warrant the assimilation of new to old in the 
first place.
In the next two sections, I reverse the procedure. Rather than search 
ing for even a crude blueprint for the future in the past, I look only for 
those old building materials that can be used to erect the new system. 
Instead of treating the flexible economy as a distinctive elaboration of 
certain historical traditions in new circumstances, I try to outline a plan 
of construction by reflection on the novelty of the current situation as it 
has emerged in the preceding discussion.
The Localization of the Labor Market
Firms, we saw, are opening themselves to one another (through the 
transformation and extension of subcontracting relations) and to the 
society in which they are more and more embedded (through increas 
ing reliance on public or at least collective provision of training and 
other services as well as new forms of social insurance). This double 
opening is leading, I argued earlier, to the regionalization of produc 
tion: at the limit the fundamental unit of production is not the firm, but 
an ensemble of firms and public or community institutions in a particu 
lar locale.
Regionalization has two closely related effects on the organization 
of labor markets and hence on the boundary conditions that any labor 
movement operating in such markets would need to respect. First, the 
blurring of boundaries among firms that follows from the reintegration 
of conception and execution means that even as the demand for skill 
increases, individual jobs become less and less secure. When even the 
largest firms expect to turn to system suppliers to provide crucial 
expertise, but cannot predict when and for what sort of know-how they 
will do so, who at what level of the firm can be sure of his or her job? 
Where is the stable core of the economy? When high-flying employees 
can expect to be rotated from autonomous division to autonomous 
division or project group to project group to develop a sense of loyalty 
to the corporation as a whole, but the corporation cannot define itself
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as a unified entity except by pointing to the common experience of the 
high flyers, what sort of loyalty will the latter develop? Under these 
circumstances, to pursue a career does not mean to progress rung by 
rung up the bureaucratic ladder as envisaged in the concept of the 
closed labor markets central to the social democratic system of indus 
trial relations: many rungs are gone and the very structure on which the 
ladder rests may disappear. Nor does it mean, as in craft labor markets, 
to master a well-defined body of knowledge by moving from firm to 
firm in a predictable pattern: the definition of what knowledge is rele 
vant is constantly changing. Rather it means to assess constantly which 
of all the current or potentially acquired skills ought to be developed in 
the light of changing market conditions and one's unfolding self-con 
ception.
Second, the blurring of the boundary between the firm and society is 
paralleled for the individual in the blurring of the boundary between 
work and other crucial spheres of experience. The devolution of 
authority within organizations and the growing need for skill and team 
work require employees even in large corporations to exercise on the 
job the kind of autonomy and responsibility for the use of resources 
that in capitalist democracies have typically been regarded as the pre 
rogative of groups such as homeowners or the self-employed: those 
whose control over some form of capital entitled them to a correspond 
ing kind of economic sovereignty. "Private" or even "family" values 
such as self-reliance in complex situations are highly valued, perhaps 
even indispensable at work. Conversely, however, the less secure jobs 
become and the less meaningful the traditional ideas of a career, the 
more employees must rely on extra-firm associations established 
through the family, professional groups, churches, political parties, 
hobby groups, or social movements to learn what kinds of jobs are 
imperiled, what kinds expanding, and where to acquire the skills nec 
essary to compete for them. By definition, an information network that 
followed the contours of the firm would be of no help in these regards 
precisely because the information of value concerns possibilities 
beyond the corporate boundaries—the disintegration of which creates 
the insecurity in the first place. The more the social and the economic 
become fused through regionalization, the more the home invades the 
workplace and vice versa. Changes in gender relations, related but not 
reducible to changes in the organization of work, further mute the dis-
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tinction between the two by formalizing the division of labor in the 
household (if only by making it a matter for family discussion), and 
making family needs as the job prospects of each partner in the more 
and more numerous two-earner households a constraint on job 
choices. 19
Social democratic unions are coming to grief because they are not 
adjusting to these effects of reorganization, although they are in many 
ways the best positioned of all contemporary labor movements to make 
such adjustments. The unions (perhaps with the exception of those in 
Sweden) are losing their formative influence on the skilled workers 
because they are extraneous to the complex systems of post-appren 
ticeship training that define new kinds of careers and loyalties. Because 
their basic units of organization are the plant, the firm, and the branch, 
unions cannot regulate the increasing movement of work and workers 
across these boundaries. Because they presume a stable division of 
labor between the public and private sectors, and treat the public sector 
as if it were a firm in the traditional sense, unions are bewildered by 
efforts to redistribute responsibility between the state and civil society, 
efforts which often entail reorganization of the state itself.
Towards a New Model Union
To do better these unions will, in a sense, have to follow the lead of 
the firms: push responsibility for decisionmaking down to the local, 
operative level, and open the local unions and plant-level institutions 
in each area to one another and to the whole range of economically rel 
evant local actors from municipal authorities to environmental and 
social movements, and even political parties with whom they may 
have little or only hostile contact. 20 By inserting themselves into the 
regional economy at the points where the firms connect with one 
another and where they as a group join the local society, the unions can 
make themselves indispensable to management as systems suppliers of 
skilled labor and indispensable to their members as guides and advi 
sors in their passages from job to job and home to work and back. Con 
tinuing education for the skilled, extensive training for the semiskilled, 
extensive job counseling that bundles general social services and train-
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ing of both sorts in packages individuals and families can use are the 
first, indispensable steps to this end. If the social democratic unions 
can learn to do that much locally, it will be almost child's play to rede 
fine the advisory and tutelary role of the national union.
Unions in the United States seem to have an incomparable harder 
row to hoe. 21 Social democratic unions are victimized by the success of 
a broad movement towards flexible reorganization that they encourage. 
In the United States, the respective costs and benefits of the two adjust 
ment strategies are often indeterminate, and firms frequently oscillate 
between them. But whichever course firms choose, and perhaps most 
directly by their wavering, they do the unions harm.22 If the unions 
oppose cost-cutting strategies they are defending their members' privi 
leges; if they condone them, they are protecting their organizations at 
the members' expense. If they block attempts to increase flexibility, 
they are dinosaurs, unable to understand the motivations of the modern 
workforce and the exigencies of competition in world markets; but if 
they cooperate with strategies aimed at increasing productive flexibil 
ity, they make themselves and their members hostage to management's 
half-hearted and vacillating dedication to this course of action. Even 
the fear of a reversion to cost-cutting strategies— provoked perhaps by 
high-level corporate struggles far beyond the influence of plant-level 
or division management—is enough to reveal that labor's gradual 
abandonment of its traditional forms of self-defense make it vulnerable 
to incalculable risks. U.S. unions would, I suspect, love to have the 
problems of their social democratic counterparts; and that is perhaps 
one of the reasons they tend to discount the gravity of those difficulties 
if they take notice of them at all.
But it is easy to overlook the vulnerabilities of the strong and the 
strength of the vulnerability. The social democratic unions' position in 
the largest plants, the continuing allegiance of the middle-aged work 
force, and the unions' political influence make it easy for them to 
downplay the dangers of delayed adjustment, hard for the national cen 
ter to see why it should cede power to the local periphery, and harder 
still for any one powerful union to see why it should abandon its juris- 
dictional claims to the benefits of a rival. Conversely, the confusing 
fluidity of the American corporations and the debility of American 
labor mean that local unions may enjoy more freedom than their more 
closely regulated social democratic counterparts to establish them-
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selves as an indispensable component of an emergent regional econ 
omy should the occasion present itself for them to do so.
Such possibilities are, I think, much less remote than a simple sur 
vey of the disorganized and dispirited state of national—or, as their 
Canadian affiliations entitle them to say—international unions in the 
United States would suggest. At the plant level, many unions have 
become engaged during the last decade in various forms of worker par 
ticipation or employee involvement. In the many successful but scat 
tered programs of this type, blue- and white-collar workers take an 
active role in assessing the competitiveness of the plant and determin 
ing ways to improve it. 23 To do this they and the unions who represent 
them must have access to virtually all the information that manage 
ment considers in making its decisions. The result in the best cases is a 
system of substantive dispute resolution and de facto labor-manage 
ment codetermination which approximates the social democratic sys 
tems. But whereas the latter presumes rigid plant boundaries, many of 
the emergent plant-level systems in the United States grow out of 
cooperative efforts by managers and employees to establish which 
products the operating unit can, after the requisite reorganization, prof 
itably make, and which must be abandoned to other makers. Thus 
cooperation in this setting is from the first directed toward limiting the 
risks of an organizational vulnerability which, given the impossibility 
of fixing firm boundaries with any reliability, is broadly seen as a con 
stituent fact of corporate life. For the moment, these open-ended suc 
cess stories remain isolated: plants in the same corporation or region 
can have wildly different experiences in this regard, depending on the 
accidents of personality and timing; and national unions are either 
ignorant of local successes or too threatened by the popularity of the 
leaders they create to even debate their significance. But if one of the 
building blocks of a new labor movement is a local union rooted in the 
firm's decisionmaking yet not barricaded behind its formal boundaries, 
construction materials of this kind are being produced in the United 
States.
Similar considerations apply to training programs and the creation 
of subcontracting networks, although unions have been reticent to par 
ticipate in either of these foundational elements of the new regional 
economies. Here too local initiatives are indispensable. The pattern in 
training is for a group of firms, varying in size according to the nature
158 Social Democratic Trade Unions and Politics
of the local economy, to join with a community college or vocational 
training center to create a new kind of apprenticeship which blends tra 
ditional forms of vocational education with the relevant components of 
an undergraduate-level technical curriculum.24 New degree programs 
transform traditional machinery and other trades into paraprofessions. 
Often the project is initially funded with the help of state or federal 
monies. In this case too the fluidity of the situation is a potential advan 
tage. If apprenticeship were recreated in the United States now, and if 
the unions participated in its formation, it could be done in a way that 
gives labor a central place in a system of life-long training—a system 
that does not draw the line between initiation into a trade and continu 
ing education that vexes much of the social democratic labor move 
ment. But for the moment, U.S. unions are so absorbed with their day- 
to-day problems and the defense of the interests of their current mem 
bers that they are less likely to embrace these efforts to regenerate skill 
than to ignore or even to oppose them in favor of programs to retrain 
older, displaced workers.
The growing efforts to create subcontracting networks of diverse 
kinds also involve consortia of large and small firms, public—typically 
state—agencies, and educational institutions. Sometimes the initiative 
comes from large corporations, sometimes from trade associations, 
sometimes from ad hoc groups of small firms, sometimes from the 
public sector. Again the results are mixed. There are plenty of reliable 
successes strewn among the tales of disaster. But win or lose, the 
effects seldom succeed in overcoming the unions' preoccupation with 
other matters or fear that they lack the competence to participate 
knowledgeably in decisions for which they may later be held account 
able. Yet again it is clear that if the unions could vanquish their reti 
cence, they could be rebuilding themselves by building a structure 
indispensable to the local economy—and difficult to construct with the 
organizational tools of social democracy.
If your imagination stretches easily to comprehend these separate 
possibilities, then it will take only a slight additional effort to compre 
hend the possibility of a strategy that makes realization of each easier 
by connecting it to the others. Take the common case of a local union 
fighting for the innovation strategy in alliance with one faction of plant 
management against the rear-guard, cost-cutting methods of a second. 
Suppose next that the union and its allies participate in a training con-
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sortium that, among other things, undertakes to remedy the spot skill 
shortages that clouded the prospects of the permanent-innovation strat 
egy and provided a convenient argument to oppose it Suppose further 
that the union and its allies in management simultaneously participated 
in a consortium of large and small firms dedicated to improving sub 
contracting relations, and thus removing yet another potential obstacle 
to the flexible alternative. Suppose, finally, that a state government pro 
vides funds and advice to help the local union pursue all these tasks at 
once, and—welcome to America—you will have imagined just the 
program which the State of Michigan and a local of the United Auto 
mobile Workers in the auto parts sector pursued until the governor who 
supported the plan was unexpectedly defeated for reasons unrelated to 
his economic initiatives.25 Had this plan succeeded, or if any of the 
many, less formal ones that survive it prospers, one result would be to 
create local constituencies (other firms, educational institutions, public 
officials) who will take the union's side in its struggle against the cost- 
cutting strategy. If successes multiply, a second result would force 
unions to reverse the firms' strategy of using labor's concessions at one 
plant as justification for demands for give-backs at another. Instead, 
unions favoring the permanent-innovation strategy could begin whip- 
sawing recalcitrant management, using the examples of managers else 
where who participated to their benefit in cooperative strategies as a 
means of convincing their recalcitrant local interlocutors to do the 
same.
Does It Matter Whether
There Are New Model Unions?
Whether There Are Unions At All?
To us, the us addressed at the beginning of this essay, the answer to 
both these questions is self-evidently yes. People who are not much 
interested in labor these days are so sure that unions have no future that 
they seldom can be troubled to read essays alleging they might; those 
who believe unions do have a future or should are so desperate for 
some conformation of their hopes that they take the mere fact that 
essays appear on the topic as a sign that labor is more vigorous than it
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appears. But this essay about the future of the unions had indirectly 
raised the question whether we—and I am still talking about us— 
should care about the fate of the new model union, and indeed whether 
that organization is reasonably regarded as a union at all.
The answer to the first question is clearly connected to the unions' 
role in economic adjustment. If (almost) everyone should reasonably 
prefer the innovation strategy to the sweating strategy in the long run, 
and strong unions in the social democratic or new model sense encour 
age diffusion of the innovation strategy, then (almost) everyone should 
support either social democratic or new model unions.
But in the light of the foregoing discussion it is hard to extract much 
of a defense of new model unions from this kind of shaky syllogism. 
First, the argument supposes that unions play a critical role in deter 
mining the choice between strategies as though most of what managers 
did was decided by what unions did or how industrial relations are 
organized. Those things count—a lot. But we saw, first, that a social 
democratic industrial relations system is neither a necessary nor a suf 
ficient condition for the choice of the innovation strategy, and, second, 
that social democratic unions do not automatically become new model 
unions. On the contrary, they are more likely to be victims of the reor 
ganization they encourage.
The upshot is that the preceding discussion provides reasons for 
supporting several types of unionism if you care strongly about the 
outcome of economic adjustment, but no reasons for supporting unions 
more than, say, programs to encourage training or build subcontracting 
networks. Presumably more of all these things is better than less, and 
doing them concurrently or at least in a coordinated way is better than 
doing them disjointedly. But the model of resurgent social democracy 
is too ramshackle a theory of economic adjustment to suggest how 
scarce resources should be allocated even among this limited group of 
tasks.
The one strong conclusion which discussion of the model of resur 
gent social democracy does allow is, paradoxically, that whatever 
robust labor organizations emerge from and take root in the process of 
economic reorganization will not be trade unions in any traditional 
sense. Trade unions in the sense of social democracy or of American 
industrial unionism are concerned with the interests of employees at 
work, where work typically means a long-term association with a par-
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ticular occupation in a single firm. But if the foregoing analysis of the 
effects of reorganization is correct, the new model labor organizations 
will have to be concerned with addressing problems that cross the 
boundaries among firms and between work and other vital life activi 
ties. A labor organization that tries to distinguish its members' interests 
at work from their general interests in well-being could not, in this 
view, effectively represent their interests at all. 26
But why call an organization that represents some aspects of mem 
bers' general interests in well-being a trade union, or even a labor orga 
nization? I can think of little reason especially if that organization 
operates in association with social service agencies, schools, churches, 
and political parties. I say little reason rather than none at all because I 
imagine this organization might play a distinctive role in wage deter 
mination. But the more wages are set through individual negotiations 
between employees and firms on the one hand and more and more 
encompassing minimum wage or minimum social income legislation 
on the other, the less distinguishing a mark this will be. 27
No, the more natural but troubling way to think about organizations 
that represent their members' general interests in well-being is to 
regard them as engaged in politics. The characterization is natural 
because to defend its members' general interests in well-being an orga 
nization must articulate and advance a vision of life, including ideals 
of justice, views about the proper distribution of control over economic 
activity, and so on. If an organization that does these things is not a 
political organization, what other kind of reorganization might it be? 
But because the same kinds of everyday definitions that make it rea 
sonable to say that the new model union is not a union but a political 
organization obstruct efforts to say what kind of political organization 
it might be. Plainly unions are not parties in any traditional sense, 
because parties, we just saw, traditionally leave concerns about work to 
unions. More precisely, concern with work exhausts itself in concern 
for "the economy," which typically means macroeconomic decision- 
making, except insofar as such decisionmaking is in the hands of virtu 
ally self-governing institutions (as is often the case with, for example, 
central banks). Nor are these new model political organizations easily 
assimilated to social movements. Either these movements are con 
cerned with the situation of particular groups, in which case they aim 
to regulate workplace conditions only insofar as those conditions
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threaten their constituents' interests: for example, feminist groups fight 
sexism on the job and seniors' associations fight ageism. Or the social 
movements are concerned with what they regard as public interests 
such as a healthy environment or safe consumer products. In that case 
they aim to regulate production insofar as it is necessary to eliminate 
threats to these public interests: for example, by legislating reductions 
in pollution or creating incentives to or improving the safety of prod 
ucts by making firms strictly liable for harm caused by their wares. 
Thus social movements are not trying to regulate the relation between 
the economy and other spheres of life in general.28 On the contrary, it 
would be more accurate to say that the proliferation of these move 
ments is a response to the failure of the existing division of labor 
between parties and unions to define a form of regulation adapted to 
current circumstances; and that this response presumably makes the 
task of finding a general solution harder by creating more and more 
precise divisions among groups and interests that will eventually need 
to be reconciled both on and off the job through complex compro 
mises.
New model political organizations cannot, therefore, be social 
movements. If they are doing their jobs, they will be reducing the need 
for social movements, or rather the need for social movements to do 
some of the things they currently do in the way they do them. Certainly 
this will require collaboration between the new model entities and the 
social movements; but this does not suggest that one will absorb or 
come to approximate the other, any more than cooperation with politi 
cal parties suggests analogous outcomes.
Hence the disturbing provisioned conclusion: there is nothing in the 
logic of the current reorganization that warrants the assumption that we 
will have trade unions in the future. And if we have them they will be 
filling a political function that we can specify only in the sketchiest 
outline. But then it may well be that reflection on the void that would 
exist if these almost indefinable political entities did not take the place 
of trade unions is the beginning of another and more robust kind of 
argument for creating them.
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Training and the 
New Industrial Relations
A Strategic Role for Unions
Wolfgang Streeck 
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In the past decade, training seems to have emerged as a core subject 
of what to many promises to become a new type of industrial relations: 
more cooperative and consensual, less adversarial and conflictual, with 
fewer costly power struggles. More and more employers have come to 
accept that a modern economy's competitiveness depends on the skills 
of its labor force. Many union leaders, in turn, no longer object to the 
idea that secure employment at high wages requires above all eco 
nomic competitiveness. To deal with what are perceived as critical skill 
shortages, employers in many countries and industries urge govern 
ments and unions to join them in conceited training offensives. Gov 
ernments, for their part, have moved training to the center of labor 
market policies. As skill formation turns into a central issue of eco 
nomic policy and labor relations, previously opposed group interests 
and the general interest finally seem to converge; distributional conflict 
promises to give way to productive cooperation; and eventually what 
appears to be outdated political antagonism may be displaced by 
peaceful competition for the best ideas on how jointly to organize and 
implement the upskilling of a country's, industry's, or company's labor 
force.
Still, few unions have yet thought through the implications of the 
resurgence of training as an industrial relations issue for their own 
strategy and status. Beyond general acknowledgments of the impor 
tance of skill formation, there is considerable skepticism and suspi 
cion, especially about the intentions of employers. Among many 
unionists, memories of the destruction of the craft tradition under mass 
production in the name of economic necessity and rationality are still
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vivid. More recently, unions in many places have observed an indus 
trial restructuring process that was above all aimed at "doing more 
with less"—less labor, that is. The training efforts that accompanied 
this were too often intimately linked with downsizing, speed-up, 
unemployment, and intensification of work to offer strategic promise 
from a union perspective. Moreover, the frequent and conspicuous 
emphasis on "social" and "attitudinal" skills, especially in firms and 
sectors that have gone through the trauma of downsizing, is bound to 
raise suspicions that employers' real objective in training is the restora 
tion of unquestioned managerial prerogative. And are there not enough 
cases where "retraining" or "further training" are no more than a cover 
for outright de-skilling? Or where alleged skill needs in fact serve to 
justify the reintroduction of discretionary wage differentials?
In the burgeoning "new industrial relations" rhetoric (for a more 
moderate version, see Heckscher 1988), all of this alleged to have 
changed recently. Employers are said to "need" high skills—as well as 
"good industrial relations" in a participatory work organization 
because of fundamental changes in their competitive environment. As 
markets and technology allegedly force employers into high-wage and 
high-skill production—turning them into "good employers" as a matter 
of economic self-interest—the implication seems to be that there is no 
longer a need for unions to impose benevolent labor practices through 
mobilization and application of collective political power. Now it is 
suggested, and not just by traditional unions foes, that unions can and 
should instead concentrate their efforts on the implementation of such 
changes as economic restructuring, modernization, and flexibility, 
thereby finally taking on productive rather than merely distributive 
functions and moving from conflict to cooperation as their main new 
source of influence and organizational status.
Union reluctance to embrace tripartite cooperation on training as a 
central new industrial relations subject ultimately derives from its 
unclear implications for the role of unions and the structure of indus 
trial relations in general. In the following, I wish to argue that popular 
images of a harmonious "new industrial relations" based on common 
interests in high skills are dangerously simplistic—mixing truths and 
delusions, profound insights and business school rhetoric, in an almost 
perfect melange. The principal flaw here is a misconstrued relationship 
between productive cooperation and distributive conflict, or between
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cooperative policy and adversarial politics, suggesting that the benevo 
lent market pressures that give rise to "flexible specialization" signal 
the obsolescence of struggles over and for power. This is not just a mis 
reading of the evidence which, as will be illustrated in more detail, 
supports the old insight that conflict and cooperation not only do not 
preclude, but often in fact presuppose, each other. In addition, by 
implying that unions that care about productive concerns can be no 
more than agents of management-determined economic necessities, it 
also deters unions from constructive and creative rethinking of present, 
primarily distributional policies. The point I would like to make here is 
that one can fully agree with the proposition that unions should 
embrace skill formation as the centerpiece of a new, cooperative, and 
productivistic strategy, and at the same time insist on unions' need for 
a strong, independent power base giving them, just as in the past, a 
capacity to impose rules and obligations on employers that they would 
not voluntarily obey or accept. I will argue that the latter no less than 
the former is in fact an indispensable condition for a successful joint 
union-management strategy of industrial upskilling, even from the per 
spective of governments and employers. To do this, I begin with a brief 
general discussion of the relationship between unionism and the sphere 
of production.
Unions and the Supply Side
Mainstream unions in the postwar period have almost universally 
conceived of themselves as agents of distributive and redistributive 
politics, not of production. As such, they were reluctant to discuss their 
activities in terms of their impact on, or their contribution to, efficiency 
and productivity—and indeed usually such discussions were forced 
upon them by employers, conservative governments, and hostile aca 
demics. Nevertheless, the ideological self-stylization of unions as 
exclusively devoted to distributive concerns, 1 enabling them to decline 
direct responsibility for the well-being of national economies and indi 
vidual enterprises, was not only historically new but also factually 
incorrect. This was because, through their very concentration on distri 
bution, unions in the Keynesian-Fordist world of postwar Social
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Democracy contributed to economic performance both by more or less 
explicitly accepting managerial prerogative at the workplace, and by 
helping stabilize aggregate demand and increase the economy's pro 
pensity to spend at the macro level. In fact, unions' very power in dis 
tributive politics was conditional on the productive functions that their 
emphasis on distribution performed for the economy as a whole; and it 
was only because of these that unionism could come to be regarded by 
governments and employers as serving not only particularistic but also 
general interests.2
Today the Keynesian configuration is history (Skidelski 1979). For 
many reasons, the critical problems of the economy have migrated 
from the macro to the micro level, from the demand to the supply side, 
from the amount of output to its structure—and from distribution to 
production. In the process modern unionism has been thrown into dis 
array. Having comfortably located themselves in the distributive poli 
tics of macroeconomic demand management, unions are now faced 
with an apparently irreversible breakdown of the felicitous conver 
gence of particularistic interest representation and the promotion of the 
general interest that had in the Keynesian period sustained both their 
institutional position and the economy.
Why do unions typically have such a hard time asserting themselves 
in the changed political economy of the 1980s and 1990s? The supply 
side has been called the "kingdom of the bourgeoisie" (Przeworski and 
Wallerstein 1982, p. 59). At first glance, production requires above all 
cooperation and compliance, not conflict and resistance. Likewise, 
structural change and industrial adjustment have to be responsive to 
market conditions; if they are driven or constrained by distributional 
politics, the result is all-too-often disastrous. Moreover, unlike the 
demand side which is governed by politicians, the supply side and the 
microeconomics of individual enterprises are run by managers; while 
politicians are subject to a similar set of incentives and strategic imper 
atives as union leaders, and therefore are often sympathetic with them, 
managers are not. Also, the micro level is a world, not only of diverse 
conditions in different sectors and workplaces, but also of competitive 
market pressures. Unions that get entangled in these may lose their 
capacity to impose general rules on the economy as a whole, find their 
internal politics and their organizations fragmented by divergent mem 
ber interests, and run the risk of being torn apart by identification of
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their members with the competitive needs and interests of their 
employers.
Not that there was, even in an orthodox view, no place at all for 
unions in an economy driven from its supply side. Today unions are 
again and again invited to "cooperate" with management in restructur 
ing, in rebuilding competitiveness, improving quality, increasing pro 
ductivity, and other efforts. But typically such cooperation is not meant 
to entail much more than union leaders explaining to their membership 
why it is necessary to comply with whatever management determines 
is required—for example, more training and retraining. The rewards 
held out for such cooperation are improved economic performance, 
with an uncertain share of the benefits accruing to union members, and 
perhaps management absention from trying to break unions and run the 
workplace unilaterally. Indeed not a small number of union officials all 
over the western world today pursue cooperative policies for exactly 
these reasons, and for no others. Correspondingly, unions in stronger 
industries or with a more secure organizational base often prefer not to 
get involved in a kind of cooperation that seems to offer them essen 
tially no other role than that of subordinate agents of management- 
determined economic, or "strategic," necessities.
Drawing on training as my example, I argue that just as in the past 
on the demand side, there are today on the supply side numerous 
opportunities for unions to combine independent, powerful representa 
tion of member interests with a pursuit of general social and economic 
interests. Exploring such opportunities indeed requires cooperative 
policies and strategies. But the type of cooperation needed here is far 
from passive acceptance of managerial decisions or self-limitation of 
unions to the implementation of them. Quite to the contrary, forceful 
intervention in, and regulation of, managerial behavior are required, 
with unions potentially and eventually appropriating, through collec 
tive political action, a significant share of the responsibility for produc 
tive performance. This is so, and indeed cooperation is necessary in the 
sense that it is competitively superior to managerial unilateralism, 
because the supply side of a modern industrial economy is a kingdom 
of the bourgeoisie only on the surface. In reality, it is rather a magic 
kingdom full of paradoxes and contradictions, the most important of 
which is that the king cannot properly govern, either in his own interest 
or in that of his subjects, unless he is himself governed by these—a
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king who needs to be constrained by a powerful citizenry in order to be 
able to accomplish what he would like to accomplish; a king, as a pris 
oner of his passions, faces dilemmas that he can solve only if he is 
compelled to do so by others.
Skills and Effective Supply
Union involvement in skill formation may well be the successor in 
the post-Keynesian political economy to what wage formation was for 
unions under Keynesianism, being as important and performing the 
same functions for them. Understanding the politics and institutional 
dynamics of training constitutes a major step towards a theory of effec 
tive supply to succeed older theories of effective demand, and may help 
unions adjust their position in the political economy to new conditions 
and realities. In training as well as, before, in demand stabilization, the 
possibility for unions to perform a useful function for both their mem 
bers and the society at large derives from the fact that their oppo 
nents—capitalists or management—are confronted with vexing 
dilemmas between their collective long-term and their individual 
short-term interests. In the Keynesian world, this was the dilemma 
between the need for high and stable purchasing power and the desire 
to cut costs. The solution was cooperation between employers, forced 
upon them by unions through the exercise of collective power in indus 
trial conflict, and often also by governments through legal intervention. 
More specifically, unions imposed on employers a more or less uni 
form and rigid wage pattern, thereby taking wages out of competition 
and insuring investors against the downward spirals in purchasing 
power that may result from competitive cost-cutting. In this way, col 
lective action of workers created the stable and growing product mar 
kets that enterprises in the era of mass production needed to invest and 
grow.
In a market economy, training poses similar problems for employers 
on the supply side to that of aggregate demand stabilization on the 
demand side, and it offers similar opportunities to unions to build a 
base of independent power. What wage bargaining was for distribu 
tional unionism, training may become for unions working on and
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through the production side of the economy and making their peace 
with it: an opportunity for conflictual cooperation, or cooperation 
through conflict; for redistribution in the general interest; and for deep 
involvement of unions in the management of an advanced industrial 
economy and society. In short, this is because:
1. In certain growing but highly competitive product markets, a rich 
supply of skills, and especially of broad, experientially based general 
work skills, constitutes perhaps the most important source of competi 
tive advantage for firms.
2. The skills that are most needed in such markets are of a kind that 
can be generated only with the active involvement of employers. This 
is because such skills are most likely to be generated through work- 
based learning in close proximity to the work process, and clearly not 
in schools.
3. While the acquisition of today's critical skills requires the utiliza 
tion of workplaces for nonwork purposes, most employers, if left to 
their own devices, will not do enough for skill formation, in part 
because of individually unsolvable problems of calculating expected 
returns on investment, and in part because in an open labor market 
skills are, in an important sense, collective, or public, goods (Becker 
1975).
4. Unions, if properly supported by public policy, have the capacity 
to make employers train, and may well develop the motivation to do 
so.
I have elaborated these points elsewhere (Streeck 1989). For the 
present purpose, I would like to confine myself to a few selective 
observations.
The Relationship Between Modern Technology, 
Work Organization, and Skills
Modern technology is less than instructive with respect to the skills 
needed to operate it (Brodner 1990; OECD 1988). The reason is that 
microelectronic circuitry can support radically different patterns of 
work organization. Vastly increased capacities to process and transmit 
information allow for centralization of control and differentiation of 
tasks far beyond what has been possible only a decade ago. At the 
same time, they also enable organizations to delegate decisions to flex-
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ible subunits with integrated, overlapping functions, so as to respond 
better to more complex and specific demands from their environment.
Different patterns of work organization give rise to different skill 
needs. A centralized and functionally differentiated organization 
requires a small number of highly skilled employees located in staff- 
like departments remote from the actual production process, and a 
large number of unskilled or semiskilled operators with narrowly spe 
cialized tasks waiting to be eliminated by automation. By comparison, 
a decentralized and functionally integrated work organization will 
have short hierarchies and will require a relatively even distribution of 
skills.
Beliefs about a trend towards upgrading work in modern production 
systems, about urgent needs for improvements in initial and further 
training, about a "skill gap" in the workforce, or about skills as a cru 
cial resource for international competitiveness are all premised on the 
assumption that in the future, most productive work will be done in 
less centralized and less functionally differentiated organizations. To 
the extent that firms will be compelled to exploit the potential of 
microelectronic information technology for decentralizing and reinte 
grating work tasks, it is argued that they will have to rely on a large 
supply among their workforce of a combination of cognitive-technical, 
attitudinal, and social skills that together form the basis for what may 
be called "decentralized competence"—where competence means both 
the organizational autonomy and the individual ability of workers to 
make correct and responsible decisions embedded in and related to the 
context of the organization at large.
The Relationship Between Product Markets, 
Product Strategies, and Productive Flexibility
While the skill needs of employers using new technology depend on 
how employers choose to organize work, that choice, in turn, is related 
to the product market in which a firm operates. Decentralized compe 
tence seems to be particularly conducive to, or outright required for, 
small-batch production or customized production of goods or services 
designed to fit the specific needs of individual clients. This is because 
decentralized competence provides organizations with a high degree of 
internal flexibility in general and a capacity for fast retooling in panic-
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ular, i.e., for switching from one product, or batch of products, to 
another.
Producing a diverse and changing range of products at a high qual 
ity level requires not only a strong engineering capacity that allows for 
a high rate of product innovation. It also demands close interaction 
between the organization and its customers, as well as between differ 
ent organizational functions such as marketing and product engineer 
ing, or product engineering and production. For this to be possible, 
employees in different parts of the organization must be able to under 
stand each other's job, and sometimes to substitute for one another. 
That is, their qualifications must overlap (Gustavsen 1986). Moreover, 
rapid product change is facilitated by work groups integrating, like 
small firms, a wide range of tasks and thereby becoming more inde 
pendent from concurrent decisions or supporting activities of differen 
tiated, functionally specialized units. This calls for duplication of skills 
across organizational subunits. Productive flexibility thus necessitates 
redundant (i.e., overlapping or duplicated) organizational capacities 
that can be economically sustained only if other overheads, like quality 
control, supply management, or worker supervision, are cut—which 
again demands integration of previously separate, specialized tasks in 
front-line production work.
Overall, it appears that today's product markets place a premium on 
customization (Piore and Sabel 1984), and that firms that are flexible 
enough to engage in small-batch or customized production can com 
mand higher profit margins, are less vulnerable in their market posi 
tion, and are likely to enjoy more long-term stability. Ultimately, this is 
based on the experience that in the highly competitive 1970s and 1980s 
firms, or national economies, that were capable of offering more diver 
sified and customized products fared better than more traditional pro 
ducers of standardized mass products. There is some disagreement as 
to why this should have been the case, to what extent product markets 
have really changed, and how large the new markets for what has been 
called "diversified quality production" (Streeck 1991) actually are. 
What seems clear, however, is that the economic attraction for employ 
ers of small-batch or customized production is often conditional on the 
prevailing wage level in a given country or region—firms that can 
bring down their wages far enough may have the alternative to survive 
as mass producers. The problem is that in a more and more global
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economy, mass markets tend to be increasingly taken over by produc 
ers from newly industrializing countries where wages are so low that 
firms in old industrial countries may, for all kinds of reasons, find it 
impossible to compete.3
In addition, it seems that the distinction between mass and custom 
ized markets is more fluid than is often believed. Given the productive 
flexibilities made possible by information technology, especially in 
combination with a work organization that emphasizes decentralized 
competence, small-batch producers and customizers are often able to 
transform mass markets into markets for more customized products, as 
mass producers in the course of industrialization transformed craft 
markets into mass markets. This is because high productive flexibility 
makes it possible to narrow the cost differential between customized, 
or semicustomized, and mass production to a point where the (still) 
higher price of nonstandardized goods or services is compensated by 
their better match of the customer's individual needs. To the extent that 
advances in customized and semicustomized production methods 
make this possible, mass markets shrink and differentiated quality mar 
kets grow.
In sum, as product markets fragment, the market a firm serves 
becomes increasingly subject to "strategic choice." Simultaneously, as 
technologies become more undefined and malleable, the products that 
are produced with them, and the organization of work that surrounds 
them, are less determined than in the past by a technology's intrinsic 
properties; they, too, have to be strategically chosen. Given existing 
technologies and demand structures, a firm can in principle aspire to be 
either a quality-competitive producer of customized goods with a flexi 
ble, fluid, and decentralized work organization, employing highly 
skilled workers at a high wage, or an efficient price-competitive pro 
ducer of standardized goods with a centralized and formalized organi 
zational structure, unskilled labor, low wages, and high-wage 
dispersion (see Carnevale 1991; CSAW 1990).
The Institutional Sources of Skill Use 
and Skill Development
The long controversy on the direction of skill development under 
capitalism can now by and large be considered settled. Whether or not
Training and the New Industrial Relations 177
employers prefer de-skilled over skilled labor cannot, in Bravermanian 
fashion, be decided deductively and once and for all. The question can 
sensibly be answered only when placed in the context of wage-setting 
mechanisms, the regulation of employment contracts, patterns of work 
organization, styles of technology use, and firms' strategic product 
market decisions (Sorge and Warner 1988). Tbday managerial choices 
between downskilling and upskilling are clearly not driven by technol 
ogy as such; microelectronic circuitry can be used for cutting costs by 
eliminating skills and human intervention, as well as for increasing 
product quality and variety by enriching the productive capacities of 
well-trained workers. Downskilling presupposes, among other things, 
downward flexibility and wide dispersion of wages, enabling employ 
ers to adjust wages to relatively declining labor productivity, as well as 
high numerical flexibility of employment, permitting rapid adjustment 
of labor input to market fluctuations and making it unnecessary to pro 
vide for workers' internal redeployability through training. By compar 
ison, rigid and high wages, an egalitarian wage structure, limited 
access of firms to external labor markets, and limitations on the 
deployment of new technology for "rationalization"—by making it 
impossible for firms to be profitable in mass markets for standardized, 
price-competitive products and forcing them to try and serve differen 
tiated, quality-competitive markets—tend to forbid downskilling and 
instead induce firms to raise the skill level of their workforce.
The Importance and the Difficult Economics 
of Work-Based Learning
Consensus is growing that today's advanced work skills are best 
acquired at or near the workplace (for the United States, see OTA 
1990). Workplace-based training, where it is up to its new task, is quite 
different from traditional on-the-job training. Its task is to impart, for 
the mass of the workforce subject to easy, flexible hiring and firing, 
cheap, narrow, workplace-specific skills supplementing the general 
skills produced in public educational institutions. The growing need to 
use the workplace for training purposes is related to the fact that with 
fast-changing and highly flexible technology, and with fast product 
turnover, work routines can never become so established that execu 
tion can be neatly separated from conception. Work in such environ-
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ments amounts to continuous experimentation with, and permanent 
"debugging" of, new processes and machine setups. On the part of 
operators, this requires, in addition to high cognitive skills (literacy 
and numeracy), an intuitive feel for the work that can only be gained 
from experience, as well as a range of motivational, attitudinal, and 
social skills that cannot be adequately developed outside "real work" 
production situations with their pressures and constraints. This is one 
reason why countries like Japan and Germany, where most industrial 
skill formation takes place in work settings, are so advantaged by their 
human capital endowment. Put in more general terms, the skills 
required for advanced industrial competitiveness are most likely to be 
available where it is possible to transform the workplace into a place of 
learning in addition to a place of work (i.e., to place a large share of the 
training burden on firms and managements and make them accept the 
utilization of the enterprise not just for production but also for skill for 
mation).
Mainstream labor economics proceeds from the seminal insight that 
in an open labor market, returns on investment in general skills cannot 
be internalized by individual firms since such skills are transferable 
from one employer to another. This is why such skills will not be pro 
duced unless the costs are borne by the worker as an individual or as a 
taxpayer (i.e., in the latter case, by the general public). Keeping expen 
diture on and responsibilities for general and specific skills apart is 
greatly simplified if general skills are taught outside the workplace in 
specialized training organizations—schools—while specific skills are 
generated at the workplace. To the extent that the workplace is used to 
produce general skills, which is not likely to be typical, workers must 
be willing to accept a pay cut equivalent to the cost of the general train 
ing they receive, or the government must reimburse employers for their 
expenses. The first solution presupposes that general training can 
indeed be paid for out of a share of a worker's wage during the training 
period; both assume that the costs and returns of training at the work 
place can be reliably established.
All these assumptions have come under heavy pressure. As has been 
pointed out, there is for a variety of reasons a fundamental school fail 
ure with respect to the formation of general work skills. As a result, to 
the extent that an economy depends for its competitiveness on high 
skills, a growing share of its general training effort has to be carried out
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at its workplaces. Typically, the costs of such training are high and can 
be recovered by individual employers only over a long period far 
exceeding the time of training, and with some reasonable commitment 
by workers not to move to another employer. The benefits of work 
place training for employers inevitably become vulnerable to being 
pirated by competitors. Unlike previous types of market failure, this 
problem cannot be remedied by unilateral public provision, since that 
fails to produce the desired type of skills.
Moreover, the exact costs of workplace training defy conventional 
accounting and can therefore not easily be reimbursed. Workplace 
learning is optimally effective in a group-based or team-centered work 
organization that is more open and "porous" than what traditional 
industrial engineering prescribes. While this may in one sense increase 
costs, or at least make costs less easy to detect, it may at the same time 
engender quality improvements and productivity increases. To this 
extent, workplace training may pay for itself. In any case, an offer by 
the public sector to pay employers for general training at the workplace 
is likely to encourage all kinds of "creative accounting." Also, employ 
ers may feel induced to rely on more traditional, classroom-style train 
ing, the costs of which are easier to establish. The inevitable 
conclusion is that adequate utilization of the workplace as a learning 
site requires that employers pay a significant share of the costs of gen 
eral training.
The difficult economics of workplace training require public inter 
vention of a kind that makes unilateral provision look simple by com 
parison. The assumption by employers of responsibility for training in 
workplace-unspecific skills, as appears optimal for competitive perfor 
mance, demands effective imposition of social obligations to train, as 
a substitute for insufficient individual market incentives and as a way 
of taking training costs out of competition. In open labor markets, 
employers competing with each other will always be under a tempta 
tion to "cheat" by not investing in general training and hiring skilled 
workers from their competitors. What is more, the mere prospect that 
others may behave in this way is likely to deter employers from train 
ing even if the result will be a general skill shortage. Societies that 
have at their disposal institutional or cultural mechanisms by which to 
oblige firms to cooperate in training are likely to enjoy competitive 
advantages as they will be able to protect their firms from the dysfunc-
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tional consequences of market-rational behavior for the production of 
skills as collective goods. The governance of workplace training, like 
that of workplace relations and the employment contract in general, is 
best assigned to legally supported and facilitated joint regulation 
between management and labor at the point of production. The same 
reasons that speak for collective bargaining as an alternative to both 
managerial unilateralism and direct government intervention in the 
workplace also speak for an orderly sharing of responsibility for gov 
erning the workplace as a place of learning.
Union Policies on Training: From 
Consumption to Investment
Unions in advanced industrial countries differ widely in their atti 
tudes towards training. The spectrum extends from outright hostility 
among radical unions of unskilled workers (as in parts of the Commu 
nist French CGT), to indifferent lip service to the idea of shared, public 
responsibility for skill upgrading; and to long-standing support for, and 
involvement in, initial and continuous training (e.g., in Denmark or 
Germany). However, even where unions have accepted training as a 
current concern, there usually is still a long way to embracing it as a 
core subject of union strategy.
This is not only because there is a temptation for unions that support 
training to do so in the traditional framework of distributive politics, 
conceiving of training as a basically consumptive nonwage benefit. 
More important, training tends to be regarded by many unionists as an 
investment employers make out of economic self-interest, as required 
by technology and product market conditions. To this, the principal 
modus operand! of unionism—the creation of entitlements for work 
ers—does not seem to apply. As long as it is assumed that "employers 
know what they are doing" (i.e., that product market signals are suffi 
ciently instructive for employers to "do what is needed" on training), 
there is simply no reason for unions as unions to expend scarce bar 
gaining power on making employers train. For this to make sense, 
union confidence in employers' ability to act with economic rationality 
must be less than complete. An active union policy on training, in other 
words, presupposes that the limited capacities of the self-proclaimed
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king of the supply side to act in his own interest are thoroughly appre 
ciated.4
A positive union policy on training may also take off from the 
insight that advanced skills require investment not just by employers 
but also by workers, and that such investment is indeed more likely if 
supported by negotiated entitlements—albeit, of course, to invest 
rather than consume. More generally, the opening for unions becoming 
agents of a more-than-distributive training policy lies in the incom 
pleteness, as it were, of the human resource investment functions of 
both employers and workers—being due to a lack of resources on the 
part of the latter, and the inherent limits of rational return-on-invest- 
ment calculations for the provision of work-based training in high, 
broad, experiential skills on the part of the former. Here as elsewhere, 
gaps in the instructive capacity of product markets and technology 
have to be filled, and conflicts between individual and collective ratio 
nality overcome, by institutional rules and social norms enabling ratio 
nal economic actors to act in their rational economic interest
Union Intervention in Training
Independent union intervention in cooperative training and human 
resource policies must combine the imposition of institutional con 
straints on managements that foreclose low-skill, low-wage paths of 
industrial adjustment, with the creation of institutional opportunities 
for managements to pursue successfully a high-skill and high-wage 
policy. Constraints and opportunities must be built simultaneously; 
while the former without the latter suffocates economic performance, 
the latter without the former results in a dual economy with widely 
divergent conditions and performance levels, and very likely an under- 
utilization of productive opportunities due to unchecked temptations 
for employers to defect from more demanding high-skill and high- 
wage production patterns.
How specifically unions can deploy their political and organiza 
tional capacities to build the constraints and opportunities required to 
make employers train, and what those constraints and opportunities 
could be in a given economic and political setting, depends on the situ-
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ation and, of course, the creativity of the actors involved.5 What can 
generally be said is that cooperation on training is not only compatible 
with conflict, but indeed may require a conflictual capability of unions 
for its success. Examples where rigorous pursuit of, in part quite tradi 
tional, union objectives—if necessary against employer resistance— 
complements and makes effective a cooperative strategy on training 
are:6
1. Defense of high wages and a relatively flat wage structure, so as 
to foreclose the option of low-wage, low-skill employment. High and 
downwardly rigid wages force employers to raise the productivity of 
their workers to match the given price of their labor, rather than 
depress wages to the level of workers' given marginal productivities. 
The more flexible the wage, the lower the interest of employers in 
training. The higher the wage spread, the more selective employers' 
training investment will be.7 Given the inherent indeterminacy of skill 
needs and the benefits of a rich skill environment for advanced com 
petitiveness, highly selective and targeted human resource investment 
is, almost by definition, likely to be economically suboptimal.
2. Insistence on obligatory, standardized workplace training curric 
ula that firms have to follow if they want to train for a particular skill or 
occupation. These curricula must be broadly defined, so as to prevent 
overspecialization and provide the ground for future, further training. 
Standardized curricula also serve the important function of enabling 
workers to quit and carry their skills with them. This ability constitutes 
a major source of union and worker power that can be defended only if 
training regimes are centralized.8 Moreover, by barring employers 
from generating skills that are too workplace-specific, generally bind 
ing curricula provide the constraint as well as the opportunity to pro 
duce exactly the kind of broad, polyvalent skills that they need most.
3. Use of the union workplace organization, or whatever structure of 
worker representation may exist at the workplace, to ensure that train 
ing follows the standardized curriculum and neither becomes too 
workplace-specific nor is absorbed in productive work. Without an 
effective, on-the-ground enforcement mechanism, unions and workers 
cannot live with a high differential between training and skilled wages. 
Effective union supervision of workplace training, ensuring that it 
remains just that, is an important safeguard against the temptation for
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management to extract more productive work from trainees, thereby 
neglecting their firm's own longer-term interests.
4. Defense, or extension, of legal and other provisions that protect 
employment continuity and stability. Employers who can satisfy their 
skill needs and change the skill composition of their workforce by fir 
ing old and hiring new workers will have less incentive to train than 
employers who face fewer employment rigidities. An economy where 
employers have the option of turning to the external labor market for 
skills, instead of training or retraining their existing workforce, will 
tend to suffer from a general skill deficit This is so not least since the 
expectation on the part of employers that their competitors will seek 
external rather than internal adjustment constitutes a strong disincen 
tive to train, even in periods of obvious skill shortages and even for 
firms that feel severely constrained by these.
5. Imposition of a flat wage regime with the few wage grades and 
job classifications, which rewards knowledge rather than activities per 
formed. Wage structures of this kind allow for easy redeployment of 
workers, which affords firms a degree of internal flexibility that makes 
the constraints of external employment rigidity bearable. Even more 
important, with the right kind of pay system workers will not only be 
willing to acquire skills but will also accept internal mobility—in part 
because it helps them learn.9
6. Active pursuit, as an objective in its own right, of an anti-Tay- 
lorist policy of work organization, aimed at imposing on employers 
negotiated obligations to move towards broad job descriptions, a low 
division of labor, long work cycles, and reintegration of tasks. In addi 
tion to improving working conditions, such a policy contributes to 
making low-skilled labor unusable by eliminating the type of jobs for 
which it was in the past typically hired. Coupled with external employ 
ment rigidities and internal employment flexibility, de-Taylorization of 
work organization thus constrains as well as induces employers to 
invest in training. 10
7. Negotiation of training and retraining plans with employers, set 
ting a mutually agreed human resource policy for enterprises, regions, 
or industries. Such agreements would have to create enforceable enti 
tlements for workers to be trained and retrained at the workplace on a 
current basis, not just in emergencies, and under general as well as 
workplace-unspecific curricula. Given that firms lack instructive eco-
184 Training and the New Industrial Relations
nomic criteria as to what kind of skills and how many they need; and 
given the advantages quality-competitive firms, industries, and regions 
derive from a rich supply of excess skills, there will be ample space to 
accommodate egalitarian demands for underendowed groups in the 
workforce to be included in training. In fact, it will be through negoti 
ated entitlements to learn at work that unions will contribute most to 
the broad and unspecific skill formation that firms in demanding mar 
kets need but find so hard to generate on their own.
A Strategic Perspective?
Unions today have a unique chance to return in a productive way to 
their craft heritage (Piore 1986). Craft unions were producers of skills 
as well as sellers. Up to the present day, there are industries in the 
United States where high standards of training at the workplace, and 
indeed the very provision of such training, depend on strong craft 
union presence and disappear with the decline of unionization.
But it is also true that in their distributional battles with Braverma- 
nian employers, craft unions often redefined skill in terms of exclusive 
rights of their members to narrowly demarcated jobs. 11 In that process, 
unions' contribution to the production of skills began to take second 
place to the defense of craft prerogatives. Where craft unionism, or 
important elements of it, survived, it all-too-often deteriorated, under 
the pressure of employers' de-skilling strategies, into a reactive 
defense of status and privilege. In such cases training lost its produc- 
tivist meanings: at the worst, it became reserved for small groups of 
carefully selected apprentices, with restricted access serving to main 
tain a high differential between skilled and unskilled wages, and turned 
into an increasingly well-paid, waiting period for accession to the labor 
aristocracy, without much of a meaningful curriculum. 12 This, in turn, 
made it easier for employers to attack unions as special interest groups 
impeding both industrial progress and fair access to good jobs. De- 
unionization and the destruction of apprenticeship can thus be pre 
sented by employers as efficient as well as equitable.
In a perverse alliance, then, industrial employers bent on de-skilling 
and craft unions narrowly representing only their members, often
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enough played into each other's hands. The dismal results were unhap 
pily reinforced when industrial unionism appeared and found in de- 
skilling the promise of a homogeneous workforce easy to organize in 
inclusive unions around distributional concerns and without entangle 
ment in the sphere of production. This configuration prepared the 
ground for the postwar compromise between capital and labor, in 
which the latter agreed to leave production to management and accom 
plish its egalitarian objectives through distributive collective bargain 
ing and social policy. With the ascent of Fordism, training was no 
longer much of a concern.
There is nothing in the present return of skills onto the industrial 
relations agenda that would compel unions to give up the egalitarian 
values they inherited from industrial unionism. In fact, in a world in 
which redundant skills may be necessary for competitive economic 
success, the two traditions of unionism may now be able to converge in 
a policy of negotiated general upskilling, conducted and enforced in 
cooperative conflict with employers and in creative partnership with 
governments, and indeed much facilitated by the internal organiza 
tional dynamics of industrial unionism. Who will be king on the supply 
side is far from being a foregone conclusion.
NOTES
*I am grateful to Joel Rogers for constructive comment. The usual disclaimers apply.
1. In reality, of course, the matter was more complicated. In all western countries in the post 
war period, there were sporadic demands by unions for involvement in managerial decisions. 
Mainstream unionists typically had a hard time deciding if these were a right-wing sellout to cap 
ital, or a Communist attack on the market economy and, with it, free collective bargaining. The 
mainstream Nur-Gewerkschqfter, to use Marx's term, hated both. To keep his distance from the 
inscrutable ambivalence and the puzzling political contradictions of productivism, right or left, he 
would insist that the union's proper concern was fundamentally different from management's; that 
the two were confounded only at the union's and, perhaps, the economy's and democracy's peril; 
and that while management was in charge of efficiency, or economic issues, the union was to look 
after equity, or the social questions. Coexisting with this strand of unionism were other, older stra 
tegic orientations that sometimes looked "cooperative," or "yellow," and sometimes "radical," or 
"red." Their difference from mainstream centrism was that they sought an active role for unions in 
the efficient organization of production. In some countries, these in fact became the mainstream: 
the "left" version in Sweden, the "right" version in Japan, and a peculiar blend of the two in Ger 
many (viz. that chameleon-like institution, codetermination). The matter is made even more con 
fusing by the fact that rhetoric and behavior did not always coincide, so that one found, for 
example, distribution-minded centrists supporting wage moderation in the name of economic 
growth.
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2. For the workplace, Freeman and Medoff (1984) have produced econometric evidence that 
unions, even in the United States and in contradiction of received wisdom, increase productivity. 
For more recent confirmation, see Mishel and Voos (1991).
3. Firms in high-wage areas that do not want, or are unable, to develop productive flexibility 
may also, of course, relocate to low-wage countries.
4. Again, this does not appear to be a clear-cut left-right issue. Confidence in the superior eco 
nomic wisdom of owners and managers can be found both among "cooperative" unionists for 
whom cooperation consists of rallying their members behind management-defined economic 
inevitabilities, and among "arms-length," "adversarial" opponents of cooperation who want to 
confine unions exclusively to extracting distributive concessions. The latter position implies that 
the economic basis for such concessions can be safely produced and reproduced without union 
"involvement," i.e., by management acting on its own.
5. A different but related question that I will not address here is how unions with weak or 
declining organizational capacities, for example in the United States, can use involvement in skill 
formation to build or protect such capacities. Much depends in this respect on whether employers, 
and perhaps the state, perceive existing skill deficits as so critical, and their own means to deal 
with them as so limited, that they are willing to pay a political price to whoever may be able and 
willing to help them out. This would imply that if unions could come up with an effective contri 
bution to skill formation that only they can make (or that they can make better than others), they 
could in principle "sell" that contribution in the same way and for the same kind of returns as they 
have in the past sold their more traditional "product"—peace at the workplace. As Joel Rogers 
reminds me, unions thrive if their policies satisfy three conditions: they must be advantageous to 
their members and possible members; they must give employers something that they want, but 
cannot get on their own; and they must make a visible contribution to the "common good." Pro 
motion of effective skill formation, especially at the workplace, may very well do all of the above.
6. As will easily be recognized, my list draws in large measure on the German experience 
(Hilton 1991; Lane 1989; Streeck et al. 1987). However, this is only because I happen to know 
that experience better than others. To the extent that there may be lessons from the German case 
for other countries, these would consist of a number of general principles rather than concrete 
institutional cookbook recipes. I believe that most of those principles have to do with the insuffi 
ciency of a market mode of skill formation; the crucial importance of using the workplace as a 
place of learning; the dangers of off-loading training to the state; the need, resulting from this, for 
mechanisms generating social obligations for employers to train, thereby transcending the limits 
of a liberal-voluntaristic training regime; and the potentially extremely productive role unions can 
play in generating such obligations. On the basis of what I think I have learned from the German 
case, I would be inclined to predict that where such principles are neglected, skill formation and 
advanced industrial competitiveness will lag behind German (and Japanese) standards.
7. Alow wage spread at a high overall wage level induces employers to distribute their human 
resource investment more evenly. This presupposes relatively low training wages, especially for 
young people—which may or may not be difficult to concede for unions. The narrower the gap 
between training wages and skilled wages, the larger the productive component of a trainee's 
activities at the workplace, as distinguished from its investive, training component
8. While this might appear alien in an American context, it is not so at all. Not long ago 
apprenticeships were a major mechanism of skill formation in the United States. Their rapid 
decline in the recent past derives from the combined effects of de-industrialization, declining real 
wages, and de-unionization, not from a basic incompatibility of externally regulated and stan 
dardized workplace-based training with the American culture.
9. While a low wage spread above a high wage floor creates an incentive for employers to 
train, it may constitute a disincentive for workers to learn. The latter seems to have been one of
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the unanticipated consequences of Swedish "solidary wage policy." Unions taking an active role 
in skill formation will have to search for a "saddle point" where wage differentials are low enough 
for employers to be willing to provide training to the workforce at large, and high enough for 
workers to justify the effort of undergoing training. (To make remaining wage differentials effec 
tive with respect to training, they should to the greatest possible extent be based on knowledge.) 
One would expect that the ideal level of wage differentiation should be found somewhere between 
the extremely high American and the extremely low Swedish wage spread.
10. To advance more comprehensive job demarcations as well as facilitate the move towards 
an ability-based payment system, unions could negotiate higher wages for workers who have 
undergone training, regardless of whether or not their additional qualifications are actually used. 
This will be a strong incentive for managements to reorganize work in such a way that the new 
skills can in fact be utilized—which will in turn make it easier for unions to push for a less frag 
mented work organization. Being forced to use newly generated qualifications by reorganizing 
work so as to accommodate them, managements will be educated about the possibilities and 
advantages of high-wage and high-skill production, and in this way unions may provide further 
training to management in their own long-term interests.
11. That is, where they were given the chance to do so, especially in the Anglo-Saxon coun 
tries. For a variety of reasons, the development was quite different in Germany and Scandinavia. 
Still, the differences are gradual and not categoric, and at least historically the dynamic described 
here was present everywhere.
12. This was the case particularly in Britain where apprenticeship typically deteriorated into 
"lime served," at declining pay differentials between skilled workers and apprentices. As a result 
it almost completely disappeared.
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